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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. A general statement. 
The doctrine of the Trinity is the result of a desire 
to determine the true relation of Jesus Christ and the Holy 
Spirit to God the Father. Speculation on this problem 
started at a very early time in Christian thought, but, 
from the very first, religious experience was more of a 
factor in such speculation than was the use of reason.1 The 
doctrine was formulated by men of great intellect and of 
great piety. Because of the varied emphases which came out 
of a varied religious and intellectual background, there 
has been considerable variation in describing the Trinity. 
i. Definition of terms. 
The term 11 Trinity11 means a union of three persons or 
modes in one Godhead. 2 It will be shown later that this idea 
did not originate with Christianity; but it has had its most 
significant development in Christian thought. The most wide-
ly accepted definition of the Trinity is that contained in 
the orthodox conception. 
1. Fulton, Art.(l924), 458b. 
2. Webster, NCD, 909. 
2. 
The term "orthodox view" will be used frequently in this 
dissertation. The writer will always mean by this term the 
view of the Trinity which was adopted in the Council of Nicea 
in 325 and clarified by the Second Ecumenical Council, which 
met at Constantinople in 381. It was further clarified by 
the writings of Augustine . In this view of the Trinity the 
union of the three persons in one Godhead is such that all 
three are one God as substance, but three persons or hypo-
1 
stases as to individuality. There is no subordination 
among the persons. .All are equal to each other and to the 
whole. 
The "subordination" theory is taken to mean the posi-
tion in which the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit are 
considered subordinate to the person of the Father. This 
is a position which the proponents of the orthodox view tried 
hard to avoid. It has been a difficult problem for Christian 
thinkers throughout the whole develppment of trinitarian 
thought. 
The view of the Trinity which will receive special 
consideration in this dissertation is cal led the 11 modal-
istic11 view. The main tenet of this view is that the 
Trinity is composed of three modes or manifestations of the 
one God. The oneness of God is emphasized so as to elimi-
nate any idea of division in the Godhead. Some of its 
1. Webster, NCD, 909. 
J. 
proponents held that it was a ctually God the Fa ther 1.-rho ap-
peared on earth as the Son. 
The 11 modalistic 11 view is often referred to as the 
11 Sabellian 11 posit i on, as one f orm of it l¥as first popular-
ized by Sab ellius. The term 11 modalism, 11 or the 11 modalistic 
vie1r-1, 11 vtTill be used mostly throughout t h is clissert a tion , hov.r-
ever, because the d.evelopment of the idea in later years, al-
though remaining loyal to the main position of Sab ellius, 
took on certain cha racteristics which are contrary to tha t 
posit i on. The t erm "modal ism 11 is broa d enough to incluo.e the 
position of Sabellius and its l a ter mod.ifications as vJell. 1 
ii. The relation of modalism to orthodoxy. 
Modalism 1r1as 1-ridely accepted for a vfhile. It -v;as the 
official teach ing of the Roman ~nurch for nearly a genera-
tion.2 Its opponents succeeded in having it declared hereti-
cal and orthodox leaders finally pushed it into the bacJ"-ground. 
It has cont i nued to appeal to many Christian think ers, however, 
ancl. has had some outst and ing proponents. 
The orthoo.ox vie1r-1 has continued to be the most -v;idely 
accepted position on the Trinity. It became firmly estab-
lished as the Roman Catholic position and has had the author-
ity of tha t church behind it. It was accepted as ,a true doc-
trine by the Protestant reformers, who accepted it as a mystery 
1-rhich is to be received upon authority, because it was 
l. All of these t e rms v-rill be developed more fully in later 
sections. 
2. Harnack, Art.(l910), 458b. 
believed that the Bible teach es it. 1 Modalism is becoming 
more and more of a challenge to the orthodox position, how-
ever, a s modern Christians a re o.emanding a more reasonable 
explanation of the Trinity. 
2. Purp ose of the dissertation. 
The purpose of the dissertation is threefold: 
i. To investigate the positions of the early 
Chri s t i an ~frri tings concerning the Trinity . 
4. 
A survey of tri~itarian thought, from its beginning through 
Thomas Aquinas, will be presented to show the vari ous develop-
ments in this thought. The investigation will be to deter-
mi ne 'tvhether t h e thought of the early Christians actually 
led to what came t o b e the orthodox view, or if it might 
just as well have ended in the modalistic view of the Trinity. 
Influences such as biblicism and ecclesiasticism will be 
cons i d. ered to determin e the role they played in the format ion 
of t he doctrine. 
ii. To consider some developments in modalistic 
thought. 
A second purpose of the dissertation is to consider 
s ome of the outstanding developments in modalistic thought. 
It -vrill bot .)be possible to consider all of the thought along 
this line in the history of doctrine, but certa in outstanding 
expressi ons '·.rill be consio_ered to determine the main lines. 
1 • B rm·m , TMT , 16. 
5. 
which modalism has taken. Particular attention will be given 
to determine whether or not modalism presents a rational and 
empirical conception of the Trinity. 
iii. To present a rational and empirical 
view of the Trinity. 
A third purpose of the dissertation is to present a 
view of the Trinity l'tThich is both rational and empirical. 
Aft er considering the various conceptions connected with both 
the orthodox and the modalistic views a view of the Trinity 
will be presented to try to satisfy the requirements both of 
religious experience and of reason. 
3. Method. 
To present a clear picture of some of the developments 
of modalism it will be necessary to cover a long period of 
Christian history and to deal with a number of men. To do 
this it will be important to use the following approaches 
as the method for obtaining the desired ends of this disser-
tation. 
i. Use of historical background. 
·To understand any view it is necessary to know the back-
ground out of l'Thich it developed. The first chapter of the 
dissertation is largely a historical background to show the 
development of trinitarian thought as a whole through ~he 
time in 1-·rhich orthodoxy became established. In dealing with 
6. 
the thought of individual men, in the later chapters, a 
historical background is given for each man to show some of 
the inf luences which were instrumental in determining hie 
ideas. It is easier to understand a man 1 s position if we 
kno"t,T something about the influences which helped to develop 
that position. 
ii. Use of theories of religious knowledge. 
Part of the purpose of the dissertation is to discover 
whether or not modalism is a rational and empirical view of 
the 'Trinity. To accomplish this it will be necessary to 
knov-T something about the approach to religious knowledge of 
each man considered. A person who puts great faith in spe-
cial, divine revelation will be drawn to different conclu-
sions than one who stresses the importance of human reason. 
Some of the men were more greatly affected in this way than 
others and "tvill receive more attention in this regard. 
iii. Consideration of some outstanding modalistic 
vie1vs. 
It would be impossible to present everything that has 
been said ab out the modalistic view of the Trinity. Only a 
fe"t-T of the outstanding proponents of this view "¥Till be pre-
sented to show the main developments. The men chosen all 
have distinctly individual approaches which add to the modal-
istic conception as a whole. By considering the views of 
?. 
these men i'll'e can gain a greater appreciation of the possibi-
lities of modalism in explaining the Trinity. 
iv. Use of thought concerning each per son of 
the Trinity. 
As far as possible the thought of each man considered 
will include h is thought concerning each of the persons or 
modes of the Trinity. In most cases it is important to know 
what a man thinks about the individual persons to understand 
fully his view of the Trinity. The person of· the Son is es-
pecially important in this regard. The question of subordi-
nation among the persons in the Trinity v-rill receive consider-
able attention. 
4. A statement of previous work done on this problem. 
There is a great deal of information regarding the Trinity 
which reflects the thinking of all ages of Christian history. 
There is very little, however, that deals specifically with 
the question of the modalistic conception of the Trinity. 
Sabellianism is often mentioned but there have been few a t-
tempts to dev~lop the idea and to present it as a definite 
view of the Trinity. 
There are two sources '\'ll'hich do g!:v.e ·.o_onstderable help in 
this regard, however. One is an article written by F. E. D. 
Schleiermacher entitled, 11 0n the Discrepancy Between the 
Sabellian and Athan4Sian Method of Representing the Doctrine 
of the Trinity in the Godhead." This article contains much 
8. 
information regarding the early developments in modalism and 
presents a modified Sabellianism as Schleiermacher 1 s own view. 
This article will be referred to frequently in presenting 
Schleiermacher 1s doctrine of the Trinity. The second of the 
two sources is a lecture delivered by Prof. William Adams 
Brown before the Alumni Association of the Union Theological 
Seminary in New York City on Y~y 15, 1906. It is entitled, 
11 The Trinity and Modern Thought. 11 'Whereas Schleiermacher 1 s 
article dealt mainly with the early modalistic thought regard-
ing the Trinity, Prof. Brol'm 1 s lecture deals with the rela-
tion of modalism to modern thought. 
Schleiermacher stated that the consideration of Sabel-
lianism had been sadly neglected before his time.l It seems 
also to have been largely neglected since his time, too. 
There have been some expressions of modalism but very little 
real support for it. 
1. Schleiermacher, Art.(April 1835), 330. 
9. 
CHAPTER I 
THE EARLY DEVELOP11ENT OF TRINITARIANISM. 
To understand the full significance of the Trinity it 
is necessary to start at the very beginning of trinitarian 
thought and to consider the various influences and develop-
mentis 't'IThich brought it to the position it no"Vl holds. This 
development will be presented largely as an historical ap-
p roach, 1<1ith very little criticism or comment by the '\•Triter. 
It will be impossible to include a full coverage of each man 
considered. The purpose is to bring out only enough of the 
thought of each man to ascertain his position on the vital 
questions regarding the ~rinity. The main points to be con-
sidered in each man are his stand on the orthodox position, 
subordinationism, and modalism. Subortdinationism is not 
really a separate conception -of the Trinity but it is very 
important in the refutation of the strict orthodox view. 
Some of the men did not advocate any one view but were merely 
expounding their ideas regarding Jesus and His relation to 
God the Father. 
10. 
1. Some possible non-Christian influences. 
i. Possible pagan influences. 
It is impossible to know what effect other trinitarian 
conceptions had on Christianity but it is important to under-
stand that the idea was not altogether original. In Indian 
religion vre meet ·Kith the trinitarian group of Brahma, Siva, 
and Visnu. In Egyptian religion we find the grouping of 
Osiris, Isis, and Horus, constituting a divine family. In 
Nee-Platonism v.re find the view of the Supreme or Ultimate 
Reality. The primary or original Realities are triadically 
represented as the Good or the One, the Intelligence or the 
One, and World-Soul or the One and Many.l 
ii. Possible Old Testament influences. 
The que stion arises as to whether there was any antici-
pation of the doctrine of the Trinity in the Old Testament. 
There have been efforts ' to find such an allusion in the 
plural form of the pronoun which the Deity uses in several 
instanc es in referring to Himself, such as, 11 Let us make 
man in our image. 11 2 Knudson is right in saying that such 
references -are either a plural of majesty or, more probably, 
a reference to the court of heaven.3 This court was made 
up of angels who were ministers of God and carried out his 
4 purposes. Apart from God they had no will ana no purpose. 
1. Fulton, Art.(l921), 458. 
2. Genesis 1:26. 
3. Knudson, RTOT, 76. 
4. Knudson, RTOT, 208. 
11. 
Other distinctions within the Godhead are found in such 
expre s sions as the 11 Angel of Yahweh, u!: the 11 Name of Yah'\veh, n?. 
and the 11 Glory of Yahweh. 11 3 It is difficult to determine 
whether these conceptions represent a true hypostasizing 
tendency and how far a mere figurative personification of 
certain aspects or manifestations of the Divine Being. 
Sometimes they seem to be clearly distinguished from Yahweh 
himself, but not consistently so. If they did imply any 
hypo s tatic distinction the idea was not developed. 
There are three other conceptions that made a much deeper 
impression on Jewish and Christian thought. These are the 
"Spirit of God, 11 the 11 t~ord of God, 11 and the "Wisdom of God. 11 
The Spirit of God is mentioned in Haggai, where we read: 
11 And my Spirit abode among you: fear not. 11 4 Zechariah says, 
11 Not by might, nor by pow·er, but by my Spirit, saith Jehovah 
of hosts. 11 5 The "Word of God 11 and the 11 Wisdom of God" re-
ceive similar treatment. · The 11 i'i'isdom of God" is more per-
sonified than are the others in such passages as: 11 Jehova.h 
possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works 
of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, 
before the earth was. 116 The book of Proverbs has several 
such passages, which c ertainly come close to describing Wis-
dom .. as a real hypostasis. The idea was not developed, 
1. Genesis 16:11 
2. Psalm 20:1 
4. Haggai 2:5 
5. Zechariah 4:6 
3. Isaiah 40:5 6. Proverbs 8:22-23 
12. 
however, and the Jewish God remained a unity. The idea of 
Wisdom as expressed in Proverbs has a very similar content 
to the gnostic idea of the logos. 
The Old Testament could hardly be expected to furnish 
the doctrine of the Trinity as it is held in Christian 
thought. Fulton goes as far as one can in saying: 
It may be allowed that the Old Testament ideas 
of the Word of God and Wisdom of God are adum-
brations of the doctrine, as recognizing the 
truth of a vrrious self-revealing activity in 
the one God. 
2. New Testament teaching on the Trinity. 
In considering the New Testament teaching regarding 
the Trinity more pointed comments will be made than in other 
parts of the chapter. This is to develop a definite atti-
tude regarding the New Testament t eaching on this particular 
subject. It will be pointed out that the New Testament does 
not give us a real doctrine of the Trinity; but is rather a 
collection of writings expressing the various conceptions of 
the New Testament writers regardi ng the relations of Jesus 
Christ to God the Father. These expressions give ample wit-
ness to the religious experience from which the doctrine 
springs; 2 but they should not be used as authority for any 
particular conception of the Trinity, as they do not consis-
tently support any one conception. An understanding of the 
nature of such New· Testament teaching is important because 
1. Fulton, Art.(l921), 458b. 2. Fulton, Art.(l921), 458b. 
l.3. 
some later writers used quotations from the New Testament as 
authority for their points of view. 
The earliest, and probably the most important, reference 
of trinitarian expression in the New Testament is found in 
Paul '1 s Second Letter to the Corinthians in the form of his 
apostolic benediction. 1 He wrote, "The grace of the Lord 
Jesus Christ, and the love of God and the communion of the 
Holy Spirit be with you all. 112 It is significant the.t less 
than thirty years after the death of Christ His name, and 
the name of the Holy Spirit, could be employed in conjunc-
tion with the name of God Himself;.3 but the passage does 
nothing to decide betw·een the orthodox, the subordinationist, 
and the modalistic views of the Trinity. It is rather an 
expression of the devotion to Jesus and the Holy Spirit 
which came very early in Christian experience. The baptis-
mal formula, 't>rhich came somew·hat later in Matthew, is the 
same sort of expression.4 But althqugh the Holy Spirit is 
included along with the Father and the Son in the apostolic 
benediction it seems clear that Paul identified the Holy 
Spirit with Christ, or with the Spirit of Christ, in such a 
way that it would be more accurate to describe him as a 
binitarian than as a trinitarian.5 
1. Fulton, Art.(l921), 458b. 4. Matt. 28:19. 
2. II Cor~ 1.3:14. 
3. Fulton, Art.(l921), 458b. 
5. II Cor . .3:17 
There are many other references in the New Testament 
l'lhich deal more directly vJi th the relation of Jesus to God 
the Father. Some of these expressions seem to indicate the 
real equality of the two as claimed by advocates of the 
orthodox view. John records the following as words of Jesus: 
11 He that hath seen me hath seen the Father. 111 Without bring-
ing the problem of textual criticism into the matter we can 
still say that this is not a conclusive argument for the 
orthodox view, as Athanasius claimed it to be. 2 The ex-
ponents of the subordination theory can say that other people 
could see God in Jesus without Jesus being equal with God. 
The medalists can accept the statement fully, but would in-
sist that it merely pertains to tl<'iO modes of the one God. 
On this basis, most of the passages used to support the 
orthodox view can be accepted by the medalists as well. The 
main controversy in the New Testament is between the ortho-
dox and the subordinationist views. John certainly gives 
the impression of a complete equality of the Son and the 
Father when he quotes Jesus as saying: "The Father and I 
are one. 11 3 But then John seems to contradict that impres-
sion when he l'rrote: "The son can do nothing of his Olm ac-
cord, unless he sees the Father doing it."4 And Mark quotes 
Jesus as saying: 11 \IJhy call thou me good? There is none good 
but God Himself. u5 
1. John 14:9. 4. John 5:19. 
2. Athanasius, Disc., I, 3lla. 5. Mark 10:18. 
3. John 10:30. 
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The passages quoted above are far from exhaustive. They 
are presented merely to indicate that the New Testament does 
not favor any one of the trinitarian conceptions exclusively. 
Such New Testament statements are rather the religious ex-
pressions of some who saw in Jesus one who revealed God to 
them. There is very little speculation in the New· Testament 
regarding such theological questions as the Trinity. That 
was to come later. 
3. Ebionitic influences. 
Ebionitism was a conception of the Gospel which was 
characteristic of the Christianity of Jewish origin. These 
Jewish Christians had already been in evidence in the apos-
tolic age, and although their presence was still felt in the 
post-apostolic age they were gradually losing their influence. 
Ebionitism continued as a heretical strain in the church, 
however. 1 
Fisher said that in trying to be at once Jews and Chris-
tians, they failed of being either. The rigid Ebionites in-
sisted that circumcision is necessary to salvation and that 
the Mosaic ceremonial ordinances are still binding on the 
Christians.2 They 't-tould have robbed Christianity of its uni-
versal character and l\l'Orld wide destination, and have nar-
ro"V;red it dm.rn to the limits of Judaism. 3 
1. Fisher, HCD, 49. 3. Fisher, HCD, 51. 
2. Fisher, HOD, 49. 
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To the Ebionites Jesus was merely a man. They rejected 
the virgin birth, and insisted that the Holy Spirit had de-
scended upon Jesus for the first time at His baptism. The 
Messianic work of Christ was looked upon as that of a prophet 
and a teacher. 1 
By the fifth century Ebionitism had practically disap-
peared. If it had any effect at all on the Church, it was 
to force the Church tovrard the formulation of a more correct 
theology. 2 
4. Gnostic influences. 
Gnosticism began as a movement within paganism before 
the advent of Christianity. It continued through several 
centuries of the Christian era and influenced Christian 
thought in several ways. rlliereas the Ebionites would have 
robbed Christianity of its universal character, Gnosticism 
was interested in just the reverse. It wanted to sweep 
a"t'lay all barriers and include the many mythological and 
philosophical systems and cults. It ivas an eclectic philos-
ophy which included Christian elements. The Gnostic sects 
were quite diverse and conflicted with one another.3 The 
main interest was philosophical, but they were interested 
also in the problems of religion and stressed ritual forms, 
ascetic practices, and other matters pertaining to conduct. 
1. Neve, HCT, 51. 3. Scott, Art.(l924), VI, 240b. 
2. Neve, HCT, 51. 
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The Gnostic systems flourished in the second century. They 
used Christianity to give an authority of revelation to 
the il" ideas .1 
Gnosticism entered the history of the doctrine of the 
Trinity by its rejection of the doctrine of the incarnation. 
It declared that Ghrist could not possibly have had a body. 
2 This idea is known as docetism. Some Gnostic views held that 
Christ had joined Himself for a time 'td th the body of a pro-
foundly spiritual man called Jesus. This union was affected 
either at the birth or at the baptism of Jesus, and was dis-
solved shortly before th~ crucifixion. It follows, therefore, 
that Christ was not really crucified. Such a view would de-
nude the Redeemer of any real humanity and 'tvould destroy the 
histeric person of Christ.3 
5. The Trinity in the Apostolic Fathers. 
The Apostolic Fathers wrote during the last few years of 
the first centuryand the first half of the second. It is im-
possible to speak of any formulated theology of this group. 
Their writings are very much as the writings of the New Testa-
ment. Their chief interes't was in the practical demands of 
the Christian life and of the problems which confronted the 
new church. Any doctrinal 't<lriting among them vJas sporadic 
and incidental. 
1. Fisher, HOD, 51. 3. Scott, Art.(l924), VI, 237b. 
2. Scott, Art.(l924), VI, 240b. 
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There are some passages in the Apostolic Fathers which 
show a definite interest in the Trinity. The baptismal 
formula is given in the Didache, where it says, "Baptize 
in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit in living 'tvater. 111 The three persons are linked also 
in the Martyrdom of Polycarn.2 First Clement mentions all 
three but there is a question as to the standing of the 
third person. He wrote: 11 Have l'Te not one God and one Christ 
and one spirit of grace that was shed upon us? 11 3 The spirit 
doesn't seem to be a distinct person in such a statement. 
Ignatius also seems to give the spirit a significance that 
is far from the place given the Holy Spirit in later think-
ing. In some passages he linked God and Christ together 
but made no mention of a third p erson. 4 But in his Epistle 
to the Ephesians he made a more definite trinitarian allu-
sion.5 The three persons do not have the same relation as 
given them in the orthodox view, however. They still seem 
to h ave the New Testament expression of a religious faith. 
The Apostolic Fathers did not really add anything to the 
formation of a doctrine of the Trinity, but they did pre-
serve the Christian faith which is so essential to such a 
doctrine. 
1. Didache, Par. 7, 2:32. 
2. Martyr. Poly., Par. 1, 20:3. 
:3. First Clem., Par. 46, 77. 
4. Magn., Inscr., 14:3. 
5. ~., Par. 9, 139. (All refs. to Apos. Fathers are 
found in Lightfoot, AF.) 
l9. 
6. The Trinity in the Greek Apologists. 
The Greek Apologists were active throughout the second 
century. Such men as Tatian and Justin Martyr blended the 
gnostic philosophical interest into the Christian thought. 
They w·ere interested in Christian theology and discussed 
the relationship between the Father and the Son considerably. 
They made a more formal attempt to define the theological 
doctrines than did the Apostolic Fathers. 
These Christian apologists insisted first that God is 
one. Justin said that the incarnation came in the fullness 
of time. Christ was born of the Virgin ~mry and became man. 
He took unto Himself flesh, blood and a human soul, but He 
still remained God. 1 Justin cnsidered Christ a separate, 
but a subordinate, person. He is the same as the one who 
appeared to Abraham and to Moses. Justin said: 
He who is said to have appeared to Abraham, and 
to Jacob, and to Moses, and who is called God, 
is distinct from Him who made all things,--
numerically I mean, not distinct in will. For 
I affirm that He has never at any time done any-
thing which He 1vho made the 'tiOrld--above v-Thom 
there is no other God--has n.ot wi~hed Him both 
to do and to engage Himself with. 
The relationship of the Son to the Father is defin-
itely subordinationism in the teaching of Justin. He said: 
~1ve reasonably worship Him, having learned that He is the 
Son of the True God Himself, and holding Him in the second 
1. Justin, APol., I, Par. 12, 166. 
2. Justin, Dial., Par. 56, 223. 
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place, e.nd the prophetic Spirit in the third. 111 But in spite 
of this subordinationism Justin held to a conception of Christ 
which implies that the inner nature of the Son is identical 
vrith that of the Father. The sonship of Christ is traced 
back to the ante-mundane generation of the hypostatic Logos. 
The Logos, next to the Father, is the recipient of divine 
honors. 2 Thus l"Je see that Jus tin held to a more than human 
conception of Christ. 
Tatian, a student of Justin, said that the Logos sprang 
forth by the exercise of God 1 s will as a thought is uttered 
in speech. This involved no separation or violence or loss 
in the Godhead, but is like a fire which is not diminished 
b y kindling another from it.3 
The Greek Apologists were the first to try to explain 
the Trinity systematically. They certainly added something 
to the trinitarian thought. But their subordinationism was 
certainly not any help to t he orthodox view. The main ideas 
of these thinkers are more akin to Arianism and modalism than 
to what came to be the orthodox view. 
?. The Trinity in the thought of Irenaeus. 
Irenaeus was .born about 126 A. D. and died about 200 
A. D. He was opposed to Gnosticism ana. all philosophical 
1. Justin, Apol., I, Par. 13, 166. 
2. Fisher, HCD, 63. 
3. Tatian, Add., Ch. 5, 67. 
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speculation in matters of religion. He made. his theology 
to conform to biblical teaching. He added something to the 
development of Christian thought in his insistence on the 
eternal co-existence of the Father and the Son. 1 He gave 
Christ a position higher than man when he said that man is 
not an uncreated being, nor did he always co-exist with 
God, as did the Son.2 
In some passages Irenaeus spoke of Jesus as God. He 
saiCt : 11 Consider the terrible blasphemy ye are thus guilty 
of against Him who truly is God.u3 He felt that the manner 
in which the Father generated the Son is beyond description. 
God is known to us not through speculation but through revela-
t :Lon. We .: should not concern ourselves with -vrhat God did 
before creation, and other such problems. 4 
Irenaeus insisted on the eternal co-existence of the 
Father and the Son, but he did not vrant to try to explain 
it. He shows a theory of religious knO'\"lledge 1-rhich came to 
have a great influence on the formulation of the orthodox 
view of the Trinity. His thinking was based on his faith 
in divine revelation. He stressed faith and tried to mini-
mize· the importance of speculation. His thinking vias a turn-
ing from the influence of Gnosticism and to a more Christ 
centered position. 
1. Irenaeus, Ag. Her., Bk. II, Chap. 30, Par. 9, 406b. 
2. Irenaeus, Ag. Her., Bk. II, Chap. 25, Par. 3, 397a. 
3. Irenaeus, Ag. Her., Bk. II, Chap. 28, Par. 4, 400a. 
4. Irenaeus, Ag. Her., Bk. II, Chap. 28, Par. 4, 400a. 
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8. The Trinity in the thought of Tertullian. 
Tertullian lived from 140 to 225 A. D. · He was the first 
of the great Latin fathers. He was the first to use the word 
~rinity" and the first distinctly to say that tripersonality 
pertains to the one God as He is in Himself. 1 His teaching 
along this , line -vras in opposition to Monarchianism, '\I>Jhich 
reJected the idea of the diversity of persons as immanent in 
God. 2 Tertullian attacks Monarchianism and states his posi-
tion in the following way: 
The simple, indeed (I will not call them um·rise 
and unlearned,) who al"rays constitute the major-
ity of believers, are startled at the dispensa-
tion of (the Thre e in One), on the ground that 
their very rule of faith vli thdraws them from 
the world 1 s plurality of gods to the onl y true 
God; The numerical. order and distribution of 
the Trinity they assume to be a division of 
the unity; whereas the unity which derives the 
Trinity out of 1 ts O'\'m self is so far from be-
ing destroyed, that it is actually supported by 
it.3 . -
The thought of Tertullian on the Trinity is a good ex-
ampl e of the attempt to avoid subordinationism and the dif-
ficulty of tritheism to which tha t view is subject. He 
also tries to a void docetism and mone.rch ianism, 't'fhich he 
felt 1•muld deny t h e earthly Christ. He does not suceeed 
in avoiding subordination of the Son to the Fa ther, ho'\'rever, 
as he says: 
1. Tertullian, Ag. Prax., Chap. III, 598b. 
~~ A discussion of Monarchianism will follow. 
3. Tertu~lian, Ag. Prax., Chap. III, 598b-599a . 
It is not by way of diversity that the Son 
differs from the Father, but by distribution; 
because the Father is not the same as the Son, 
since they differ one from the other in the 
mode of their being. For the Father is the 
entire substance, but the Son is a derivation 
and~rtion of the whole .•• thus the Father is 
distinct from the Son, being greater than the 
Son.l 
An interesting teaching of Tertullian regarding the 
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Trinity is that it is for the purpose of revelation only. 
After all has been accomplished and the persons ha ve ful-
filled their mission, the distinctions between the persons 
will cease. He said, "When, how·ever, all things shall be 
subdued to Hirn ..• then sheJl the Son also Himself be sub-
jected unto Him ••• that God may be all in all. u2 
Tertullian added more to the real development of the 
doctrine of the Trinity than had anyone before him. It is 
important that he stressed the idea that the Father was not 
divided by the coming of the S~n.3 He did not avoid subor-
dinationisrn, hov-rever. 
9. The Monarchian movement. 
The term 11monarchian 11 wa s first used by Tertullian to 
designat'e the thought of those who defended the monarchy, 
or sole government, of God. 4 It was a movement which sought 
to save the unity of God by rejecting the idea of three 
1. Tertullian, Ag. Prax., Chap. LX, 624a. 
2. Tertullian, Ag. Prax., Chap. IV, 599b. 
3. Tertullian, Ag. Prax., Chap. VII, 60Ja. 
4. Chapman, Art.(l911), X, 448. 
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persons in a Godhead who shared the functions of God. The 
name 'tva s used to describe t wo different groups, the 11 dyna-
mistic11 and the 11 modalistic 11 monarchians. They had some 
things in common; but they also had sbme real differences. 
i. The Dynamistic Monarchians. 
The Dynamistic Mona rchians taught an adoptionist view 
of Christ. It involves a christology more than d.oes the 
moclalistic vie1-1. It is not so accurately called monarch ian. 
Its adoptionist idea of Jesus wa s not new. In fact it wa s 
one of t h e oldest typ es of christology in Christian thought.l 
It held that J esus wa s completely human but wa s peculiarly 
2 
repl enished i..,rith the grace and pmiT er of the Holy Spirit. 
The first dynamistic monarchian of prominence was 
Theodotus, c alled the Tanner, of Byzantium, who 1rrent to 
Rome about 190 A. D. He t aught that Jesus i.ras a man, born 
of a virgin, and of holy life, but tha t until his baptism 
he -vms completely human. It was a t his baptism tha t the man 
Jesus vras adopted by God a na_ the divine Christ descended upon 
him. Some of t h e followers of Theodotus denied to Jesus any 
title to divinity. Others h eld t hat he became in some sense 
divine at his resurrection.) 
Theodotus was excommunicated by Bishop Victor of Rome. 
His work was continued by another Theodotus, the money-
changer, who tried to found a separate communion out side 
1. \'Talker, HCC, 72; cf. Hebrews. 
2. Sheldon, SOD, 194. 
). Walker, HOC, 72. 
25. 
the Catholic Church, but it amounted to very little. Other 
attempts vtere also made to a a_vance this concept in the 
Weste~1 Church but they, too, were no t very successful. 
Dynamistic monarch ianism was stronger and mo r e persist-
ent in the East. Its most outstanding representative there 
was Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch from about 260 to 
272 A. D. His view of Jesus was adoptioniet and was quite 
like that of Theodotus. He said that Jesus ivas a unique man 
in that he was born of a v i rgin but that he wa s only a man 
until his baptism. At that time the Logos came down upon 
h i m i n the form of a dove and wonders were manifested in 
him. The Logos was described as the Son of God, an imp er---
sonal attribute of the Father. It had inspired Moses and 
the prophets and now i t adopted Jesus to take the form of 
a man.l It was not considered to have made Jesus God, how-
ever. It was an inc1welling insp iration by which Jesus \'las 
united in will to God, but he did not become one in substance 
with God. It was considered a moral union, but an insepar-
able one. By reason of thi s union Jesus was raised from the 
deact, according to Paul of Samosata, and i'tas given. a kind of 
delegated divin ity. 2 
Between 264 and 269 three syndds considered the views of 
Paul of Sarnosata and the last of them excommunicated him. 
This was an example of the rising power of ecclesiasticism. 
1. Neve, HOT, 109-11 0. 
2. Walker, HOC, 73. 
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Although various adoptionist views were prevalent throughout 
the history of Christian thought, the dynamistic monarchian 
movement was not lvidely supported.l 
ii. Modalistic Monarchianism, 
or Sabellianism. 
Modalistic monarchianism affected the vast body of 
Christian b elievers much mo r e than did t he other type of 
monarch ianism. Modalism app ealed very strongl y to the or-
d inary believer, who saw in it a s a feguard f or monoth eism, 
but "rhich yet preserved the divinity of Jesus. It became 
quite widespread , especially in the West. 
This form of monarchianism emphasized the oneness of 
the Father and the Son so as to make them really one person. 
The distinctions in the Trinity were regarded a s modes, not 
persons. It "t-Tas said that God the Father app eared on earth 
as the Son. Opp onents to this view claimed that t h is would 
neces sarily make the Father to have suffered and died. The 
medalists denied this conclusion and advanced severa l argu-
ments to prove that although the Son was a ctually one with 
t he Father, God did not suffer and die. 2 The name 11 Patri-
passian11 was applied to them, hm•rever, and the movement v.ras 
kno"t-m by that name in the West. In the East it '1iras knmm as 
11 Sabellianism, 11 because Sabellius was the outstanding of the 
medalists. 
1. Chapman, Art.(l911), 448. 2. Chapman, Art.(l911), 449. 
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The first to be especially known for his modalistic 
ideas was Noetus. He gathered many follovrers and had a great 
deal of influence. He "t-ras excommunicated in 230 in Asia 
Minor. Ep igonus, a pupil of Noetus, went to Rome and pro-
mulgated the teachings of his master. He succeeded in 
starting a definite modalistic movement. Cleomenes, a pupil 
of Epigonus, became the head of the movement. In 215 he \·;as 
succeeded by Sabellius, who did much to develop the movement. 1 
Modalism became the official teaching in the Roman church for 
nearly a generation. 2 
The teachings of Sabellius vrere closely akin to those 
of his forerunners but he developed a more exact theology. 
He aiso included a recognit ion of the Holy Spirit in his 
considerations, a feature which had been neglected b y most 
of the theologians of all types up to that time. The car-
dinal tenet of Sabellius wa s that th~ Father, the Son, and 
the Holy S9irit are identical, but with three names. He 
said t hat God is not the Fa ther and the Son simultaneously 
but that God became operat i ve in three successive energies.3 
God was manifested first as the Father, the creator and legis-
lator. He 1..ras manifested secondly as the person of the Son, 
the Redeemer, which extended from the incarnation to the 
assumption. He \vas manifested thirdly a s the person of the 
1. Pope, Art.(l912), 779. 
2. Harna ck, Art.(l910), 458. 
3. Harnack, Art.(l910), 460. 
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Holy Ghost, as the maker and giver of life. Sabellius insisted 
that t hes e were not really three persons but only one person 
1 in three manifestations or modes. 
Harnack correctly criticizes this view of successive 
appearances of God in three mocles lvhen h e says: 
It is improbable that he was able to make a 
strict delimitation of these successive persons, 
for he can scarcely have avoided the recogni-
tion of the contiRuous activity of God the 
Father in nature. 
Harnack further points out that by insisting on paral-
leling the p erson, or the mode, of the Father with the other 
t \·.ro persons, or modes, Sabellius was the forerunner of 
l a ter orthodoxy, vrhich rejected the pre-eminence of the 
Father over the Son and the Holy Ghost.3 For Sabellius the 
three were one and the same person. 
10. The Trinity in the Thought of Clement 
of Alexandria. 
Clement of Alexandria lived from a bout 150 to 220. His 
ideas on the Trinity were not very well developed. He felt 
that God was incomprehensib~e and that human speech wa s in-
capable of uttering God. 4 
He gave Christ a h i gh pl ace in relation to God. Some 
passag es seem to make the Father and son practically 
1. Harnack, Art.(l910), 460. 
2. Harnack, Art.(l910), 460. 
3. Harnack, Art.(l910), 460. 
4. Clement, Strom., Bk.VI, 
Chap . 18, 4o4. 
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1 identical. He isn't very clear as to the eternal nature of 
Jesus. He is more interested in the purpose of Jesus than 
he is in His true nature. He considered Jesus to be the Wis-
dom of God.or t he Instructor of mankind for salvation. 2 Clement 
clearly teaches a subordinationist relationship between the 
Father and the Son. He said that God is not susceptible of 
demonstration and of description, but the Son is.3 
11. The Trinity in the thought of Origen. 
Origen lived from 185 to 254. He '\"Jas a native of Alex-
andria. He wrote much and made a real contribution to the 
doctrine of the Trinity. 
In Origen 1 s thought , the Son is g iven a high place in 
His relation to God the Father. He is the image of the 
Father and the revealer of Him. Origen v.rrote: 
Our Saviour, therefore, is the image of the in-
visible God, inasmuch as compared with the 
Father He is the truth; and as compared with us, 
to whom he reveals the Father, He is the image 
by "t-rhich vre come to the knowledge of the Father. 4 
One of the main contl"ibutions of Origen '\vas his teach-
ing regarding the eternal generation of the Son. He said 
that Go d the Father never existed, even for a moment, 't'li th-
out having generated the Son.5 But in continuing his 
1. Clement, Strom., Bk. V, Chap. 14, 298. 
2. Clement, Strom., Bk. VII, Chap. 2. 
3. Clement, Strom., Bk. IV, Chap. 25, 212. 
4. Origen, De Prin., Bk. I, Chap . 2, Par. 6, 248b. 
5. Origen, De Prin., Bk. I, Chap. 2, Par. 2, 246b. 
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description of the relationship of the two Origen states 
that the Son derives vlhat He is from the Father.l This is 
clearly subordinationi sm. It shows how impossible it is to 
eliminate a subordination between the persons in any kind of 
a theory of generation or proceeding. 
In calling the Son 11 1Visdom 11 Origen insis-ted that he did 
not mean anything impersonal. He 't'lant ed to mak e sure that 
2 he was understood in saying that the Son is personal. 
In Origen 1 s conception of God, the Father is the fountain-
head of Deity. The Father is God as He is, in and of Him-
self. The Father is 11 the 11 God, 't.,.ith the article prefixed 
to the vJOrd. The Son is God '\·ri th the article omitted. He 
explains this by saying that the true God is 11 the 11 God, and 
those 1r1ho are formed a fter Him are gods, images, as it "rere, 
of Him the prototype. The Son is the highest of the images 
of God, but he is still inferior to God.3 He says again: 
We have to say that God on the one hand is 
very God (Auto-theos, God of Himself) ••• 
but that all beyond the very God is made 
God by participation in His divanity, and 
is not to be called simply God. 
The relation of the Father to the Son is a problem for 
Origen. He 1-rants t o fend off monarchianism by emphasizing a 
difference between the Father and the Son, but yet he wants 
to give Christ a hig_.h place in the divinity of God. It leads 
to a .confused picture of the Son. 
1. Origen, De Prin., Bk. I, Chap . 2, Par. 2, 246b. 
2. Origen, De Prin., Bk. I, Chap. 2, Par. 2, 246b. 
J. Origen, Comm. on John, Bk. II, Par. 2. 
4. Origen, Comm. on John, Bk . II, Par. 2. 
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The Holy Spirit in Origen 1 s teaching does not have the 
close relationship to the Father as does the Son, but Origen 
does sp eal~ of the third person as having a direct relation 
to God. He is not dependent on the Son. This is seen in the 
following passage: 
"i>Te must understand, therefore, that as the Son, 
t·rho alone knovrs the Father, reveals Him to 'tnThom 
He will, so the Holy Spirit, who alone searches 
the deep thi ngs of God, reveals God to v.rhom He1 
will: For the Spirit bloweth where he listeth. 
Origen gives better treatment to the Holy S~irit than had 
anyone before him. The third person is given a more definite 
purpose and is more definitely a person. This is certainly 
not the orthodox viet-.r, hO't·rever. Origen did much tov1ard the 
f o rmulation of a complete doctrine, but it was still far 
short of completion. 
12. The Arian-Athanasian dispute. 
Arius 1-.ras born in Af rica in 256. He vras a. presbyter in 
the church at Alexandria. He was influenced by the teachings 
of Paul of Samosata. Springs of Arianism can be found in 
the subordinationist teaching of Origen, but Arius does not 
follow Origen 1 s teaching as a whole. 
Arius was opposed to modalistic monarchianism and 
strongly in favor of hypostasianism of the subordinationist 
type. He was interested in saving the monotheistic prin-
ciple of Christianity and felt that the best way to do so 
1. Orig en, De Prin., Bk. I, Chap. 3, Par. 4, 253a. 
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was to emphasize subord.inationism. He -vron a large follo-v;-
ing but some of the Church leaders saw in his teaching a 
kind of Christian polytheism. 1 The bishop of Alexandria 
called together a large syhod, the first Ecumenical Council, 
in the year 321, at Alexandria. Ar1us was deposed and ex-
communicated. The controversy continued, hO\·rever, and in 
325 A. D. Emperor Constantine called the first General Coun-
cil, to meet at Nicea. It was attended by about three hun-
draa_ and eighteen bishops, ancl many of lower rank. Many 
of those present vrere either Ariana or semi-Arians, but 
the group led by Bishop Alexander and Athanas ius, vras vic-
torious. Athanasius \vas the main spokesman for this group 
and must have been very convincing. It is imuortant to 
note tha t Athanasius considered scriptural statements as 
final in his arguments. They must also have been considered 
so by the other members of the council, for his arguments 
evidently 1·mn them over to his vie'tv. He used scripture pas-
sages which he felt would support his position. The points 
on which he based h is argument against Arius are contained 
in the following passage: 
The novelties they have invented and put forth 
contrary to the Scriptures are these following: 
God was not all"v"ays a Father, but there -v;as a 
time when God was not a Father. The \'lord of 
God was not always, but was made of things that 
\.rere not: for God that is, made Him that l-Ias 
1. Fisher, HCD, 135. 
not, of things that were not; wherefore there 
was a time 1-rhen He \'Jas not; for the Son is a 
creature and a work. Neither is He like in 
substance to the Father.l 
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Athanasius quote~ John 1:3, which says that all things 
\'!ere made by the only begotten Son, and :a.s1ted h ow Christ could 
be one of the things l'Thich He had made Rims elf. Ho1"1 can 
He b e the Only-begotten, when, according to the Ariana, He 
is counted as one among the rest? 2 
To refute the arguments of Arius against the likeness 
of t h e Father and Son in Substance, Athanasius quoted John's 
Gospel to have Jesus say, 11 He that hath seen me hath seen 
the Father. 11 3 It was pointed out earlier that this is not 
a c onclusive statement in support of the orth odox vie\'r of 
the Trinity, even if the Scripture is to. be accepted as final 
authority. Athanasius did accept the Scripture as authority, 
and h e considered it as a conclusive argu~ent for the Father 
and Son being of the same substance.4 
Athanasius considered the Arians to be blasphemous 
because they said t hat t he Son does not know· the Father per-
f ectly. He said tha,t they contradicted the express 1vords 
of Christ, since he says, 11As the Father knmveth me , even so 
know I the Father. 11 5 
To emphasize his position that the Father and t he Son 
are of one substance, Athanasius wrote: 
1. Athanas ius , HT, Apend., Par. 2, 300. 
2. Athanas ius, HT, Apend., Par. 3, 301. 
3. John lL~o: 9. 
4. Athanasius, HT, Apend., Par. 3, 301. 
5. Athanas ius, HT, Apend., Par. 3, 301. 
. I 
On this account and reasonably, having said 
before 1 I and the Father are one,' He added, 
1 I in the Father ancl the Father in Me, 1 by 
way of shewing the identity of Godhead and 
the unity of substance ••• All that is the 
Father's is the Son 1 s.l 
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A new creed was formulated by the Nicene Council. It 
included the expression which Athanasius desired rather than 
the one advocated by Arius and his friends. It bound the 
whole church to the acknowledgement of the consubstantiality 
of the Son with the Father. Only seventeen of the three 
hunctred-seventeen present were loyal to Arius, ana. all but 
two of these were prevailed upon to sign the creed. 2 
The Nicene Creed made an official decision regarding 
the r 'elation of the Father and the Son in the Trinity but 
it did not br i.ng a unity of thought in the matter. During 
the next half century there v-ras much controversy between the 
several parties which had developed. One party was in as-
cendancy for a while and then another. Athanasius remained 
the leader of the orthodox group and in 362, as bishop of 
Alexandria, he called a synod and presided over it. The synod 
accepted the Nicene Creed and added to it a statement regard-
ing the Holy Spirit. The Nicene Creed had merely stated a 
belief in the Holy Spirit. This new statement accepted 
the word 11 homoousia 11 as applying to the Holy Spirit and de-
clared it to be a per son in the Trinity like the Father and 
1. Athanasius, S~~' Disc. III, 403. 
2. Sheldon, SCD, 193. 
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the Son. The leading theologians followed Athanasius in this. 
At a synod in Rome in 380 the West decided the matter in the 
same 1•ray. In 381, soon after the death of Athanasius, the 
Second Ecumenical Council met at Constantinople.l This 
council reaffirmed the Nicene Creed and made some changes in 
it. An enlarged form of the creed 1-ras adopted but its main 
addition v.1as a statement regarding the Holy Spirit. The re-
vised creed stated a belief in the Holy Spirit as: 
The Lord and Giver of Life, who proceedeth from 
the Father, who with the Father and Son together 
is worshiEped and glorified, who spake by the 
prophets. 
The w·estern Church changed this statement to read: 11 Pro-
ceed~th from the Father and the Son."3 
This council was recognized as an ecumenical council in 
451, in both the West and the East. Because of the great 
authority placed in the church councils the revised Nicene 
Creed became the orthodox position of the church. No other 
view has since been given ariy great consideration by the 
church as a whole. Most of the great Christian thinkers who 
came later accepted this position on the Trinity as authority 
ano. merely tried to strengthen it. It has continued to be a 
problem for many thinkers and there has been very significant 
opinion contrary to it. It was accepted by the Protestant 
1. Neve, HCT, I, 120. 
2. Schaff, COC, 29. 
3. Schaff, COC, 28. 
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reformers and remains today as the generally accepted view in 
all of Christendom. 
13. The Trinity in the thought of Aqgustine. 
Augustine lived from 354 to 430. His influence upon 
WesteTn theology is comparable to that of Origen upon the 
East, but l'l}'as far greater. There is hardly a dogma of the 
Roman Catholic Church that does not bear in one way or another 
the marks of Augustine's influence. 
The doctrine of the Trinity was practically completed 
by the Council of Constantinople in 381 but it remained for 
Augus itine to give it a final expression for the 11'estern 
Church. In his thinking on the Trinity he let faith precede 
knowledge. The very first statement of Augustine in his work 
on the Trinity is that the v-rork 11 has been \vri tten in order to 
guard against the sophistries of those who disdain to begin 
with faith, and are deceived by a crude and perverse love of 
reason. 111 Augustine accepted as a principle of authority 
that :t•re should accept the Scriptures and the traditions of 
the church. 2 He felt that points left ambiguous or undecided 
by a church council could be improved by a later one, but de-
cisions of all church councils are binding.3 After expound-
ing what he believed to be the view of the Trinity of the 
Catholic faith he wrote, 11 This is also my faith, since it is 
the Catholic faith. u4 
1. Augustine, De Trin., I, 1, 1.3. Fisher, HOCD, 123. 
2. Fisher, HOCD, 178. 4. Augustine, DE Trin., I, 2, 4. 
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The first emphasis of Augustine regarding the Trinity 
is on the unity of God. The Trinity is the one ·God. He ex-
pressed it in the follovring ·way: 
The Trinity is the one and only and true God, 
••• the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit are 
rightly said, believed, understood, to be of 
one and the same substance or essence.l 
The Fa ther, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
intimate a divine unity of one7 a nd the same 
substance in an indivisible equality; and 
therzfore they are not three Gods, but one 
God. 
And this Trinity is one God, alone, good, 
great, eternal, omnipotent, itself its own 
unity, deity, greatness, eternity , omnipo-
tence.J 
Augustine gives the Son a high place in the Trinity. 
He even took part in sending Himself in the incarnation. 
Augustine said, 11 ••• the ·v.,r ill of the Father and the Son is 
one, and their 1vorking incLivisible. u4 Again he said, "··· 
therefore the same Son was sent by the Father and the Son, 
because the Son Himself is the V1lord of the Father. n5 
Augustine held that the persons of the Trinity are not 
really different from one ··· another. V.li th respect to the 
entire divine substance they are identical and equal with 
each other. He wrote: 
1. Augustine, De Trin., I, 2, 4. 
2. .1\ugustine, De Trin. , I, 4, 7. 
J. Augustine, D~ Trin., V, 11, 12. 
4. Augustine, De Trin., II, 5, 9. 
5. Augustine, De Trin., II, 5, 9. 
The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit to-
gether is not a greater essence than the Father 
alone or the Son alone; but these three . sub-
stances or persons, if they must bf so called, 
together are equal to each singly. 
Not only the Father is not greater than the Son 
in the substance of truth, but both together are 
not anything greater than the Holy Spirit alone, 
nor that any two a t all in the same Trinity are 
anything greater than one, not all th2ee together 
anything greater than each severally. 
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According to Augustine the distinctions in the Trinity 
are entirely a matter of function. He wrote: 
Not because the one is greater, the other less; 
but because the one is Father, the other Son; 
the one begotten, the other begetter; the one, 
He from 1rrhom He is who is sent; t h e other, He 
who is from Him who sends. For the Son is 
from the Father, not the Father from the Son.3 
This sounds like subordinationism, but Augustine insists 
that it does not in any manner hinder us from believing the 
Son to be equal, and_ consubstantial, and co eternal "ri th the 
Fathetr.4 He has already explained that the Son participated 
in hi·s own sending in the incarnation. 5 
Aub~stine 1 s conception of the Holy Spirit can best be 
described in his m-rn words, as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3· 4. 
5. 
The Holy Spirit is the Spirit both of the Father 
and of the Son •• • He is the gift of the Father and 
Son ..• The Holy Spirit is a certain unutterable 
communion of the Father and the Son'; and in that 
account, perhaps, He is so called, because the 
same name is suitable to both the Father and the 
Augustine, De Trin. , VII, 6, 11. 
Augustine, De Trin., IV, 20, 27. 
Augustine, De Trin., IV, 5, 9. 
Augustine, De Trin., IV, 20, 27. 
Augustine, De Trin., II, 5, 9. 
Son. For He Himself is called specially that 
which they are called in common; because both 
the Father is a Spirit and the Son a Spirit, 
both the Father is holy and the Son is holy. In 
order, therefore, that the communion of both may 
be signifi ed from a name which is suitable to 
both, the Holy Spirit is called the gift of both.l 
The Holy Spirit is thus a gift and not a Son, 2 but that 
gift existed before it was given.3 
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Augustine says that 'tvords are not sufficient to explain 
the Trinity ano_ he implieo. that he used the expression 11 per-
sons11 reluctantly.4 He wrote: 
For, in truth, as the Father is not the Son, 
and the Son is not the Father, and that Holy 
Spirit who is also called the gift of God is 
neither the Father nor the Son, certainly 
they are three ••• Yet, when the question is 
asked., vJhat three'? human language labors al-
together under great poverty of speech. The 
answer, hoviever, is given, three 11 persons, 11 
not that it might be completely sp oken, but 
that it might not be left 'tvholly unspoken. 5 
He did. try to explain the Trinity in human language, 
h owever. He used several analogies, taken from the human 
soul, to try to explain what he meant by the Trinity. 
The f irst analogy is based on sight. It includes the thing 
seen, the vision, and the intention of the will uniting the 
two.6 A second analogy is based on thought. It includes 
the thing in memory, the inner vision, and the will uniting 
the two.?. A third analogy is based on the mind. It 
1. Augustine, De Trin., V, 11, 12. 
2. Augustine, De Trin., V, 14, 15. 
3. Augustine, De Trin., V, 16, 16. 
4. Augustine, De Trin., VII, 6, 11. 
5. Augustine, De Trin., V, 9, 10. 
6. Augustine, De Trin., XI, 2, 2. 
7. Augustine, De Trin., XV, 3, 5. 
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includes memory, understanding and will. 1 A fourth analogy 
is based on love. It includes the lover, the beloved, and 
the l ,ove itself. 2 Augustine used these analogies to shO't'l 
hm'l one harmonious entity can be impelled and controlled 
from a threefold center. He also stressed the thought that 
the three are equivalent to one. He knew that such analogies 
could not really describe the Trinity, but he wanted at least 
to shot·.r the diversity itrithin a unity. 
The comments to follow will deal considerably with 
Augusrtine 1s presentation of the Trinity. 
14. The Trinity in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. 
'Thomas Aquinas \'!aS born about 1225 near Rome, Italy. 
He studied under Albert the Great. He was influenced very 
much by his study of Aristotle. He became the greatest re-
presentative of Scholasticism. His main work in theology 
was S,umma Theologica. It is an apologetic for the Christian 
faith. The doctrine of the Trinity had already become es-
tablished by the Nicene Creed and further strengthened by 
the itrritings of August ine. Thomas accepted the essential 
features of the orthodox doctrine but elaborated and refined . 
it somewhat.3 He lifted the doctrine of the Trinity above 
the plane of rational justification altogether and based it 
exclusively on the authority of revelation.4 He expressed 
1. Augustine, De Trin., XV, 3, 5. 
2. Augustine, De Trin., XV, 3, 5. 
3. Knudson, DOG, 407. 
4. Knudson, DOG, 3~6-9. 
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it in philosophical language, however. 
Thomas goes into great detail to prove that God is not 
composite1 and that he is truly a unity. 2 In his considera-
tion of the Trinity he starts with the idea of procession. 
He said that an out1rrard procession would be either in the 
sense of an effect proceeding from its cause or the cause 
proceeding to the effect. He criticized Arius for holding 
t h e first view and Sabellius for holding the second. He 
said that whatever proceeds by outward procession is neces-
sarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds. The Son 
and Holy Ghost could not truly be God.3 To exula in his idea 
of procession Thomas said: 
Since procession always supposes action, and as 
there is an outw·ard procession corresponding to 
the act tending to external matter, so there 
must be an inward procession corresEonding to 
the act remaining within the agent. 
Thomas used the i ntellect as an example of this lcind of pro-
cession. The action of the intellect remains in the intel-
ligent agent. ~fhenever we underst and, by the very fact of 
understanding there proceeds something 'trli thin us, which is 
a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing 
from our intellectual pmver and proceec1ing from our know-
ledge of that object. This conception is signified by the 
spoken -vrord. It is called the word of the heart signified 
by the word of the voice. It is an intelligible emanation 
1. Summa Theol., Q . ~, Art. 7. 
2. Summa Theol., Qll, Art.J. 
3. Summa Theol., Q.27, Art. 1. 
4. Summa Theol., Q.27, Art. 1. 
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like the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, 
yet remains in him. Thus Thomas holds the procession of the 
Trinity as existing in God. 1 The more a thing is understood, 
the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and 
united to the intelligent agent, since the intellect, by 
the very act of understanding, is made one with the object 
understood. Thomas said: 
Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very sup-
reme perfection of God, the divine Word is of 
necessity perfectly one with the source whe~ce 
He proceeds, without any kind of diversity. 
Thomas held that there are two processions in God, that 
of the Word, and t hat of love. Just as the Word is by way of 
an intelligible operation, so love is an operation of the 
Nill within us. The 1.vill and intellect are not diverse in 
God, nevertheless the nature of 1vill and intellect requires 
the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a 
certain order. Nothing can be loved by the will unless it 
is conceived in the intellect. Th is procession of love from 
God is the Holy Ghost.3 
Thomas said that the procession of the Word in God can 
be called generation. He distinguished between t wo kinds of 
generation. One is nothing more than a change from nonexis-
tence to existence. The other kind is limited to living things,, 
It signifies the origin of a living be i ng from a conjoined 
living principle. This is properly called birth. Thomas 
1. Summa Theel., Q. 27, Art.l. 3. Summa Theol., Q. 27, Art.3. 
2. Summa Theel., Q. 27, Art.l. 
said, hot.;ever, that not everythj_ ng of that kind is called be-
gotten, but, strictly speaking, only 1•rhat proceeds by l(;ay of 
similitude. In living things such as men and animals genera-
tion includes both of these kinds of genera tion. And if there 
is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to 
act, procession in such a being excludes entirely the first 
kind of generation, but may still have the kind which belongs 
to living t h ings. It is in this manner tha t the procession 
of the · \vord in God is generation. He proceeds by r,;ay of in-
telligent action, from a conjoined principle, by way of 
similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a 
likene ss of the object conceived. In God the act of under-
standing and His existence are the same. Hence the proces-
sion of the 1~lord in God is called generation, and the \'lord 
Himself proceeding is called the Son. 1 
Although love is a procession in God Thomas does not ac-
cept it as generation. The Holy Ghost is from the Father 
and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding. Thomas 
accounts for t his by saying that the intellect and will 
differ in this respect. The intellect is made actual by the 
object understood residing according to its ovm likeness in 
the intellect. The will, however, is made actual, not by 
h aving a c ertain inclination to the thing willed. The pro-
cession of intellect is generation because it begets its own 
1. Summa Theol., Q.27, Art.2. 
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like. The procession of the l'rill, however, is not by '\-ray of 
simil tucte, but is rather by ";Jay of impulse and movement 
towar ds the object. Thus what proceeds in God by -vray of love 
does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather 
as spirit. Both processions are one with the divine nature, 
but the ltford is born and is Son, 't'JhePeas the Holy Ghost, 
though receiving the divine nature, ''ras not born and is not 
son. It is spirit.l 
Thomas held that there are real relations in God. The 
relat ions bet"E'V'een t he persons are not mere logical ones but 
are a ctually the same as His essence. They differ in their 
mode of intelligibility but are really one and the same.2 
He said that t hey can be definitely distinguished from one 
another but tha t t h e distinction is not according to the 
essence, wherein t here is unity and simplicit y , but accord-
1ng to that which is relative. 
Thomas said tha t the individual belong s to the genus of 
substance. The individuals of the genus substance should 
have a special name of t heir Ol'V'n. They a re called hypostas es, 
or first substances. In a more sp ecial and p erfect '\vay the 
part i cular and the individual are found in the rational sub-
stances, "'hich have dominion over their o1•m a ctions. The 
individuals of a rational nature have a special name even 
among other subst~nces. They are called persons.3 Person 
1. Summa Theel., Q.2?, Art.4. 
2. Summa Theol., Q.28, Art.4. 
3. Summa Theol., Q.29, Art.l. 
signifies wha t is most perfect in all nature, a subsistent 
individual of a rational nature. 11 Since everything that is 
p erfect must be attributed to God, fora smuch as His essence 
contains ev ery perfection, this name p erson is fittingly 
applied to God. ul Hov-rever, it is not applied to God a s it 
is to creatures, but in a more excellent way. Thomas told 
of how famous men 1..rere represented in drama by the name 
11 person 11 to mignify those who held high dignity. Also, those 
";ho held high rank in the church came to be called 11 persons. 11 
Thus the d efinition of person is given as hypostasis by 
reason of dignity. And because subsistence in a rational 
nature is of high dignity every individual of the rational 
nature is called a person. No11r the dignity of the divine 
natui· e excels every other. dignity. Thus the name 11 person 11 
p re-eminently belongs to God. 2 But Thomas ~dmits that a 
difficulty arises concerning the meaning of person as predi-
cated plurally of the three relations in God. He proceeded 
to e~plain that it is one _thing to a sk the meaning of the 
Nord 11 person 11 in general, and another to ask the meaning of 
the v-.rord as applied to God. Person in general signifies 
the individual substance of a rational nature. The 1ndiv1-
dual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. 
Distinction in God is only by relation of origin. Relation 
in God is not a s an accident in a subject, but is the divine 
1. Summa Theol., Q.29, Art.J. 
2. Summa Theol., Q.29, Art.~. 
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essence itself. It is subsistent, for the divine essence 
subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God, so the divine 
paternity is God the Fa ther, who is a divine per son. There-
fore a divine p erson signifies a relation a s subsisting. 1 
There are several persons in God, for the word 11 person 11 sig-
nifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine na ture. 
This does not mean a plurality which excludes the supreme 
unity and simplicity of God. It is a plurality of relations. 
Relations are predicated relatively and do not import com-
position. Thomas held that the vmrd "person 11 is appropriate 
for t he three divine persons in the Godhead because each of 
t h em subsists di stinctly from the others in the divine nature 
a nd all have a common idea .2 He said that the three persons 
are called a trinity to signify the det erminate number of 
persons. It differs from other collective l'lords in that in 
the dimine Trinity not only is there unity of order but also 
a unity of essence. It is not triplicity but trinity.3 
Thomas said that inasmuch as the Fa ther is the v·rhence 
from which the other persons proceed it follows that He is 
the principle one. This gives the Fa ther a certain authority, 
but Thomas does not attribute any kind of subjection or in-
feriority to the Son or the Holy Ghost. He said: 11 By author-
ity of the Giver, the Father is the greater; neve r theless t h e 
Son is not less to whom oneness of nature is given. 114 
1. Summa Theol:, Q.29, Art. 4. 3. Summa Theol., Q.Jl, Art.l. 
!. Summa Theol., Q.JO, Art.l. 4. Summa Theol., Q.JJ, Art.l. 
47. 
In discussing the humanity of Christ Thoma s said that 
Christ had a real body of the same nature as ours, a true 
rational soul, and, together with these, perfect deity. 
These three substances are united in one person,l but do not 
combine to form one nature, but tw·o natures. 2 These t~..ro na-
tures resulted from two generations or births. One is an eter-
nal generation, whereby he received a divine nature from His 
Fa ther. The other occurred in time, 't·rhereby He received 
human nature from His mother. This means that there lvere 
t1-ro intellects in Christ, one humanand·: one divine, and lilce-
wise t\·Io 't-ri l ls, as vrell a s a double lcnoi•rledge and charity. 
This does not mean that Christ h ad tw·o existences, hm;rever. 
There was on e existence but two kinds of action in Him.3 
Thomas said that the human nature of Christ was the organ 
of His divine nature. The e. ctivity of His humanity vras more 
eminent but the action of His divine nature had an instru-
mental po1.ver. The rotivity of the human nature in Christ re-
ceived a certain efficacy from the divine nature, over and 
above its human power. 11 When Christ touched a leper, the 
action belonged to His human nature; but the fact that the 
touch cured the man of his leprosy is owing to t h e p ower of 
the divine nature. 4 
God gives certain gifts to man which are called graces. 
They are given gratis and they make man pleasing to God. The 
1. Aquinas, COT, 227. 3. Aquinas, COT, 236. 
2. Aquinas, COT, 231. 4. Aquinas, COT, 237. 
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man Christ received a s i ngular grace. He was united to God 
in unity of person. This made Him supremely pleasing to 
God. The closer any creature draws to God, the more it 
shares in His goodness, and the more abundantly it is filled 
with gifts infused by Him. Therefore, in consequence of the 
very union of His human nature 1-.rith God in unity of p erson, 
Christ's soul was filled with gifts of graces beyond all 
other souls. 1 This supreme fullness of grace overflowed 
from Him t o others so that grace and truth came to others 
from Him. Thus it is fitting that He should be the head of 
t h e Church.2 His grace is infinite and He. has the power 
suffic i ent for the sal vat ion of the "rhole "t-rorld. 3 
Thomas held t hat it was important for Christ to take 
His bodily nature from human nature. He brought salvation 
to the human race, not onl y by conferring the remedy of 
grace, but also by giving an example t hat cru1not be i gnored. 
Thoma s said: 
Doubts may be raised about the teaching and the 
life of any other man because of a defect in his 
human knowledge and his mast ery of the truth. But 
what the Son of God teaches is believed without 
hesitation to be true and what He does is a ccepted 
with out mis giving as good. In Him we ought to have 
an exam:pl e of the glory vre hope for and of the 
virtue whereb y we may merit it. In both instances 
the exampl e "tvould have been less telling if He 
had taken His bodily nature from another source 
than that from which the rest of men receive theirs.4 
1. Aquinas, COT, 243. 
2. Aquinas , COT , 244. 
J. Aquinas, COT, 247. 
4. Aquinas, COT , 255. 
Nevertheless Thomas held that the body of Christ could 
not becomingly have been fashioned in human nature in the 
same -r;.ray a s the bodies of other men are formed. Original sin 
is passed on through the active power of the male seed. 
Therefore, the body of Christ was formed miraculously through 
1 
the Holy Spirit, the author of all grace. Since in human 
generation the w·oman provides the matter, Christ appropri-
ately took flesh from a woman. She conceived without the 
admixture of male seed. She vms filled with s ph•itual gifts 
and endO\'I' ed l'Jith virtues by the Holy Spirit. Her soul was 
free from sin. 2 
15. Comments. 
1. Although it is not evident that the Old Testament 
h ad any direct influence on the Christian concept of the 
Trinity it is clear that the New Testament v;ri ters and 
the early Church Fathers used the Old Testament consider-
ably in formulation of their ideas. The Old Testament per-
sonffication of such concepts as 11 Spt·rit of God 11 and the 
11 vlisc1om of God 11 might vtell have influenced the Jevrish 
thinkers when they -v.rere presented with the Lo gos theology 
of considering Jesus a s the incarnation of the 11 \'lord of 
GocL 11 The gentile Christians also made vride use of the 
Old Testament in developing their Christian ideas. 
1. Aquinas, COT, 256-257. 
2. Aquinas, COT, 259. 
, , 
so. 
The Old Testament personifications of certain of God's 
manif estations, or modes of revelation, did not destroy the 
oneness of God for the Jev-rish people. It '''as merely God 1 s 
way of approachi ne; His 'tvorld. Any possible Old Testament in-
fluence vmuld certainly have to be on the s ide of modalism. 
ii. The trinitarian concept in the Nevi Testament and 
in the vlri t ings of the early Fathers is mainly one of re-
ligious experience. AJ_though the names of Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit are linked together there was no real develop-
ment of the idea into any doctri nal form. It 1f\l'as rather a 
form of expressing the deep faith that had built up around 
the p erson of Jesus and linger i ng experience of the Holy 
Spirit aft er the death and resUl"rection of Jesus. It r1as 
the k ind of faith that could lead Paul to place the names 
of Jesus and the Holy Spirit along with God the Father in 
1 the apostolic benediction. It was the k ind of faith that 
d.ould lead Ignatius to refer to 11 Jesus oul" God. u2 
This religious experience did not disappear when the 
Christian thinkers started forming doctrines to explain 
one's faith . The faith remained, but it was difficult to 
put into 't.;ords. This deep faith tvas a definite deciding 
factor in fo1~ ing Christian doctrine. Although there was 
some purely speculative and philosophical influence the 
1. II Cor. 13:14. 
2. I gnatius, Ephesians, Pro., 137. 
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general position was to disclaim any necessity to provide a 
rational explanation. They preferred to consider the doc-
trine a mystery and to be accepted on faith. Augustine 
started his discussion of the Trinity by. stating that it must 
be started with faith and that his arB~ments were to guard 
against those who are deceived by a crude and perverse love 
of reason. 1 
The approach of faith is valid only as it is left en-
tirel y as a matter of faith. But when one tries to express 
their faith in the form of a doctrine one inevitably enters 
the realm of speculat ion and reason. Although Augustine 
disclaimed any necessity for a rational explanation of the 
Trinity he proceeded to present rational arguments in its 
defen:se. It is interesting that when he turned to these ar-
guments his reasoning serves more to strengthen the modal-
istic than the orthodox view of the Trinity. This is be-
cause the orthodox view is essentially irrational and can 
be accepted only on faith and as a mystery. As soon as one 
tries to present it rationally difficulties arise. To satisfy 
reason one must turn to a doctrine such as modalism. 
iii. Although religious faith in Jesus Christ wa s a 
determining factor throughout the development of the doc-
trine of the Trinity it cannot be denied that certain 
1. Augustine, De Trin., I,l,l. 
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philosophical ideas played a large part too. The Logos 
idea certainly afforded a ready mold for the nerson of the 
Son and had a great effect on Christian thinking. But the 
philoso:9hical idea that affected the development of the 
trinitarian conception most \•Tas the idea of substance. 
Th i s platonic id ea t.ras still a dominating on e and made it 
po s sible for the Christian t h inkers to hold to a real divi-
sion of the substance of God and yet hold to the oneness of 
God . This concept of substs nce is at the very heart of the 
Nicene controversy. It is an es sential ~art of the trini-
tarian position of Augustine and Thoma s Aqui na s. 
Our modern conception of personality had not yet been 
developed but both Augustine and Thomas used the word 
11 person 11 tn connection 1-vi th the Trinity reluctantly. Thomas 
explained that the word was used for a character in a drama 
or for a dignitary. As long as it is limited to a concept 
such as that there is no difficulty in using it in connec-
tion with the Trinity. But Thomas went on to say that per-
son generally signifies an individual of a rational nature 
and admits that a difficulty arises in the use of the word 
pr edica ted plurally of the three r elations in God. He ac-
cepted the usage, hovrev P.r, and said that it is one thing to 
ask the meaning of the -vrord "person 11 in general and another 
thing to ask the meaning of the word as applied to God. 1 
1. Summa Theel., Q29, Art.3. 
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The modern conception of personality has made it neces-
sary to revise the whole concept of substance. Personality 
is itself the ultimate form of reality and as such cannot 
be ex9lained by anything else. It is a unity of self-
consciousness that cannot be divided as Thomas thought of 
substance being divided. God is an intelligent agent. His 
unity does not consist in a substance but in consciousness 
itself. God is a person, but to call the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit three nersons in the one person of God is con-
trary to the generally accepted meaning of the 1·rord 11 person 11 
and an impossible conception of the personality of God. 
Thus we see that the orthodox view of the Trinity is based 
on both an outmoded conception of substance and an impos-
sible conception of personality. 
iv. The orthodox statement of the Trinity was developed 
as an answer to the threats of tritheism. Those who helped 
to form the orthodox vievr were determined to avoid all sub-
ordination between the persons of the Trinity because to 
permit any subordination is to open the way to tritheism. 
If the Son and Holy Spirit are not equal to the Father 
then they are lesser Gods. 
This problem was never completely overcome by the ortho-
dox theologians. They made very definite statements to the 
effect that there is complete equality among the persons, 
but then they always defeat their purpose in the illustrations 
used to support their statements. This is true even in 
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Augustine. He said that the persons are entirely equal but 
yet in explaining their functions he said that the Father is 
begetter and the Son the begotten. 1 No matter how much 
Augustine insists that there is no subordination intended, 
and even though the process of begetting is eternal, it is 
onl~ reasonable to hold a certain pre-eminence for the be-
get ter. If the begetter did not beget, then the begotten 
could never be the begotten. The orthodox view cannot 
avoid attributing some sort of priority to the Father and 
thus is open to the criticism of subordinationism, and thus 
tritheism. 
v. The orthodox statement of the Trinity is also an at-
tempt to avoid the alternatives of dynamic and modalistic 
monarchianism. The threat of tritheism in the orthodox 
view led to these movements to preserve monotheism by 
stressing the sole government of God. The orthodox advo-
cates, felt that these viel\"S deny the real divinity of 
Christ and proceeded to develop their view of three persons 
in the Godheact. 
But orthodox theology has not succeeded in reas onably 
avoiding either of these forms of monarchianism. Any con-
ception of the pre-existence of Jesus cannot avoid either 
an adoptionist view or else a modalistic view. If Christ 
pre-existed then he either adopted t h e human form of Jesus, 
1. Augustine, De Trin., IV, 20, 27. 
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or else Jesus was a mode or manifestation of God. The ortho-
dox writers tried to avoid this, but they often resor~ed 
to modalistic and adoptionist expressions. Augustine in-
sisted that the distinctions between the persons are en-
tirely a matter of functions.l And when he tried to provide 
analogies to explain the Trinity he used psychological func-
tions which are certainly modalistic. 2 
Christianity's allegiance to monotheism can never per-
mit any activity in the Godhead which would deny the sole 
government of God. Any division of activity or function 
can only be modes of expression or manifestations of the 
one God. The plight of the orthodox theologians is seen in 
Augustine, who tried to give expression to the orthodox 
view, but yet could not avoid modalistic explanations. 
vi. The dominant position of the orthodox view of the 
Trinity was larg ely the result of bibliolatry and ecclesias-
ticism. From an early time the Christian thinkers attri-
buted great authority to the Scriptures. They felt obligated 
to develop their theology in conformity with the Scriptures.3 
This influence played a very important part in the triumph 
of Athanasius over the Arian group in the Council of Nicea. 
Atha nasius used selected proof tests to argue against Arius 
s nd to support what came to be the orthodox view. This pro-
cedure must have carried enormous ~reight to swing a large 
1. Augustine, De Trin., IV,20,27. 
2. Augustine, De Trin., XV,3,5. 
3. Irenaeus, Ag. Her., Bk. II, Chap. 30, Par. 9, 406b. 
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group of the churchmen to support his view. 
Although an overwhelming majority signed the creed for-
mulated at N:XEa there ~·Jas considerable opposition to it for 
many years. But once the council had s poken there was no 
changing it. An ecclesiasticism had developed '\'rhich led 
Augus tine to say later that the decisions of all church 
councils are binding . Some ambiguous or undecided point might 
be cleared up but a definite decision could not be changed. 1 
This meant that a decision, though based ~pon an incorrect 
interpretation ana_ a false use of the Sc r iptures, 't-.'"ould be 
b inding upon the church for all time. Some of Augustine's 
statements seem to indicate that he had some definite reser-
vations regarding the orthodox view· of the Trinity but be-
cause it \vas the accepted viel"J of the Catholic Church it was 
his view.2 
Ecclesiasticism was not only responsible for the strong 
establishment of the orthodox view but it was also its great 
p rotector. By means of ecclesiastical control and punish-
ment all other vie'\'rs were :9revented any r eal consideration 
until after the Protes tant reformation. 
vii. The modalistic conception of the Trinity received 
early consideration in Christian thought. In the second 
century vie find Tatian a.pplyigg the Logos idea to the Son 
a nd explaining it as an exerc i se of God's will, as a thought 
1. Augustine, De Trin., I,4,7. 
2. Augustine, De Trin., VII,6,11. 
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is uttered in speech.1 The oneness of God was the basic thought 
among all of t he main Christian thinkers. Monotheism 1..ras to 
be preserved a s an essential doctrine. That is "torhat made 
subordinationism such a problem and what made monarchianism 
attractive. Modalistic monarchianism received such wide-
spread acceptance becau s e it presented a means by which 
monotheism can be protected and yet also preserves the divi-
nity of Jesus Christ. The reason for its being pushed into 
the baclcgrounc1 is largely ecclesiastical. If it had been 
permitted to develop further it might have become more of a 
chal l enge to the orthodox view. But after the Nicene Council 
all attempts to present this view met with inevitable ecclesi-
a stical action. It was not until the Enlightenment that this 
vielv could really be developed. 
1. Tatian, Add., Chap. 5, 67. 
CHAPTER II 
HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 
1. Introduction. 
This pre s entat ion of Hegel's doctrine of the Trinity 
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is based on a collection of statements gathered from a 
number of Hegel's works. There is a considerable difference 
of approa ch bet1-.reen the va rious works of Hegel. Some of 
t hem make direct references to the va rious a spects of the 
Trinity, but oth ers merely ref er to them in abstract terms. 
But even in the abstract language of such 1-rorks as his 
Lo gic Hegel makes statements which clearly r efer to such 
trin i t a rian ideas as 11 the Son, 11 11 the Father, 11 11 Inca rna-
tion,11 etc. Such references a re u sed, a long with more di-
rect statements i n such works as his Philosonhy of Religion, 
to p i ece to geth er Hegel's position regarding the Christ i an 
Trinity. 
2. Historical Background. 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel wa s born on August 27, 
1770 at Stuttgart, Germany. The age of reason and enlight-
enment 1-ms closing and the day of the romantics wa s at hand. 
Both of these contempora ry influences affected his thinking.l 
1. Hegel , ET\'l , 1. 
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His father '\>rae a revenue officer. He learned the elements 
of Latin from his mother before he went to the Stuttgart 
grammar school, v-rhere he remained until he was eighteen. 
As a schoolboy he made a collection of extracts, alphabeti-
cally arranged, comprising annotations on classical authors, 
passages from newspapers, treatises on morals and mathematics 
from the standard 't.,..orks of the period. In this 'tvay he ab-
sorbed raw material for elaboration. Yet as evidence that 
he was not merely receptive we have essays already breath-
ing that admiration of the classical "t"lorld which he never 
lost. 
II 
In the autumn of 1788 he entered Tubingen as a stu-
dent of theology; but he showed no interest in theology and 
his sermons were a failure. He found more congenial reading 
in the classics and wrote on the advantage of studying them. 
After t"t·lO year s he took the degree of Ph. D., ana_ in the 
autumn of 1793 received his theological certificate. 
As a student, his elderly appearance gained him the 
title of 11 0lc1 Man, 11 but he took part in the i1allcs, beer 
drin1king and love-making of his fellows. He gained most 
from intellectual intercourse with his contemporaries, among 
II II 
vJhom ivere. Holderlin anc1 Schelling. With Holderlin Hegel 
learned to feel for the old Greeks a love which grew stronger 
as the semi-Kantianized theology of his teachers more and 
more failed to interest him. With Schelling like sympathies 
bound him. The y both protested against the political and 
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eccleiastical inertia of their native state, anc1 adopted the 
doctrines of freedom and reason. 
On leaving college, he became a tutor at Bern and lived 
in intellectual isolation. He made an intensive study of 
Christianity. Under the impulse given by Lessing and Kant 
I 
he t~rned to the original records of Christianity, and at-
tempted to construe for himself the real significance of 
Christ. He wrote a life of Jesus, in which he asked for 
the secret contained in the conduct and sayings of this man 
which made him the hope of the human race. In religious 
life Hegel found the principle vrhich reconciles the opposi-
tions of the temporal mind. He found that life is higher 
than all its accidents. He found his panacea in the concrete 
life of humanity. 
During these years Hegel kept up a slack correspondence 
II 
with Schelling and Holderlin. Schelling, already on· the way 
to fame, kept Hegel abreast with German spec~uation. Both 
of them were intent on forcing the theologians into the day-
light. To"t·mrd_ the close of his engagement at Bern, Hegel 
recei ,ved hopes from Schelling of a post at Jena. Fortunately 
II 
his friend Holderlin, now tutol1 in Frankfort, secured a 
similar situation there for Hegel in January, 1797. The new 
post gave him more leisure and the society he needed. ~nile 
here he made a preliminary sketch of h~s system. About this 
time he turned to questions of economics ana_ government. He 
aimed at correcting the abstract discussion of a topic by 
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treating it in its systematic interconnections. Church and 
state, law· and morality, commerce and art are reduced to 
factors in the totality of human life, from vrhich the speci-
alists had isolated them. His old interest in the religious 
question reappears, but in a more philosophic form. In this 
p erioo., h01:vever, Hegel still felt that philosophy was sub-
ordinate to relig ion. Later he adopted a view according to 
which philosophy is a higher mode of apprehending the infinite 
than even religion. 
In J anuary, 1799, Hegel's father died. The slender sum 
vrhich he receiffed as an inheritance enabled him to think once 
more of a studious life. Hegel arrived at Jena in January, 
1801. He collaborated with Schelling and their thought wa s 
much alike. During 1801-1802 Hegel lectured at Jena on logic 
~nd metaphysics. In 1805 he was made a professor extraordi-
nar~us. Though some of his hearers became attached to him, 
Hegel wa s not a popular lecturer. In 1807 he produced a 
w·eekly ne'tvspaper. It lva s not a suitable vocation, hov-1ever, 
and he gladly acc~pted the rectorship of the Aegidien gym-
nasium in Nuremberg, a post which he held from December, 1808, 
to August, 1816. As a teacher and master Hegel inspired con-
fidence in his pupils, and maintained discipline without 
uedantic interference in their associations and sports. 
. -
In 1811 Hegel married Marie von Tucher of Nuremberg, \-.rho 
\!TaB t v-renty--tl10 years his junior. The marriage was entiPely 
happy. Two sons were born to them, Karl and Immanuel. 
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There appeared in 1812 the first two volumes of his 
Science of Logic. It was completed by a third volume in 
li816. This work presented his system for the first time. 
It brought him offers of three professorships. He accepted 
the post at Heidelberg in Octoger, 1816. In 1818 he accepted 
the dffer of the chair of philosophy at Berlin, vacant since 
the death of Fichte. His influence on his pupils, and his 
solidarity with the Prussian government, gave him a position 
such as few professors have held. During his thirteen years 
at Be1rlin Hegel's vrhole soul seems to have been in his lee-
tures:. Betv;een 1823 and 1827 his activity reached its maxi-
mum. His notes were subjected to perpetual revisions and 
addi t 1ions. vle can form an idea of them from the shape in 
't<Ihich they appear in his :published '"ri tings. Those on 
Aesth:etics, the Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of 
History have been published by his editors, mainly from the 
notes of his students. Those on Logic, Psychology, and the 
I 
Philo 1sophy of Nature are appended in the form of illustrat ive 
and ekplanatory not es to the sections of his Encyclopedia. 
During these years hundreds of hearers from all parts of 
Germany, and beyond, came under his influence. His fame ''las 
c a rried abroad by eager and intelligent disciples. 
On November 14, 1831, Hegel contracted cholera, and after 
only 0ne day 1 s illnes s he died. He was buried, as he had 
desired, between Fichte and Solger. Hegel's influence has 
continued after his death. He is responsible for more of 
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the developments in modern art, religion, philosophy, govern-
ment, etc., than any other one man. 
!Adams makes a very interesting distinction between the 
earl~ and the later writings of Hegel. The significance of 
the early vrri tings is that they enable us to see that at 
I 
one ti<J'ell defined -oeriod in his development Hegel's philosophy 
I -
was through and through of the type which chooses to explore 
life, l the spirit, etc. It was historical rather than logical, 
exper;iential rather than metaphysical. Adams points out that 
a di vi s ion of Hegel's works chronologically lets us see some-
thin@ o"f t he motive which led him into sympathy for mysticism 
and e~en romant ic enthusiasm during this early perioc1. Adams 
wrote ,: 
Indeed, one might come avray from a study of the 
early l-Tritings f eeling that the Logic of the 
ma ture Hegel is nothi ng but a highly elaborated 
ano_ formal account of what the younger Hegel felt 
and lived in a concrete and vivid way. The in-
sight expressed in these early writings is the 
real stuff, the real c ontents of the later sys-
tem, however self-contained and self-adequate 
the latter may appear to be. Whatever fate 
awaited the later Hegel, the younger Hegel con-
ceived of his philosophy as a sympathetic criti-
1 cism of life, and not as the logical construction 
of a rational system.l 
3. Theory of Religious Knowledge. 
i. A revealing God. 
Hegel asked, 11 Why should God not reveal Himself to us if 
we earnestly seek the lcnowledge of him? u2 A light loses 
1. Adams, Art.(l910), 68-69. 
2. Hegel, HOP, II, 73. 
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nothing by another's beirig kindled therefrom. If the knowledge 
of God were kept from us in order that we should know the 
fi nite only, and not attain the infinit e , God would be a 
jeal0us God. God would become an empty name.l Hegel held 
that there is no obstacle to a knowledge of God through men. 
I God ~s a relation to us. He communica tes Himself and re-
veals Himself t o man. God reveals Himself in nature , but He 
cannot reveal Himself to nature, to the st one, to the plant, 
etc. God is Spirit, and can reveal Himself only to man, \'Tho 
thinks and is Spirit. The only hind.rance to a kno't'Jledge of 
God i 1s human caprice. Man has an affectation of humility 
't"'hich1 contx•asts human reason and. divine reas on. Hegel re-
pudiatt ed this contrast. He e:a.;i:.d that it is not a Christian 
humil~ty, but is rather sin agai nst the ·Holy Spirit. 2 He 
holds that, though much human reason is inadequate, the 
Spirit of God is in man and a ctually it is t he self-consciousness 
of God '\I'J'hich knows itself in the know·ledge of man. Therefore 
it is possible for man t o kno't-v God compl etely. 3 
When the record adds that God drove men out of 
yhe Garden of Eden to prevent their eating of 
the tree of life, it only means that on his 
natural side man is finite and mortal, but in 
lcnm·rl edge infinite. 4 
ii. A reasonable world. 
Hegel said., 11 To him who looks upon the l"Torld rationally, 
t h e 'tvorld in its turn presents a rational aspect. The reve-
1. Hegel, HOP, II, 73. 
2. Hegel, HOP, II, 73. 
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lation is mutual. u]_ ''!hat is rational is actual and what 
is actual is rational. This is the conviction which lea ds 
man ~o a study of mind , as well as a study of nature. Hegel 
believed tha t rationality is synonymous with the idea of God. 2 
I 
· SteJ•rett tells us that the whole -vrork of Hegel lvas to -
reconcile reason with religion, by finding reason in religion 
and religion in reason. Hegel wanted to expl icate in the 
form of thought, the content of relie ion, which is ordinarily 
held 1in the form of feeling or metaphor, or at best in the 
form 
1
of faith, or abbreviated knm·.rledge.3 
lsome of the earlier thinlcers did not rlish to bring 
theology into a closer relation to Peason but Hegel held 
that if there is a meaning in such a doctrine as the Trinity, 
I 
we m~st try to underst and it. 4 God revealed Himself in the 
Chris~ian religion. He is no longer a concealed or secret 
exist6nce. This possibility of knowing Him t hus afforded us, 
I 
rend ers such a knowledge a duty. 11 God wishes no narrow-
hearted souls or empty heads for His child.ren. u.S 
Working from the thesis that reason governs the world, 
and that knolvledge of God is possible, Hegel brO.ught the 
methods of philosophy into the search for religious know-
ledge. He -vras conscious of the fact that philosophy was 
under suspicion from the point of view of relig ion, but he 
assertecl that philosoPhy had a clear conscience and that it 
1. vJallace, LOH, 56. 
2. He gel, PORT, 10-11. 
3. Sterrett, HPOR, ix. 
4. Hegel, HOP, I, 222. 
. 5. Hegel, POH, 15. 
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-vras able to defend religion . against attacks even of some 
theon.o gical systems. He said that rational lmowledge is a 
fundamental characteristic of the Christian religion. It 
gives development to its content, for the ideas regarding 
its general subject-matter are implicitly or in themselves 
thoughts, and must as such develop themselves. 1 
iii. A reasonable religion. 
Hegel beld that religious convictions need a rational 
basis. Religion is never merely intellectual, how·ev er . 
Cons ciousness of God, or religious certitude, at first 
seems to be an immediate relation between the soul and God. 
vle ane as sure of God as vre are of our mm selves. But 
perf~ct c~rtitude of a thing does not prove its truth.2 
There is a difference between conviction when it rests on 
subje'ctive grouncl s, such as feeling and perceptions, ano_ 
when it r ests on thought proceeding from acquaintance with 
the nption and the nature of the thing. In the former case 
conviption is opinion.3 If God were present only in feel-
1 ing, then man would be no higher than the beasts. It is 
true that He doe s exist for f eeling too, but he exists es-
sentially for thought. 4 Hegel neld that the position of 
Religion is right in pl acing God at the cent E~r of all of 
life, giving the consciousness of the active presence of 
1. Hegel, POR, I, 18. 
2. Hegel, POR, I, 14. 
3. Sterrett, HPOR, 73. 
4. Hegel, POR, III, 8. 
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truth. The nature of this truth should be examined and com-
preh~nded, however. 1 This is the purpose of philosophy.-
The object of religion as well as philosophy is the 
kno 'Hl.Sg.ge .of eternal truths of God. Philosophy unfolc1s it-
self when it unfolds religion. As the mind thinks philo-
soph~cally it immerses itself in God, as religious conscious-
ness does. 2 Religion and philosophy come to be one in this 
regand. Philosophy is itself really .·t-rorship. i'lhat distin-
guisties them from each other is merely the kind and manner 
of religion we find in each. It is the peculiar way in which 
they 1both occupy themselves l'Tith God that the distinction 
comes out.3 Philosophy does not stop with the knowledge that 
I 
God ~s; it 1vants to know what God is. Hegel 1-1anted religion 
to have this same knowledge.4 
Hegel proceeded to consider the various theological 
probllems just as he would any other problem of kno-vrledge. 
He considered all thought to be evolutionary and dialectical. 
He did not accept any of the dogmas of the church as author-
ity but ~eld t he necessity of subjecting every thought to 
the m'ost rigid tests of truth. He had a high regard for 
the BtLble, but lfie,ldi t hat the doctrines based on it vrere 
highly subjective. He said, 11 ~his man finds this thing, 
the other finds that; 11hat -vras secure no1'11' sho-v.rs itself as 
1. Hegel, POR, I, 3-4. 
2. Hegel, POR, I, 19. 
3. Hegel, PO~ I, 20. 
4. Hegel, POR, I, 45. 
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insepure, because it is considered by the subjective spirit."1 
He argued against the use of the 11letter 11 of the Bible. 
The Bible itself says that 11 The lettel"' killeth. 112 He crit-
icized the exegetical scholars for trying to find exact · 
biblical support for each of their doctrines. Hegel pointed 
out that it was the Church that formulated the doctrines 
I 
through the guidance of the Spirit.3 He cast aside all ex-
ternal authority and held: 
1·lhat is to be of value to me must have its veri-
fication ._ in my own spirit, and in order that I 
may believe I must have the witness of my spirit. 
It may indeed come to me from 1•Ti thout, but any 
such external origin is a matter of indifference; 
if it is to be valid, this validity can only 
build itself up upon the founaation of all truth , 
in the witness of the Spirit. 
Hegel did not 1rmnt to restrict religion to mere prin-
ciples, however. He did not want religion m·erely of the 
head. He considered religion as of the heart and feeling 
also. Only then will it be a real part of a person's in-
dividual1ty.5 He insisted, however, that it is not the 
concern of philosophy to produce religion in ·any individual. 
The existence of religion is presupposed as forming what is 
fundamental in everyone.6 
' 
Some later students of Hegel were crit i cal of his deep 
interest in religion and held his philosophy to be primarily 
a religious one. They considered his systematic logic a 
1. Hegel, HOP, I, 14. 4. Hegel, POR, I, 42-43. 
2. Hegel, HOP, III, 12. 
3. Hegel, POH, 331. 
5. Hegel, POM, 21. 
6. Hegel, ~OR, I, 4. 
ratiOnal theology. 1 They felt that Hegel had not cut himself 
free from theology and that his philosophy was still dressed 
up in the terminological frills and ruffles of Christianity. 2 
It v-rill be shmm later how Hegel's system of thought, 
of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, fits into the logical 
conception of the Trinity. 
4. God as Father. 
i. The Universal. 
Hegel's conception of God as Father is God as He is in 
Himse1lf, in His essence. 3 It is purely a speculative concep-
tion ~hich is decidedly apart from any historic revelation. 
4 Its proof is b a sed entirely on rational truth. This God 
exist!s only for the man who thinks, who keeps 't..ri thin the 
quiet of his ovm mind. 
It is pure theoretic contemplation, the supreme 
repose of thought, but at the same time its 
highest activity manifested in grasping the 
pure Iclea of God and becoming conscious of 
this Idea.:> 
The abstract God, the Father, is the Universal, the 
eternal, all embracing , total particularity. He is Absolute 
Bpiri t.. The Univel"sal includes everythi ng wlthin itself. 6 
God, the absolute Idea, the category of categories, is found 
to be the ultimate reality, the thought which alone ha s 
being in itself, and which imparts whatever measure of thought 
1. Hook, FHTM, 17. 
2. Hook, FHTM, 114. 
3. Hook, FHTM, 17. 
4. Bro1-m, TMT, 17-19. 
5. Hegel, FOR, III, 12. 
6. Hegel, FOR, III, 25. 
70 . 
and being that all else has to it.l Goa is not merely the 
a bstra ct, or most real being. If he vrere h e woul d be relegated 
to a l)ot her world beyond. 2 If we consider Goa as the Essence 
only, and' nothing more, \-J e lcnO'tAJ Him only as the universa l and 
irresistible p ower. This implies tha t we look up on t h e world 
befo~e u s in its immed i acy as someth ing p ermanent and posi-
tive , and forget tha t true Being is just t h e sup e r seding 
of all that is immediate. The true knolvledge of God b egins, 
according to Hegel, when "re knovi that things, as they im-
media tely are, have no truth.3 God created the world out of 
nothi,n g . In othe r words, the world of finite thing s has 
i s sued from the fulness of whe divine thoughts and the divine 
decrees. Whatever else is true is only true in so far as it 
is fo,und ed in .Him and is knov-m from Him. 4 It is only he who 
knol·rs l the world that knows God. Yet, we cannot lcnovr Him 
fully without knmving the sup er-sensuous e s s ence of C-od. 
God i !s s pirit or mind , not a particula rized individual s p irit, 
but a is absolute. 5 ' 
~egel sees the ·finite "t'!Orld as c ompletely d en enctent on 
God. God is not only complete subjectivity , He is also 
compl ete objectivity. 
As absolu te object, h01>1ever, God does not 
therefore take up the position of a da rk and 
hostile p ower ov e r a gainst subjecti~ity. He 
r a ther igvolves it as a vital element in 
Himself. 
4. lvallace, LOH, 294. 
5. Hegel, POFA, 154. 
6. Wallace, LOH , 334. 
1. Sterrett, HPOR, 61. 
2. \val lace, LOR, ?L~ . 
3. 't'lal 1 a ce, LOR, 210. 
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Thus God is the beginning of all things, and. the end. of all 
things, and 't'·rhich animate s and pr eserves in existence all the 
1 
v a rlqus forms of being.-· 
ii. Division of finite and infinite. 
Hegel speaks much of the division of the finite and 
the infinite. The infinite is C~d in His essential nature. 
The f inite is God in His otherness. In the realm of t he 
world it is man alone who can att a in the infinite. Man is 
a thinking spirit and has infinite possibilities of know-
ing God. 11 It is t h r ough thought, concrete thought, or to 
put ~t more d efinitely , it is by rea son of his being Spirit, 
that lman is man. u2 All of the conditions which have reference 
to main 1 s freedom and will; all the manifest forms of human 
I 
relations, activities, and pleasures; all that ha s 't-Torth 
and a!i gnity for man, finds ultimately its center in the 
thought, t h e consciousne ss, and the feel i ng of God. Man 
comes into his hi ghe s t level of consciousness as he finds 
his p~oper rela tion to God.3 It is in the realm of thought 
I 
or sp irit that man achieves his real being . God rules the 
world as reason and it is through man's re~son tha t his real 
l(nowledge of Goa_ is obtained. 4 11 It is only :for thought that 
the universal object exists, only to thought can the es-
senc e of the object show itself. u5 Heg el identified this 
1. Hegel, POR, I, 2. 4. Hegel, POH, 15. 
2. Hegel, POR, I, J. s. Hegel, POR, III, 7-
3· Hegel, POR, I, J. 
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rational knowledge of God in the mind of man as the actual 
self consciousness of God. He said: 
God is God only so far as He knows Himself: 
His self-knowledge is, further, His self 
consciousness i n man, and man's knowledge of 
God, wh ich proceec1s to man 1 s self-knov.rledge 
in God.l 
Man himself is thus comprehended in the notion of God. But 
this 
1
unity mus t not be superficially conceived of, as though 
Gocl. 1.ve r e only man, e.na_ man, 1-ri thout further condition, ,,;ere 
God. Man, on the contrary, is God only in so far as he an-
nuls the merely natural and limited in his Spirit, and ele-
vates himself to God. It is necessary for man, who knows 
that he himself is an element in the Divine Idea, to give up 
his merely natural being . The natural is · unspiritual.2 
iii. Revealed in the world. 
God also reveals Himself in the sensuous or natural vJorld, 
but not in His eternal and absolute essentiality. His mani-
fest a tion of Himself in the sensuous realm is something dif-
f erent from this, and is made to sensuous consciousness. If 
God were present only in this realm, then men would be no 
higher than the beasts. It is true that He does exist for the 
senses, but only in the region of a9pearances or manifesta-
tion.3 The real presence of Goo. must be spiritual. "God 
thunders with His thunder and is not knowu. The spiritual 
3. Hegel, POR, I, 7-8. 1. Hegel, POM, 176. 
2. He~el, POH, 336. 
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man demands somethj_ng higher than what is merely natural. 111 
The conclusion of Hegel is that the real -v1orld is as it 
ough~ to be. The uni,rersal divine reason is not a mere ab-
stradtion, but a vital principle capable of realizing itself. 
Reason in its most concrete form is God. 
God governs the world; the actual vmrking of 
His government--the carrying out of His plans--
is the history of the world ..• Only that which 
has been developed as the result of it, pos-
sesses bona fide reality. That which does not 
accord with it, is ne gative, worthless existence. 2 
God is the absolutely perfect Being, and can vlill nothing 
othe~ than Himself, His o~m will.3 Necessity forms part 
of ttle essence of God. God knm._rs '!.>!hat he 1-rills is deter-
mined in His eternal ~rill nei thel"' by accio.ent from vli thin 
I 
nor ~rom without. \(hat He wills He also accomplishes ir-
resi~tibly.4 In describing God as creator Hegel said: 
It is not the action of Power as Power, 
but of Power as Power that is wise, for 
Power first determines itself as wisdom; 
t..;hat appears as f init e is thus already 
contained in it, and the determinations 
here get affirmation, i.e., the finite 
existences, the things created get true 
affirmation.5 
iv. A divine person. 
Hegel holds tha t God must be of necessity because He 
is the absolute Thing . He held, hoviever, that this makes 
Him no less the absolute Person. Hegel feels that he has 
1. Hegel, POR, III, 44. 
2. Hegel, POH, 36. 
). Hegel, POH, 20. 
4. Wallace, LOR, 269. 
5. Hegel, POR, II, 155. 
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avoided Spinoza 1 s pantheism at this point. He trie~ to con-
ceive of God as not merely the absolute, but as a divine 
PerSQn. 1 He insisted tha t the necessity of God is not blind; 
but that there is a t eleological action in God in vrl~ich the 
end :lis already forekno"t<m. God's e.ctivity is, therefore, not 
blind. 2 But, if there is such forekno"ViTledge , can there be 
any real freedom in the 't'JOrlo_? Hegel ansvrered this problem 
b y s a ying tha t there is free lvill and things, a.nc1 persons, 
follow their own bent. God does not d i rectl y interfere in 
this process. But, God is still -vrork ing out His ovm aims . 
He heJs a cunning in 1-rhich he p ermits His objec ts a freedom 
but yet the result is the accomplishment of, not their plans, 
but His.3 
Hegel does not go into much detail in describing the 
characteristics of God. He does ref er to Him as crea tor, 
ruler of the universe , etc. He sa:~d _ that holine s s is found 
4 in God, and mentions the moral perfection of Goct, ancl that 
He is l eternal love.5 But Hegel's main interest in describ-
I ing the nature of God is purely speculative and rational 
and r 1esults in such t erms as absolute Idea, absolute Truth, 
the In:f i nit e , etc. 
Hegel's conception of God as Father involves no idea 
of generation as a sexual relation. F&.therhood is attributed 
1. Wallace, LOR, 274. 
2. Wallace, LOH, 268. 
J. Wallace, LOR, 350. 
4. Hegel, ETW, 160. 
5. Hegel, FOR, III, 111. 
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to God because of the dependence which all else has on Him. 
This ~!onception will be discuss ed further in a later section. 
5. God as Son. 
L:n Hegel's system of thought it is nece13sary to look 
for the inherent vital movement in his concept of Goc1. He 
saicL that the pure identity of the Spirit separates itself 
I from ~.tself ana_ makes a second aspect of itself as contrasted 
w·i th the universal. Hegel c::o.nst:d·ere:d this antithetic form of 
SDirit to be the Son of God. It is God redueed to limited 
- I 
and ~O {' Lrticular conceptions; it is world-nature, and finite 
spiri t . 1 
i. The coming of Christ. 
1'his movement of the concept of God, or the Notion, is 
to be l loolcecl upon merely as play. The 11 othe1~ 11 i'lhich it 
sets t:.p as the Son of God is not really an 11 other. u2 It 
is really the manifestation of God. He goes forth into 
the 11 <Dth er 11 and malces Himself objective. It is the revela-
tion ~f God in history. Speaking in the languag e of Chris-
t iani r y' it viaS the Christ who came forth into the vmrld. 3 
This is not the history of one individual, however, but it 
is God 't-Tho accomplishes what is told. in it. Hegel · :l'lieJ:'d that 
the history of Christ is the universal and absolute history.4 
Christ is to be considered as--man as man--in whom the unity 
1. Hegel, POH, 323-32·4. 3. Hegel, HOP, I, 73. 
2. Wallace, LOH, 289. 4. Hegel, POR, III, 95. 
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of Gpd and man has appeared. In Christ is presented the 
eternal history of Spirit. It is a history which every man 
has t o accomplish in himself in order to exist a s Spirit, 
or to become a ch ild of God.l 
ii. The person of Jesus. 
The historical person of Jesus is considered by Hegel 
to be just as human as any other person. He rej ected the 
idea of the virgin birth anc1 minimized the i.mportance of 
the miracles . To Hegel, Jesus v-ms a teacher vvho gathered 
friend.s around him and taught revolutionary doctr·ines, for 
his clay. The primary point is the correspondence between 
the a cts, ("leeds, and sufferings of Jesus, anc1 His own tea ch-
ing.2 Christ enforced a completely unmistakable requirement 
in hils life, the infinite exalta tion of the Spirit.3 But 
all t~ought of a difference in es s ence between Jesus and 
thosel in \'Thom faith in him became life, in "t-.rhom the divine 
is pr.esent, must be eliminated. 4 
ln Jesus Hegel finds the eA~ression of something higher 
I than mere morality. He f inds a noble spirit \'Thich rises 
above the contrasts of -virtue and vice into the concrete 
life, seeing the infinite ah·rays embracing our finitude, 
and proclaiming the divine that is in man.5 The disciples 
h ad a consciousness of the divinity of Jesus, but it was a 
1. Hegel, POH, 340. 
2. Hegel, POR, III, 86-87. 
J. Hegel, POH, 326. 
4. Hegel, ETW, 268. 
5. Enc.Brit., Art.(l929),XI, 379. 
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consciousness based on faith only. It was not yet the fill-
ing of their \'Thole being with the sense of the divine , which 
carne with the Holy Spirit •1 Hegel held, hovTever, that in 
Christ humanity was carried to its furthest point. 2 
6-. Cbd as Holy Suiri t. 
i. A union of the p ersons. 
In his rational approach Hegel described the Holy 
Spirit as the union between God the Father, and the Son. 
It becomes a union of pure thought, the infinit e , and its 
opposite, the f inite Y.IOrld. This union results in a Being 
1vhich is not only pure thought and infinite but which also 
has ~ definite relation to the finite. The former two are 
not ]ost or denied but are rather fulfilled in the Holy 
Spirit. It is still the one God. 
ii. God revealed through Christ. 
Christ appeared in the \.ovorld as the Son to satisfy 
the sensuous needs of man in knowing God. But it '\va s only 
after his death that the Spirit came upon his friends, only 
then ]'\;;rere they able to conceive the true idea of God.3 The 
actual presence of Christ in his humanity was of imrnen~e 
importance to Christianity, because it "t·re~ s the union of man 
and God. But this conception of Christ was not evident to 
his followers in its first manifestation. The greatness of 
1. Hegel, ETW, 267. 
2. H~gel, POR, III, 89. 
J. Hegel, POH, 328. 
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the idea came later, after the Spirit had perfected the idea. 
The real significance of Christ became known through the 
Spirit. Before Pentacost the Apostles did not yet know 
that Christ is t h e infinite history of God. They had be-
lieved in him, but not yet a s seeing in him t his infinite 
I 
truth.1 
:Hegel considered the Holy Spirit to be God as revealed 
through Christ. He emphasizeo_ the 'ti'Tords of Christ in saying 
I 
that he would be l>rith his disciples even unto the ends of 
the eFtrth , and that ,.-There two or three are gathered together 
in hi:s name, he ~rould be in the midst of them. Jesus, him-
self, had said that the external is not the true rela tion. 
It v'lill disappear, but t he Spirit of Truth w:lll guide you 
into all Truth.2 •._ 
The history of Christ is a history of the Sniritual 
Community. Thus the 1"li tness of the Spirit is the ind1velling 
of Christ. This presence has the kind of verification whose 
I 
force is of a spiritual kind. It is the kno'tr'rledge of faith, 
for f~i th is also knowlectge, only in a peculiar form. 3 
Hegel h eld that to think of Ghrist only in his sensuous 
appearance is to regard him unspiritually. We should not 
think of him onl y as a historical bygone personality. To 
the Apostles, Christ living 1-1as not that 't'll'hich he 1-.ras to 
them subsequently as the Spirit of the Church , in ~rhich he 
1. Hegel ·, HOP, I , 15-16. 3. Hegel, POR, III, 113-114. 
2. Hegel, HOP, I, 73. 
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beca~e to them for the first time an object for their truly 
sp ir+tual consciousness)- \fuat Jesus calls the 11 Kingdom of 
God, 11 is the living ha rmony of men, their fellm..rship in God. 
It ·is the develor ment of the divine among men, the relation-
ship 'vli th God vrh ich they enter through being filled v.ri th 
the Holy Spirit.2 
'Hegel stressed the expression of J esus regarding the 
nsin against the Holy Spirit. 11 Hegel said that this comes 
from a contrast of individuality 1vith the spirit of the whole . 
trfhoev,er blasphemed a man, such as Jesus ~ras, this sin shall 
be f :o!!'gi ven him. But l'Ihoso blasphemes the Spirit itself, 
I 
the d:ivine, his s i n shall not be forgiven. He who sins 
again:st an individual shuts himself out only from that in-
dividlal . But he who sunders himself from God blasphemes 
nature itself. His spirit has destroyed its own holiness, 
and he is therefore ince.pable of annulling h:ls separation 
I 
and r~uniting hims elf 1nrith ho1iness.3 
I 
7. God as Trinity. 
i. The Rational notion of God. 
Hegel felt that if there is a meaning in the Trinity 
we must try to understand it. He pointed out the fact 
that the idea of trinity in God WR S not new in Christianity 
but i t s development took the :oath of Christian dogmatism.~ 
But Hegel was not satisfied to arrive at the Trinity through 
1. Hegel , POH, 325-326. 
2. Hegel , ETW, 277 . 
3. He gel, ETW, 273. 
4. Hegel, HOP , I, 222. 
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dogmatism. He held that the Christian idea of Goo_ as a 
Trinfty contains the rational notion of God.l He lookec1 to 
the T,rinity as t he most rational of doctrines, the clearest 
phildso:phical expression of the being of God. 
And wherever the Hegelian influence is control-
ling we find interest in the doctrine reviving 
and giving birth to a serie2 of attempts at 
speculative r econstruction. 
[n formulating his doctrine of the Trin:lty Hegel does 
not start -v.ri th the historical revelation of the Son but 
rather w-ith the being of God as He is in HimBelf. He -v;anted 
to shb"t-J that the Trinity is a rational truth which needs no 
exter:ral authority for its proof. His appeal is solely to 
reason. He interpreted the Trinity as an expression in 
I 
religious language of the f uno_amental truth of his philosophy. 
He held that the ultimate reality, or absolute, must be con-
ceived in the form of the synthesis of a logically preceding 
thesis and antithesis. The thesis is God a s the Absolute, or 
the I dea. This would be God the Father. The antithe s is is 
t h e Other which God distinguishes from Himself. This would 
be th~ Son. The synthesis is that which proceeds out of a 
union of the tl'ro. This vmuld be God as Spirit. 
ii. Process of the Trinity. 
Hegel conceived of the Father as Spirit, as the activity 
of pure thought, the activity which is not outside of itself. 
1. He§el, HOP, II, 383. 2. Wallace, LOH , 317. 
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Pure activity is knowledge, but in order that it may actually 
appe~r as activity it has to be posited in its moments or 
stages. Knowledge implies the existence of an Other or object 
"Vrhich is consciously 1mown. Since it is kno't'rledge which 
I ltnovrs it, it is reckoned as belong ing to it. This explains 
how God, who represents Being in-and-for-self, eternally 
produces Himself in the form of His son. He distinguishes 
Himself from Himself and is the absolute act of judgment or 
differentiation. vfuat he thus distinguishes from Himself 
does not take on the form of something \'lhich is other than 
Himself; but on the contrary, what is thus distinguished is 
nothing mol"e nore less than that from l..rhich it has been c1is-
tingui shed. God eternally begets His Son; (not just pe j--son 
of Jelsus, but the whole concept of Son). that is He eternally 
distinguishes Himself from Himself, but God is Himself this 
entire act. But God thought of simply as the Father is not 
yet the true God. Nor is God thought of merely as the Son, 
I 
His manifestation, the true God. He is, on the contrary, 
beginhing and end; He is eternal process; He is the Snirit 
as individuality.l 
It is in this process of God that 1•re find His love be-
ing expressed. Hegel said: 
God is love, i.e., H8 represents the distinctions 
referred. to, and. the,'nullity of this distinction, 
the sort of play of this act of distinction which 
~. Hegel, POR, III, 1 2-13. 
is not to be taken seriously, and which is there-
fore posited D.s something abolished, i. e., as 
the eternal, simple Idea. This eternal Idea, 
accordingly, finds expression in the Christian 
religion under the name of the Holy Trinity, 
and fhis is God Himself, the eternal Triune 
God. 
iii. A pictorial trinity. 
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He~el vJanted to mak.e it quite clear that his use of the 
t erms ' of relation, Fa ther, Son, and Holy Spirit, for the 
Trini~y is merely pictorial. God as Spirit does not ac-
' tually enter into a relation of this kind. But the under- · 
standi ng has no category, no relation, which in point of 
I 
suitability for expressing the truth can be compared with 
I 
this. r He 't'>TaS willing to use the terms but he y.;ant ed to be 
I 
understood as to how he was using them. 
I 
The Hegelian conception of the Trinity is a psycho~ 
I lo gical description of the mind of God. The s elf-consciousness 
of God is analyzed as the self as knower, the self as knoy.m, 
ancL t ,e union of the tvm 
This trinity could never 
I 
in the act of self-consciousness. 
be perfect in man since we never 
completely know ourselves. There is always a difference 
' 
betweJn our subjective thought of ourselves and reality. 
This i ,s not so v!ith God. He is the perfect personality, in 
v;hom t;hought alrrays corresponds "r.ri th reality. In His self-
consciousness, therefore, subject and object are completely 
one. He recognizes Himself as perfectly mirrored in His 
1. Hegel, POR, III, 11. 
2. Heg~l, POR, III, 25-26. 
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thought of Hims elf. So the circle _is complete, and God is 
bound back to God in conscious un i ty. 1 
Hegel sa id tha t it is wrong to conceive of the Trinity 
as three completely external persons in relation to the 
othe~s . He said: 
If t his quality of number be made the founda-
tion of the relation, it is undoubtedly a com-
plete c ontradiction that those who are perfectly 
external in r elation should at the same time be 
One. 2 
Hegel' s empha sis is on t h e oneness of God, but yet he held 
that t h e content of God is quite correctly conceived of as 
a Trinity.3 
1. Br9~m, TMT, 19-20. 3. Hegel, HOP, II, 418. 
2. Hegel, POR, I, 159. 
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CHAPTER III 
SCHLEIERMACHER 1 S DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 
1. Introduction. 
Schleiermacher is included in this study of the Trinity 
because he represents a development in the history of doc-
trine that provides some netv thought on the Trinity. It 
v!ill be seen tha t his vie1·JS <Ud not follov! the established, 
I 
orthodox teaching but presented a fresh and. vi tal approach 
to theology that has had a lasting effect. His approach 
to religious knowledge is considerably different from that 
of the orthodox thinkers, and also tha t of Hegel. This is 
reflected in his consideration of the Trinity. The doctrine 
of the Trinity involves much of the main development of 
Schleiermacher 1 s theology and he presents some very care-
fully developed ideas regarding it. 
2. Historical background. 
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schl eiermacher was born in 
Breslau, Germany, in 1768. Through his father he received 
some Moravian influence and studied in a Moravian College. 
He brolte vii th the 1·foravians, hot·rever, and was greatly 
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influenced by the theology of the Enlightenment. He was or-
dained in 1794 and in 1896 1•ras appointed as chaplain in a hos-
p ital in Berlin. He became known as a classical scholar . He 
had a great love for such study and used h is leisure hours 
to t nanslat e and comment on Plato 1 s l·wrks •1 
r~e ¥ras a ctive in many fields of endeavor and was dis-
t ingu! ished anc1 ~)re- emin ent in them all. He 1·ras well known 
as a theologi an , a p r eacher, a philosopher, and a philologer. 
Hi s "tvritings on many i mportant aff a irs of his ctay 1·.rer e vJidely 
read. In 1 804 he was elected pnofessor extraordinary of 
theology and. philos ophy a t Halle. In 1807 he helped to 
found the Univers i ty of Berlin, and t aught philosophy t here. 
He also served as pastor of t h e 1'rini ty Chur ch in Berlin. 
He was best known for his theology, h owever, and from 1809 he 
i'Jas t he dominant figure in the Prot estant life of Germany. 
He v-ra s a storm center. A n e1\r tenc1ency in theology and in 
the Church had its start in him. I n general , h e marks the 
trans 1it ion of German Protestant theology from the more 
negat!l..ve-critical tendenc y to that of a reconstructive, posi-
tive r eformat ion.2 
In 1821 Schl eiermacher published his main i'Tork, The 
Christ i an Faith. It was an attempt to present the Chris-
tian faith so as to eliminate the c ontradiction anc1 hos-
tility in whi ch it had become involved. The solution of 
1. Stuart, Art.(l835), V, 266. 
2. Lucke, ROS, 9. 
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the p'roblem 11as the main endeavor of his l'lhole life .1 His 
work :in the field of theology constitutes his real claim to 
a plape in the hi s tory of thought. He died in 1834. 
3. Theory of Religious Knov1ledge. 
i. The place of feeling . 
For knowledge regarding religious truths Schleiermacher 
turned to the religiou s exp erience. The thing that impressed 
him mbst about religious knowledge 'tvas the important part 
\-lhich feeling pl ays in such knm'lledge. To explain l'That he 
meant by "feeling" he connected with it the term self-
I 
cons c liousness. This was to eliminate from feeling any connec-
tion -\vi t h the unconscious states. To further define his 
meani~g of f eeling h e ex-plained that it is an "immediate" 
self-cons ciousness. This was to elimina te the idea of 
self-cons ciousness which is more lik e an objective conscious-
ness, a representation of oneself, ru1d thus mediated by 
I 
self-contemplation. He di stinguished between these t wo 
sta tes of s elf-cons ciousness b y pointing out the difference 
between joy and sorrow, which are genuine states of feeling, 
I 
and self-a9proval and self-reproach, which are r e.t her the 
objective consciousness of s elf, as results of an analytic 
contemplation. 2 
Scllieiermacher point ed out that the self-consciousness 
coul d not be receptive unless there is an Other. Unless 
1. Lucke , ROS, 13. 
2. Schl eiermacher, CF, 6-7. 
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there is this receptivity the self-consciousness would merely 
be e.n activity , \oJhich, not being directed to an object, \10Uld 
be m~rely an urge outvrarcls. But 't'l}'e never do exist except 
along with an Other. In every outward-tending sel~-conscious­
ness, receptivity is t h e primary element. 1 The common element 
in alil these d eterminations of self-consciousness, 't•rhich 
predob inantly expresses a receptivity, is the feeling of 
I 
dep enijence. On the other hand, the common element in all 
of thbse determinations, which prec1ominantly express spon-
taneous movement and activity, is the feeling of freedom. 
The O~her must be determined by us, and without our spon-
taneous activity could not be so cletermined. 2 But these 
two f belings, of freedom and dependence, are really one, in 
t h e s bnse that not only the subject but the corresponding 
Other 1 is the same for both. Therefore the total self-con-
sciousness made up of both together is one of reciprocity 
bet"t.rebn the subject ana_ the corresponding Other. In 
I 
the various activities of life we f i nd sometimes one of 
t h e s e feelings predomimnt, sometimes the other. Sometimes 
I 
they are of equal effect. There can, however, be no such 
thing a s a feel i ng of absolute freedom. This feeling ex-
presses a forth-going activity and must have an object which 
has been somehow given to us. Therefore there is always 
a feeli~g of dep endence which goes along with the feeling 
1. Schleierma cb.er, CF, 13. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 14 . 
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of f~eedom, and thus limits it. But the self-consciousness 
1-rhich accompanies our existence, ana_ 1>rhich negates absolute 
freedom, is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute 
deneddence. It is the c onsciousness that the whole of our 
spontaneous activity come s from a source outside of us in 
the s:ame sense in which anything towards which we should 
have a feeling of absolute freedom must have proceeded en-
tirel~ from ourselves. But without any feeling of freedom 
a f e e~ing of absolute dependence 'tvould not b e possible. 1 
Bchleiermacher identified the •~"~vhence 11 of b oth the 
recep~ive anc1 t he active existence in the self-consciousness 
as Goa. He said that t h is is really t h e orig inal significa-
tion of t hat word. This 11 whence 11 is not the "rorld, for 't'l]'e 
have .q:t feeling of freedom, though a limited one, in rela-
tion to the vwrld. Nor is t h is f eeling of depeno.ence cono.i-
tioned by some p revious kno1vledge about God. v·Tord and io.ea 
are al"t-rays originally one. The term 11 God 11 therefore pre-
supposes an idea which is t h e expression of the f eeling of 
absolute dependence. Any further content of the idea must 
be evolved out of this funda mental import a s signed to it. 
This is what Schleiermacher means by the formula which says 
that t o feel oneself absolutely de pendent, and to be con-
scious of being in relation with God, a r e one and the same 
t hing . The reason for t h is is that absolute dependence is 
the fundamental relation which must include all others in 
1. Schleiermaeher, OF, 15-16. 
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itself. It includes the God-consciousness in the self-
consciousness in such a way that the two cannot be separated 
from each other. 11 In this sense it can be said that God is 
given 1 to us in feeling in an original way.ul 
Schleiermacher founcl it necessary to limit this God-
I 
consciousness in our self-consciousness, however. This is 
because it is necess arily c ombined 't<Jith, anc1 related to, the 
I 
sensible self-consciousness. This is the source of the an-
I thropomorphic elements, which are inevitable in the realm of 
utterances about God. He said that some 1.-vould reject his 
whole t heory on t his ground. But he replied: 
Religious men know that it is only i n speech 
that they cannot avoid the anthropomorphic: 
in their immediate c ons ciousne s s they keep 
the abject separate from its mode of repre-
sentation, and they endeavor to sho·N· their 
opponents that without this integration of 
fe eling no certainty is possible even for 
the strongest forms of objective conscious-
ness or of transitive action, and tha t, to 
be consistent, they must limit thems~lves 
entirely to the lower grade of life.· 
The feeling of absolute dependence, expressing itself 
as consciousness of God, is the highest grade of immediate 
self-consciousness, It is also an essential element of 
human lnature. Schleiermacher usee. this as a basis to de-
' 
te rrnine the truth of all of t h e vHrious problems regard-
ing Christ.ian faith . Anything on -vrhich the immediate 
self-C'ons ciousness feels an absolute dependence is talten as 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 17. 
2. Schleiermacher, OF, 26. 
true. , He built his 1r;hole system of Christian doctrine on 
this basis .1 
ii. The place of reason. 
$chleiermacher h eld that in one sense all Christian 
dogmas are supra-rational. In another sense they are all 
rational. They are all supra-rational in the sense in 
90. 
which . everyth ing experiential is supra-rational. All truly 
Christian dogma can be traced to an inner experience. They 
rest upon a given. 
I 
Apart from this they could not have 
arise~. Such dogmas can neither be comprehended nor de-
duced
1
by purely scientific methods.2 No man can be in-
st ructed nor demonstrated into being a Christian, without 
his having had an experience of Christian truth. Thus such 
I 
doctrines lie outside the realm of reason and are real only 
I 
through each man -vrilling to have the experience for himself. 
In th~s sense the vrhole of Christian doctrine is supra-
rational. 
But the doctrines '\vhich give expression to these re-
ligious experiences are subject to the same laws of concep-
tion a.nt'l synthesis a s regulate all sp eech . The more per-
i fec t ly t hese laws are satisfied in presenting such doctrines, 
t h e more 1orill each individual be constrained to apprehend 
correctly '\vha t is t hou ght and intended, even if he cannot, 
for lack of the funclamental inward exp erience, convince 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 26. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 3. 
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himself of the truth of the matter. In this sense everything 
in Christian doctrine must be entirely according to ree.son. 
It is
1 
the supra-rationality of all particular Christian dogmas 
that jis the measu1 .. e by which it can be judged whether they 
succe~d in expressing the peculiarly Christian element. And 
their1 rationality is the test of hovl far the attempt to 
I 
translate the inward emotions into thoughts has succeeded. 
S chl e 1 ermache r v!ro t e: 
To assert that it cannot be demanded that what 
goes beyond reason should be rationally presented, 
app ears t o be only a subterfuge designed to cover 
up some imperfection in the procedure, just as the 
opposite vie't·l tha t in Christian doctrine everything 
must be, in every sense, basea. on reason, is sim-
ply meant to cover up the l ack of a fundamental 
experience of one's o~m.l 
He states definit ely that his position agrees with the 
I 
idea tha t the supra-rational in Christianity must not be 
I 
c ontrary to reason. 1·J' e must, on the one hand, recognize 
the supra-rational, and, on the other hand, show that it 
is not contrary to reason. This can only be achieved by 
means of a rational presentation. 2 
iii. The place of revelation. 
I Schleierrnacher seemed to make no real distinction be-
tween revelation and inspiration. He said that it would 
be dif'ficul t to dra-rr any cl~ar dividing line at all be-
tv-Teen the t1vo. He accepted the fact that God works upon 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 67. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 68. 
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us di~ectly by means of His total impressions on us. This 
working is alv.rays a working upon the self-consciousness. 
But he t..ras um..rilling to accept the idea that God operates 
upon man as a cognitive being, for that vmuld make the 
revela tion to be originally and essentially doctrine. 1 
This !dea faces the fact that there are conflicting claims 
for revelation. No one revelation can claim to be the pure 
a na_ entire trut;-l , while the others contain falsehoocL For 
complete truth -vmuld mean that God had made Himself kno1m 
as He is in and for Himself. Even if God did so present 
Himself to a human soul, it could not be _apprehended by 
that 9oul, nor retained as a thought. Any proclamation of 
Goo. to be received by us can only express God in His rela-
tion to us. 2 
iv. The place of the Holy Bible. 
Regarding the place of the Holy Bible for Christian 
faith we find that Schleierrnacher did not give a very high 
place to the Old Testament. He accepted an inspira~ion 
of the p:-ophets because of the use 't>rhich Christ and His 
apostles made of the utterances of the prophets. As regards 
I the New Testament he pointed out that the Christian faith 
had been disseminated for tvro hundred years before that 
Testament vras unanimously established as having peculiar 
~ validity.~ Schleierma cher held t hat even New Testament pas-
sages can demonstrate no more than that a proposition or 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 50. 
2. Sc~leiermacher, CF, 52. 
3. Schleiermacher, CF, 76. 
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doctr1ine is Christian. But he felt the.t the proper Protestant 
procep.ure, in the case of every dogmatic proposition,. is to 
go back to Scripture itself to show that it contains nothing 
demonstrably contrary to Scripture. The Scriptures are, 
howev~r, not to be used as textproofs, nor is a system of 
doctril.ne to be found in them.l 
Thus Schleiermacher held that the authority of Holy 
Scripture cannot be the foundation of faith in Christ, but 
that the l at ter must be presupposed before a peculiar 
auth ority can be granted to Holy Scripture. 2 We do not know 
that a doctrine is Christian because it is in the Ne1-1 Testa-
ment. Rather 1-1e find it in the New Testament because it is 
a Christian doctrine.3 
I Yet the New Testament is the first presentation of the 
Christian faith and is t h e norm for all succeeding presen-
tatioris.4 These writings were in a special way the result 
of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This inspiration did 
not violate the freedom of personal p roductivity. The 
writers "tvere not informed of the content of 1'rha t they v-rrot e 
in a special divine manner. All that they 1vrote, ho\'rever, 
was d~rived from Christ, for in Christ Himself is the original 
divine bestowal of all t hat the Holy Scriptures contain. Thus 
the speaking and 1-rri ting of the Apostles, as moved by the 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 115. 
2. Schl eiermacher, CF. 591 
J. Schleiermacher, CF, 593. 
4. Schlei ermacher, CF, 594. 
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Holy Spirit was simply a communication drawn from the divine 
reve]ation in Christ.l 
4. Rejection of the Orthodox View. 
Schleiermach er felt t hat the orthodox statement rega rd-
ing the Trinity conta ins certa in difficulties and imper-
:fecti1ons 'tvhich rencler it unacceptable. He rejected it as a 
doctrine i•rhich is not based on the religious self-conscious-
ness. It is neither presupposed nor contained in the im-
mediate Christian relig ious experience. 2 He stressed the point 
that the main pivot of the Christian faith, the being of God 
in Christ and in the Christian Church , is indep endent of the 
doctr~ne of the Trinity.3 
i. Objection to the idea of eternal distinctions. 
Scllieiermacher objected to the assumption of eternal 
distinctions in the Supreme Being . He s aid that this could 
certainly not emerge a s an utterance of the religious 
self-consclousness.4 He said that the impression made by 
the divine in Christ does not oblige us to conceive of 
such an eternal distinction as its basis. He p ointed out 
that the biblical passages used to support this idea of 
eternal distinctions are not conclusive and that often ex-
ponents of contrary views argue from the same passages to 
prove their own points of view.5 He said that if the 
1. Sclileiermacher, CF, 598. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 144. 
J. Schleiermacher, CF, 741. 
4. Schleiermacher, CF, 739. 
5. Schleiermacher, CF, 740. 
95. 
orthodox doctrine of eternal distinctions had arisen definite-
ly out of the utterances of Christ Himself, and of the apostles 
concerning Him, then we would have to accept it on their 
testimony. Then it l'muld be a fully elaborated doctrine, 
and 1·ie should accept it as a supersensible fact. But even 
then ~ t "t·JOuld not be a doctrine of faith. Our faith in 
Christ ancl our living fell01•rship l'Jith Him l'TOUld be the same 
although we had no knowledge of any such transcendent fact.l 
But Scllieiermacher insisted that the exegesis used to es-
tabli~h the idea of eternal distinctions has never been able 
to entrench itself so strongly as to escape constant attacks 
on it. 2 
ii. Objection to the idea of equality of Persons. 
Another point in the orthodox position concerning the 
Trinity that brought direct attack from Schleiermacher is 
the idea of the~uality of the Persons in the Godhead. He 
pointed out that the orthodox view requires that we think 
of each of the three Persons in the Trinity as equal to the 
Divine Essence, and vice ver sa, and each Person as equal to 
each of the others. He said: 11 \'le cannot do either the one 
or th~ other, but can only represent the Per sons in a 
gradation. 11 .3 He agreed that if one accepts the assumption 
of eternal distinctions i n the Divine Essence then the im-
plication of t h e double equality of the divine in all 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 740-741. 3. Sc!ueienmacher, CF, 742. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 742. 
three Persons, and of the divine in each Person with the 
Supreme Being necessarily f..a:J!·lows. But his rejection of 
that assumption has already been shown. 
I 
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Schleiermacher wa sn't content merely to brush off . the 
idea of equality of Persons by denying the basic assumption 
from which it comes. He examined the idea its elf to juc1ge 
it on its O't'm merit. He vrrote: 
If the Father and Son are distinguished by the 
fact that the Father eternally begets, but is 
Himself unbegotten, while the Son is begotten 
from all eternity but not Himself begetting, 
then (although this eternal generation is 
different as possible from any generation that 
is temporal or organic in character), the term 
itself, if it meru1s anything at all, must a t 
leas t indicate a relationship of dep endence. 
Hence if um·rer has d1·rel t in the Fe.ther from 
all eternity to beget the Son as a second 
divine Person, wher eas in the Son no such 
power dwells, and no relationship of de~ 
pendenc e in 'tvhich the Father stands to Him 
can be aclcluced as a count ertrreight, undeniably 
the po~rJ er of the Father is greater than trat 
, vrhich the Begotten has with the Begetter. 
He used the same sort of argument regarding the relation-
ship of the Holy Spirit to the other tw·o Persons. He con-
elude& that, hov.Jever we look at it, the Father is superior 
to the other tt..;o Persons. This makes the e:J.uality of Per-
sons to be lost. 2 
Schleiermacher went into considerable detail to show 
that the early Christians 1.· ere not l''eally trinitarians in 
t he orthodox sense of holding to the equality of Persons. 
1. Schleiermach er, CF, 743. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 743. 
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These thinkers identified the Father with the unity of the 
Divin:e Essence, but ·not the Son or the Spirit. He pointed 
out that Origen taught that the Fa ther is God absolutely, 
vrhile the Son ano_ Spirit El.re God only by participation in 
the Dh.vine Essence. This idea 't,ras positively rejected by the 
~rthodox teachers, but secretly underlies their whole proce-
1 
dure. 1 However the idea of derivation is presented, whether 
we call it by the name generation, procession, emanation, or 
by any other like appellation, the-.i dea of deuendence remains. 
A derived Person, if 'l:"'o r ds a re allmved to have their appropri-
ate meaning, cannot be a self-existent Person. A den endent 
Person cannot be an independent one. The idea of dependence 
and d~rivation is inseparably and by absolute necessity con-
2 
nected with t h e idea of generation and p rocession. 
Schleierma cher further points out t he inconsistency in 
the Ndcene Creed in its insistence on the equality of Per-
sons. The Creed itself states tha t ~re b elieve in one God, 
the Father almighty. Christ is not the one God, but is 
the 011e Lord, 'ttJ"ho 't'l]'as begotten of the sUbstance of t he one 
Goo_, 0 1r the Father. The Fa.ther, then, as presented in the 
creed, is not merely one of the three Persons, and on an 
equality t-.ri th the other two; but He is the:original, inc1e-
pendent, self-existent unity. No matter h ow much the ad-
herents of the orthodox view:mi'ght .: insist on the equality 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 747. 
2. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), V, 282. 
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of Persons, as long as they admit any idea of generation or 
procession they immediately contradict themselves.l 
iii. The ne ed for a restudy. 
Schleiermacher felt that, although the orthodox trini-
tarian doctrine contains difficulties and imperfection s, we 
shouln not re:pudia t e everything connected v.ri th 1 t. He v.ras 
anxio~ls to secure freedom for a t hor·ough-going criticism of 
the doctrine so as to prepare the way for a reconstruction 
of it. He said that other problems of later origin have 
been solved in a satisfactory 't'ifay but that this one has re-
mained stationary at the very unsatisfactory point to ~n1ich 
it was brought at the first rush. He felt that impassioned 
pol emical zeal, so prone to error, had too large a share in 
its constuction~ The main weakness of the doctrine came be-
cause of the earnest desire to combat the heathen idea of a 
plurality of Gods. This zeal overdid the argument by in-
sisting on the eternal distinctions and the equality of 
Persons. 2 He said that to arrive at a better doctrine 
we must become convinced that it is possible for our faith 
in the divine presence in Christ and in the Christian com-
munion to fino. fit theological expression. There n1ust be a 
transformation of the doctrine which would go back to its 
very beginning. But this inc1ependence of mind is not pos-
sible as long as the accepted doctrine is cons idered as a 
1 . Schleierma ch er, Art. (18.35), V, 282. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 748. 
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I 
precondition of faith in redemption and in the founding of 
the K~ngdom of God.l 
5. Development of a Sabellian view. 
1. Defense of the earl y medalists. 
I 
fn his main "''TorJ~, The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher 
I 
was c~ntent merely to point out his objections to the ortho-
dox vie'tv of the Trinity and to suggest a restudy of the whole 
question, beginning with the Scriptures. He did suggest that 
his examination of the Scriptures had led him t o the conclu-
sion that the orthodox view has no more biblical support than 
does one like the Sabellian vielir. He said that some formula 
must be "''ror1c ed out TrJhi ch l'rill incluo.e the union of the divine 
Essence '\<Jith Christ and 't.,ith the Sp:trit, but vrhich does not 
a s seri the eternal distinctions in the Supreme Being. 2 Just 
a few years after publishing '·The Christian Faith he 'tvrote 
I 
an article entitled, 11 0n the Discrepancy bet1...r een the Sabel-
lian EJ:nd Athanasian Method of Representing t h e Doctrine of 
the"Tr:'in'it;y. 11 In t his article Schleiermacher ctiscussed t he 
contrdversy which led to the formation of the orthodox state-
i 
ment regarding t h e Trinity and related it to the views of 
I 
the early medali s ts. He stressed the fact that the views of 
I 
Sabellius were not altogether new but were a fuller develop-
ment of earlier modalists.3 Schleiermacher defended the 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 749-750. 
2. Scl~eiermacher, CF, 750. 
J. Schieiermacher, Art .(l835), VI, 36. 
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views of the moctalists ana_ insist ed that these men 't-Jere mis-
interpreted by their opponents. He insisted t hat if the 
Sabellian views had peaceably obtained admission they would 
doubtless have received more accura te and defin it e limita-
t ions. They "Vlere overt-thelmAd in t he strong er opposite cur-
l 
rent b efore they had time to be fully unfolded. 
It seems clea r that Schleiermacher 1 s presentation of 
Sabellianism is largely his o~1n interpreta tion of this view 
and is , in fact , his own doctrine of the Trinity.2 He 
developed the Sabellian view far beyond the degree to which 
v-.r e have any knowledge of Sabellius having done. He definite-
ly pr¢sented it a s a Sabellian view, however, and felt that 
he v.rae being true to Sabell ius. He said t hat this teaching 
mi ght have arisen in and by itself, without having b een 
evok ed b y o.octrinal strife. In order to form such a view 
one needs only t o t ake · into consicteration the ideas that 
are common to a l l Christians respecting a revela tion through 
Christ and beli ef in Christ , and also \I'J'he. t Scripture and 
histo n."y inform us r especting the gifts and gr a ces of the 
Holy Spirit.3 
ii. A Trinity of revelations . 
Schleier macher said that the true question of Sabel-
1 i an ism is: 
1. Schleiermacher , Art.(l835), VI, 39. 
2. Schleierma che r , Art.(l835 ), VI, 80. 
,3. Schleiermacher , Art.(lS35), VI, 73 . 
vJhat constitutes what we name Person in the 
Godhead? Is it original, substantial, e s sential 
to divinity itself? Or does it belong to and 
arise from the exhibitions and develo~~1ments 
which the divine Being has made of Hims elf to 
His creatures?l 
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Schleiermacher denied the former and admitted the latter. 
He maintained that the Trinity was not essential to the 
Godhead i n itself, but has its reference to created 
beings and is on their account , for their salvation. 
These ,distinctions in the Godhead are related t o the 
method of salva tion as revealed to man. The Trinity has 
such an exclusive relation to men that, if men l'rere to cease 
to exist, the Trin ity would clo the same. 2 (He sa id that 
this woulo_ never happ en, however.) 
Thus we find that Schleiermacher considered the Tri-
nity a revelation of God. The most High, in and of Him-
self, and considered apart from the idea of Trinity, would 
be altogether in and by Himself ancl altogether unlcno1-m to 
other beings. But this could take place only on condition 
that no other being s had any existence. The Trinity is, 
therefore, God reveal ed. Each member of the Trinity is a 
peculi ar mode of this r evelation. The Godhead, hoill!ever, is 
one and the same in each of these modes, but it is never 
revealed to us a s ·it is in its elf, but as . it developed in 
the Persons of the Trinity. The v-;hole Trinity is God re-
vealed. But the Divine Being as He is in and of Himself, 
1. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 37. 
2. Schleierma.cher, Art.(1835), VI, 52. 
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and in His simple unity, is God concealed or unrevealed. 1 
Goc1 as unrevealed existed only before the creation of man. 
As soon as man was created, God started his revelation as 
. 2 Trinity. 
iii. Three modes of revelation. 
The functions of each of the three persons \·Jill be dis-
cussed se~9 arately later. 1ve can say here, however, that 
Schleiermacher admitted only three Persons because, as a 
Christian, he acknowledged only three ways in which God 
has specially revealed Himself. These three modes are de-
finitely separated from each other. This definite separa-
tion 0f revelation can be seen as a clear apprehension of 
the three Persons. The Son was not the same as the Father, 
because He was united with someth ing different from that 
with which the Father was united, and acted in a different 
sphere. But the real Godhead. in the Father and the Son 't'las 
one and the same.3 It is a peculiar union ·of the Godhead 
't·Ji th something else, which is easily and simply distinguished 
as the province of each member of the Trinity. Therefore, 
the Unity of God can be glorified as Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. 4 
iv. Unity of the Godhead • . 
Schleiermacher insisted that Sabellianism has been 
1. Schleiermacher, Art.(1835), VI, 61. 
2. Sch1eierma cher, Art.(l835), VI, 60. 
3. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 67. 
4. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 72. 
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misinterpreted in charging it vJ"ith a division of the unity of 
God in the app earance of the three Persons. He said that it 
is erroneous to suppose that Sabellius taught that the Father 
Himself became the Son. Schleiermacher 1 s Sabellian view· 
mak es a definite distinction between the Father and the Son, 
but it is a distinction \-.rhich definitely tries to preserve 
the u~ity of the Godhead. He said that the expression 
"unity of God" has the same homogeneity of religious exci-
tations as given to the expression 11 God 11 itself.l irlhatever 
the Persons might be they were certainly not in any way a 
division of the Godhead. God did not make a partition of 
Hi mself "'Aihen the Father, Son, and Holy S:qirit appeared. He 
is essentially immutable and is truly one. 2 ~llien the divine 
Unity became known a s three Persons there wa s no change in 
His 01vn proper nature. Schleiermachel'' does hold to an idea 
of devel opment in God, however. He said that God, in and 
of Himself, d eveloped Himself by action in and upon the 
world and became the first Person of the Trinity. But yet 
it wasn't becoming the first Person of the Trinity that 
caus ed the action of God. It was the action of God in and 
on the -v:orlCI_ that revealed Him as Father. 3 The same so:rt 
of develonment of God caused His revelation of Himself as 
the other tv10 Eersons. 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 230. 
z. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 42-49. 
3. Scbleiermacher, Art.(l835 ) , VI, 60. 
Schleiermacher held that the Trinity is not merely a 
trans:i tory development in the Godhead. God has really 
devel oped Himself in these three different ways. Although 
these distinctions commenced in time they are permanent dis-
tinct~ons, as long as redeemed men shall live. So long as 
~here is an economy of redemption these Persons shall not 
1 
cease to exist. 
6. God as Father. 
i. Office of the Father. 
Scbliermacher held the.Ple.r.s.o!;l of the Father to be God 
revealed to man through creation. The appropriate office 
of the Father is creation, preservation and legislation. 
Thes e comprise everything that may be for the spiritual 
purposes of God and yet do not include redemption itself, 
but o:hl.y what is preparatory to it. Thus the one God so 
unites 'vith the vrorld, ana_ develops Hi mself by action in 
and u~on it, that He becomes the first Person, or Father. 
He stands related a s a father to all of the p~rers of life 
and animation which form the organic structures of the uni-
verse.2 
ii. A manifestation in Time. 
Before this creation took place God was not the Father, 
strictly sp eakine; , but 1-ras the pur e divine Unity. But 
1. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 53. 
2. Schleiermacher, Art. (1835), VI, 60. 
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when He developed Himself t hrough creation He revealed Him-
self a s Father. Each of the Persons in the Trinity must 
be regarded as the result of a creative develo9ment, but 
t he first Person is especially to be seen in this light. 
The creation, and God 1 s becoming a Father must be regarded 
as coexisting , or as resulting from the same act.l 
I 
iii. Father of Jesus Christ. 
9cbleiermacher held t he first Person of the Trinity to 
be Father not merely as the Creator of all things, but also 
I 
in relation to the second Person of the Godhead. He did not, 
I 
hmvever, hold that t he s econd Person was in reality derived 
from the first. It 1:,_ras rather that the second Person be-
came a mode of God in relation to the incarnation. Yet 
I 
this depended on that arrangement of the world in v-1hich 
t h e Father had develop ed Himself. And t his relation of 
depen~ence, Ol" t h is causal and_ consequential connection of 
things, was held by Schleiermacher to be very well expressed 
by thei terms Father and Son. 2 
iv. Not superior to other Persons. 
One of t he points of emphasis in Schleiermacher 1 s con-
! 
ception of the Fath er wa s tha t he denied that the Father 
wa s the author of t h e other two Persons. He said that it 
would be 'incorrect to say tha t the Son was begotten of the 
1. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835 ) , VI, 60. 
2. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 57. 
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Father, or that the Spirit proceeded from Him. No matter 
what interpretation is given to these ideas they cannot be 
t he proper relationship betl'Jeen t he Persons of the Trinity. 
The Godhead of each of the Persons is the same in each case. 
There can be no idea of real superiority among the persons. 
I 
The only thing that might be considered superiority is the 
f act that the revelation of the Father came before that of 
the others and the later rev el ~_tions made use of those that 
had gbne before.l 
7. God as Son. 
i. A manifestation in time. 
To be consistent with h is basic stand that the Persons 
of the Trinity were the result of the revel ation of the God-
h ead ti.n time, 1-ve f i nd that Schleiermacher held that the Son 
did not exist as such before the incarnation. 2 Just as the 
Godhead developed itself to become the Father, through the 
I 
creatO..on, so novr l-ve f i nd that it further developed itself 
in the Person of the Redeemer. Without undergoing any change 
in it 1s own true nature the Godhead united with the person of 
Chris~ to form the second Person of the Trinity. This action 
t>ras to carry out a clefini te purpose in relation to the sal-
vation of man. Once united in this vmy the state or condi-
tion that ensued is abiding . The Godh ead will continue in 
t his union as l ong as the person of the Redeemer exists, or 
1. Scihleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 71-72. 
2. Schleiermacher, Art. ( 1835) , VI, 56. 
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as long as His office continues. 1 Schleiermacher did not 
hold that the Person of the Redeemer first existed, · and then 
the Godhead united 1.vi th it. It '\va s rather that this Person 
its p,lf sprung from the union. Thus we see that the develop-
ment of t h is Person i n the Godhead must be rega rded as cre-
ative.2 
ii. Father-Son relationship. 
It has already been sho1.m, in discussing the Person of 
the Fa ther, the v.ray in which Schleierma cher held to the 
F&ther-Son rela tionshin . He rejec t ed any idea of genera-
tion and denied any real dependence of the Son on the Father, 
except that connected ''ri t h t h e arrangement of the 1.,rorld. made 
by t he Father. He 1..;as 1.villine; to use the expression in a 
fi p;urative sense, but ·oointed out · .. that the meaning of 11 Son 
of God 11 is really the idea of God-Man.3 He did not concede 
t hat the G-odhead of the Son is in any respect inferior to 
that of the Father, for it i s really the same Goill1ead exist-
ing in both.4 
iii. Revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
The nerson of the Son is derived from the redeem~ng 
operat ions of God in and through the person of Christ.5 
The C~dhead exists in no other individual being in this 
1. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 59. 
2. Sc~~eiermacher, Art.(l8J5), VI, 60. 
3. Schleiermacher, Art.(l8J5), VI, 57. 
4. Schleiermacher, Art.(l8J5), VI, 71. 
5. Schleiermacher, Art.(l8J5), VI, 70. 
108. 
peculiar v1ay. 1 Schleiermacher denied that the Son was revealed 
under the Old Testament and insisted that t h i s revelation 
commenced with the new dispensation. He said that his views 
are based on wha t is common to all Christians respecting a 
revelation through Christ and belief in Christ. 2 
The s9ontaneity of the corporate life of Christ is ori-
g inal in Christ and proceeded from Him alone. As an historical 
indiviclual He must have been a t the same time ideal. Ea ch 
hi s to·rlcal moment of His exp erience must at the same time 
have borne vJithin it the ideal. This manifestation of the 
ideal in the life of Christ lies not in isolated moments, 
but in the vThole course of His 11fe.3 Schleiermacher 1-1rote: 
If 't•Te live in the Christian fellmvshi:o , \vith 
t h e conviction 't~Jhich is common to all Chris-
tians, that no more p erfect form of the God-
consciousness lies in front of the human race, 
and_ that any neH form i'l]'ould simply be a retro-
gr a de step; and, furth er, that every increase 
in the activity of the God-consciousness within 
the Christian fello1-rship proceeds, not from any 
new·ly-added pm•rer, but al1-rays and only from an 
ever-active susceptib ility to His influence, 
clearly every given state of this corporate 
life must remain no more than approximation 
to that 1·rhich exists in the Redeemer Hims elf. 4 
But Schleiermacher did not conceive of Christ as being the 
ideal of all knowledge, of all art, and skills ~n1ich have 
developed in human society. It is only in the capacity of 
the God-consciousness in which Christ wa s the ideal. But 
1. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 71. 
2. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 73. 
3. Schleiermacher, CF, 377. 
4. Schleiermacher, CF, 377-378. 
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this gives the impulse to all of lif e's experiences, 1 and 
Schleierme.cher felt that ideality is the only appropriate 
expression for the exclusive personal dignity of Christ. 2 
iv. Christ's God-Consciousness. 
Schleiermacher ~ent i nt o considerable detail to show 
the nature of this ideal Gocl-consciousness in Christ. He 
rejected the idea of the virgin birth and said that the 
being of God in Christ cannot possibly be explained by the 
fact that no male activity had any share in His conception. 
He based his rejection, first, on the historical evidence. 
He poi nted out the irregular ities in the Scripture regard-
ing it, and the fact that s ome of the main sources of 
Scrip,tural information concerning Christ make no mention of 
it. He also p,o:int·e_d t o paral lel stories regarding other 
famous personages and said that the biblical account may 
have been an attempt to add prestige for Jesus through 
the a ccount of a supernatural birth. He said tha t he had 
doubts about basing a doctrine, in these circumstances, 
solely upon these stories a nd about setting it up as an 
indispensable part of the creed. It is quite possible to 
b elieve in Christ as Redeemer without believing in His 
supernatural conception in this sense.3 
Scllieiermacher rejected the idea of the virgin birth, 
also, on the basis that it contributes no l'eal dogmatic 
1. Schleiermach er, CF, 378. 3. Schleiermach er, CF, 403-404. 
2. Scrlleiermacher, CF, 379. 
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purpose. The only importance it can have for Christian faith 
is either with reference to original sin or to the implant-
I 
ing of the divine in human nature. Schleiermacher 1 s con-
sideration of these facts leads him to say that the virgin 
birth is rTithout any real b earing upon either question. We 
shall see that he attribute~ the divine in Jesus to an alto-
gethe~ different source, and held that the connection of 
I 
Jesus lwith humanity could not be eliminated by the virgin 
birth as long as Mary, or any of her forebears, had any con-
nection with humanity. Sin c omes, not through sexual propa-
gation, but t hrough the sin of each preceding generation.l 
~ve turn novr t o Schlei ermacher 1 s positive view of the 
I 
presence of God in Chris t. It was for him a divine revela-
tion , but neither an abSelutely supernatural nor an absolutely 
supra-rational thing .Z He h eld it to be a natural thing that 
certa il.n men ~rill rise above the · circle in which they live . 
Such a development is the r esult of the power of develop-
ment which resides in our human nature. It is a power 
"lvh ich expresses itself in particular men at particular 
p oint s according to laws whi ch, if hidden from us, are 
nevertheless of divine arrangement. Apart from such a sup-
p osi tit on any p rogres s of the human race as a i-rhol e, or any 
part of it, would be inconceivable. For the good of the 
definite circle in which these men appear they have been 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 404-Lt-06. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 62. 
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quickened and inspired from the universal fountain of life. 
This is analoguous to the i d ea of revelation, which Schleier-
macher felt it is better to apply only to t he region of the 
higher self-consciousness. 1 
This same process is to be applied also to Christ. 
But in comparison to Him, everything 1·..rhich could ··otherw·ise 
be regarded as revelation loses t h is character. Everything 
else is limited to particula r t imes and pl a c es, and all that 
p roceeds from such points is from the very outs et destined to 
be submerged again i n Christ. He alone is destined gradu-
ally to quicl'- en t h e 111hole human race into a higher lif e . 
Schleiermacher conceived of Christ in this universal 1ay a s a 
ctiv in e revelat i on and a s an enduri ng phenomenon. But yet 
he definitely a s s erted that even the most rigmrous view of 
the cUfference bet~treen Christ and_ all other men does not 
hinder us fro m saying that His appearing, even regarded as 
the incarnation of the Son of God, is a na tural fact. As 
certa in as Christ wa s a man, t h ere must reside in human nature 
the possibilit y of t aking up the divine into itself, jus t 
a s did happen in Christ. Thus, t h e idea t hat the divine 
revelation in Christ must be something absolutely super-
n a tural "t-Jill simply not stand the test. 2 Even the selection 
of J esus, rath er than some other person, to fulfill this high 
office 11.ras, according to Schleiermacher, the result of divine 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 63. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 63-64. 
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l a'li'JS ana_ not to be explainec1 as an arbitrary divine act. He 
felt that the supposition of divine arbitrariness in pa rticu-
l ar matters belongs to an ant hropomorphic view of God. 1 
To do justice to the p erfect h istoricity of the perfect 
ideal revealed in Christ, Schleiermacher saio_ that v.r e must 
start at the v er y beg i nnin g of His life. Jesus develou ed in 
the same "!fray a s all others, so that from birth on His povrers 
gradually unfolded. From t h e zero point of His app eerance 
omvarc1s, Christ developed to completeness in the order 
natural to the human rac e . This applied also to His God-
consciousness, the germ of which was in Him, a s in all, but 
which in Him too, as in all, had to develop gradually in 
humari f a shion into a really manifest consciousness. This 
germ of God-consciousness is present in all, in a certa in 
sense, a s an active power.2 
Even during this period of development, after 
it had a ctually become a consciousness, it could 
exert its influence over the sensuous self-
consciousness only in the measure in which the 
various functio ns of the latter had already 
emer ged , and thus, even regarded from t h is side, 
it appeared as itself something that l'.ras onl y 
grao_ually unfoldi ng to its full extent. If 
we make the mistake of think ing that, on account 
of' His ideal nature, 'lrle mu st deny this and 
a ssume that from the very b eginni ngs of His 
life He carried the God-consciousness as such 
within Himself--then from the very outset He 
must have b e en consci ous of Himself as an Ego; 
indeed (th e o.educt ion is simple), He mu s t h ave 
been master of language from t he first, at 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 64. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 381 . 
least so far as its more abstract part is 
concerned, and before He ever spoke; thus 
His 1'lhole earliest childhood must have been 
mere appearance . Thi s excludes the thought 
of a true human life and quite definitely 
adopts the error of Docetism.l 
113. 
Thus we see tha t Schleiermacher held to the real humanity 
of Christ. His personality was completely determined by 
His hurnani ty. He v-ras lilce other men in this regard, but 
distinguished from them all by the constant potency of 
His God-consciousness , which was a veritable existence of 
God in Him. 2 
The fact that Jesus v-ras entirely free from sinfulness 
did not affect the concept of the complete identity of 
human nature in Him, for Schleiermacher held that sin is 
so l:j..ttle an es s ential part of the being of man that ve 
can never regard it as anything else than a disturbance 
of nature. The possibility of a sinless c1evelopment is in 
it self not incongruous 'tvi t h the idea of human nature. This 
poss:i.bility is invol ved, and recognized, in the consciousness 
of sin and guilt.3 Thus Schleiermacher held that the ground 
of the sinlessne.ss of Christ vre.s not external, but v.ras es-
sentially grounded in Him. This fact is important if He was 
to take away, through -vrhat He 1.vas in Himself, the sinfulness 
of the corporate life.4 
Schleiermacher explained the divinity of Christ in 
terms of the God-consciousness implanted in His self-
1. Scl leiermacher, CF, 381. 
2. Scbleierrnacher, CF, 385. 
J. Schleiermacher, CF, 385. 
4. Schleiermacher, CF, 386. 
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consciousness. 11 To ascribe an absolutely pov1erful God-
consciousness, a nd to attribute to Him an existence of God 
in Him, are exactly the same t h ing.*1 The existence of 
God is limited to the rational individual, because only in 
such a creature can God 's existence be apprehended as pure 
activity and the consciousness be receptive to this exis-
tende. The God-consciousness which was in human na ture 
before Christ, and all that is apart from any connection 
1; i th Him, cannot really be called an existence of God in man . 
Ne are tinctured with materialistic conceptions and are 
always dominated by the sensuous self-consciousness . The 
nerfect God-consciousness is found nowh ere but in Christ.2 
He is the ,"Qlnly 11 other 11 in which there is an existence of Goa. 
in the true sense. Schleiermacher said: 
'ttl!orking baclt't'Tar.ds vre must novr say, if it is 
only tlirou.gh Him that the human God-consciousness 
b ecomes an existence of God in human nature, 
and only through the rational nature that 
the totality of finite powers can become an ex-
istence of God in the i>rorlc1, that in truth 
He alone mediates all existence of God i n 
the 1vorld and all revelation of God through 
t he world, in so far He bears within Him-
self the whole new creation which con-
tains and develops t h e potency of the 
God-consciousness .3 
v. The Perso.n of Christ. 
The question naturally arises as to the real nature 
of such a God-man as we find in Christ. Schleiermacher 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 387. 3. Schleiermacher, CF, 388. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 387. 
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discussed fully the va rious two-nature theories concern-
ing Christ and rejects them absolutely. He said that any 
idea of separate natures in Christ for the divine and human 
in Hi>rn is im})ossible and cannot possibly be justified on any 
strictly scientific investigation. He wrote: 
NmrT if 1person 1 ind icates a constant unity of 
life, but 1nature 1 a series of ways of action 
or la'\'IS, a.ccording to "t.Yhich conditions of life 
va ry and a re included with in a fixed r ange, 
how can the unit y of life coexist with the 
duality of natures, unless the one gives "';-ray 
to the other, if t he one exhibits a larger and 
the other a narrower range, or else t h ey 
melt into ea ch other, b oth systems of ways 
of action and laws really becoming one in the 
one life?-- if indeed "tve are sp eak ing of a 
person, 1. e. of an Ego v-Ihich is the same in 
al l t he cons ecutive moments of its exi s tence. 1 
Schleiermacher sa-v,r only confusion in the t-vro nature 
approach. He saicl that t he vrhole conc ep tion of the divine 
in Christ must be revised and the expres s ions regarding 
the divine nature ano_ t he duality of na tuPes in the same 
Person mus t be altogether avoided. There can be but 
one nature in a ny person. The essential dif f erence be-
t ween Christ and the rest of us is that, ins tead of be-
ing obscured and yowerless, as in us, the God-con s ciousness 
in Him was abs olutely clear and determined each moment. 
It must be regarded as a continual living presence in Him, 
a real e· i Rtence of God. 2 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 393. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 385. 
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In virtue of thi s difference between Christ and us, there 
is in Him everything that we need. And , in virt ue of His 
lik eness to us, l imit ed only by His utter sinlessness, this 
is all in Him in such a way that we ca n lay hold of it. The 
existence of God in Christ is ~osited as the i nnermost funda-
mental :po-v;rer v.ri thin Him, from which every activity proceeds 
and v.~hi ch holds every element togeth er. The divine and., the 
human ,;.Tere not t'vo diffel"•ent forces in Him which vJere strug-
gl ing; against eHch oth er. Rather they ·Here both part of 
Hi s unified p ers onality . Every a ctivity 'vas a common a c-
tivit ~ · of both the divine and the human in Him. 1 
8 . God the Holy Sp irit. 
i. A manifestation in time. 
Schleiermach e r 1 s concep tion of the Holy Spirit conforms 
to his view of the Tri nity as one of revelations. Therefore 
he held t hat the Spirit did not exist before the creation 
of rnan . 2 In f act the Spiri t did not make it s appearance 
until it united itself '"ith the Church of Christ.3 Schleier-
macher i dentified this appearance 1-vi th t he outpouring of 
the Spirit on the day of Pentecost. He referred to John 16:7 
to sho~-.r that Christ !:'1ac1e Hi s going a"tvay a condit ion of the 
sending of t he Spirit. But then he referred to John 20:22 to 
she,,; that in a sense Christ communicatecl the Spirit to them 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 397-398 . 
2. Scbleiermach er, Art.(l835), VI, 56. 
J. Scbleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 59. 
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before His final departure from earth. He po int ed out that 
M:att. 16:17 even assumes that the Spirit had already been 
present 1rli th them, for what 2ver is a divin e revelation in 
the soul relative to Christ is also a iiTOrk of the Spirit. 1 
But Schleiermacher ex~lains that this was not a complete ex-
nres s ion of the common spirit, ¥rhich he hl.entif i es as the Holy 
Spirit. During the p ersonal ~resence of Christ there could 
have been no completel y common life representing at tbE.t 
time the Kingdom of God.2 As long as Christ was with them 
it took the form exclusively of a continuous desire to re-
ceive from Him. Therefore, only a fter His departure could 
the Holy Spirit really manifest itself.3 
Jus t as t he other Pe l~sons made their appearance in time 
through a development in t h e Goclhead, so the Holy Sp ir•it is 
a further development of God in uniting Himself vrith the 
psychological pmvers or functions of the members of the 
Christian community, and manifesting Himself in this way. 4 
ii. The Co1nmon Spirit. 
By all of its operations on the community of believers 
t h e Spirit formed a real unity in the Church.5 The exnres-
sian uHoly S~irit 11 is understood to mean this vital unity 
o:r thef Christian fellm . ..;ship as a moPe.l personality. After 
1. Schleierrnacher, OF, 565. 
2. Schleiermacher, OF, 566. 
3. Schleierrnacher, OF, 569. 
4. Scllieiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 58-59. 
5. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 70. 
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the departure of Christ, His individyal influences were no 
longer present in the church. But something divine still 
existed. This something Schleiermacher called the Being of 
God in it. It is this which continues within the church the 
commu~ication of the perfection and blessedness of Christ. 
Schleiermacher wrote: 
It is apparent that the communication of the 
sinless perfection and bl essedness which, as an 
absolute and continuous willing of the King-
dom of God, is the innermost impulse of the 
individual, must also be the common spirit 
of the whole, or there could be no common 
spirit at all. Were there any other than this, 
that impuls e 'ttrbuld b e subordinat e to it anc1 
thus to what is less perfect than itself; in 
every corporate life all that is p ersonal 
must be subordinate to the common · spirit. On 
the other hand, if there v.rere no common spirit, 
the Christian Church would be no true common 
or corpi!>rate life; yet this is \IThat it has 
professed to be from the beginning as regards 
the divine Spirit dwelling in it, and this is 
hO'tv it has b een accepted in the self-conscious-
ness of every effective member. This -vrill for 
the Kingdom of God is the vital unity of the 
'tvhole, and its common spirit in each individual; 
in virtue of its inwardness, it is in the whole 
an absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and 
thus the being of God therein, but conditioned 
by the being of God i n Christ.l 
This common Spirit in the church corresponds to all 
that 0hrist promtsed in the Holy Spirit and fulfills every-
thing that is represented as the Spirit's 'tiTorking. After 
Christ's departure the disciples' common apprehension of 
Christ changed to a spontaneous prolongation of His fel-
lowship-forming a ctivity. It was through this a ctivity, 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 535-536. 
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so related to the fixed apprehension of Christ, that the im-
perishable common spirit developed, and the Christian Church 
arose.1 
iii. Gifts of the Spirit. 
It is clear that Schleiermacher considered the Holy 
Spirit to be a definitely d i stinct mode of God's revelation 
and to form a part of the Christian Trinity.2 The distin-
guishing activity of the Holy S~irit is descriped mainly as 
tha t of besto1ving certain gifts upon the members of the 
church , where and i•ihen He wills to do · so. 3 This is t h e 
only ~ray in which the Spirit operates. 4 But it is not in 
any arbitrary -vmy that the Spiri t precedes to bestol"/ his 
gifts. It is through a kind of organized symmetry or divine 
lavrs.5 The gifts vrhich 1vere bestowed in this vray were 
those of the spiritual life and sanctification.6 These 
gifts i'Vere held by Schleiermacher to be the purest re-
sembl ance of the secrets or mysteries of God.7 
Schleiermacher nointed out that the activity of the 
noly Spirit was not a real presence of Himself in different 
individuals. This -vrould malce any kind of unity of the 
Spir,it impossible and thus make it impossrole for it to 
1. Schleiermache r, CF, 567-568. 
2. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 65. 
3. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, SL~. 
4. Schleiermacher, Art.(1835), VI, 56. 
5. Schleiermacher, Art. ( 1835) , VI, 59. 
6. Schleierrnacher, Art.(1835), VI, 60. 
?. Schleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 71. 
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be a true revelation of God . Therefore, the Spirit was 
held to ha ve its place in t he community of Christians, the 
church, a s one~n one, and not in the lives of individual 
Christians. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are g iven to in-
dividual Christians, however, and in this way Sc~~eiermacher 
distinguishes between the Spirit and the gifts which He be-
stows on the individual memb ers of the Christian Church. 1 
iv. The Godhead of the Holy Spirit. 
Scllieiermacher considered the Godhead of the Holy 
Spirit to be evident to us on the same g rounds as is t hat 
of the Son. This means t hat nothing less than the divine 
Essence Itself indwells the Christian Church a s its com-
mon snirit. 2 But, as in the cas e of the other Persons of 
the Trinity , there is no division in the Godhead. The same 
God that appeared as Father, and then as the Son, now ap-
peared as the Holy S~irit. There wa s no change in the 
unity of God, but only in the develop ment of His reve-
l a tion.3 
Schleiermacher insisted that there can be no real 
d ependence or subordination among the Persons of the 
Trinity. If it is t h e same Godhead in each app earance, 
t h ere can be no real subordination. But, jus t as he 
saw a kind of dep endence of the Son on the Father, because 
1. Schleierrnacher, Art. (l835) , VI, 58. 
2. Schleierrnacher, CF, 738. 
3. Schleierrnacher, Art.(l835), VI, 58-59. 
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of the dependence of Jesus on the creation 11hich came through 
t h e Faiiher, so also he se ems to hold to a sort of dependence 
of the Holy Spirit on the Son. The effects of Christ could 
hardly b e i gnoreo_ i n the v-mrk ing of the Spirit. In fact, 
Schl eiermach er considered t he most auth entic expression of 
t h e Holy Spirit t o be a consciousness of the need to be re-
deemed that is alilce :l_n all, and of t h e capacity, alike i n 
all, to be taken up into living fellowship with Christ.l 
Although t here is an obvious connection between the 
second and third Persons in the Trinity, Schleiermach er 
definitely considered them quite distinct. The Holy Sp irit, 
a s t h e common Spirit of t h e church , is truly God revealing 
Himself in this ,,ra y. 
1. Schieiermacher, CF, 565. 
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CRAFTER IV 
I . RITSCHL 1 S DOCTRI NE OF THE TRIIHTY. 
1. Introduction. 
The thought of Albrecht Ritschl is included in this 
consideration of the Trinity because of his contributions 
to the theory o~ r eligious knowledge and the conclusions 
regard1ng Jesus Christ to which his theory led. His thought 
! 
defin i"(jely added something to the considerations regarding 
the Trinity. His grea t influence on the thought of his 
day and subsequent thought makes his contribution of great 
importance. 
2. Historical background. 
I 
Al1)recht Ritschl was born on March 25, 1822. He vJas 
the son of a Lutheran bishop. He finished school with the 
I 
i highest distinction and planned to be a theologian . He 
studiec1 at Halle, l·;here he received the Ph. D. degree. In 
1846 he began his career as a univ ~ersity lecturer a t Bonn. 
Though not popular a t first he l ater had great succe s s. He 
started his teaching in the field of New Testament. In 
later ~ears he changed to the history of doctrine, and from 
1852 onv-m.rds he t aught Dogmatics. In 1859 he became a full 
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p rofessor. He accepted a chair at Gottingen in 1864 and con-
tinued to teach there until his death. It was during this 
final t1-venty-five year n erioct tha t his pov1ers as a thinker 
and a vJriter came to their height. He continued his lec-
ture s ~n N8"v·J Testa .. ment anc1 history of doctrine, but his 
main lvork lay in the field of Systematic Theology. Mackintosh 
points out that it is important to note that Ritschl had been 
a pract i ca l historian before h e took to dogmatic theology and 
that his lifelong aim i'Ias to re-int erpret the Reformation 
understano .. ing of the Gospel in opposition to the o_ifferent 
ve r-sions made current by Romani sm anc1 Hysticism. 11 Back to the 
N e1-J" Testament by 1vay of the Reformat ion--this is the motto 
I · 1 tha t guides him st eactily. 11 
In 1870 Ritschl 1 s best knovm work, The Ohristian 
Doctri~e of Justification and Reconciliation, app eared. It 
was presented in three volumes. The first is hi s torical 
in nature, the second_ is biblical, and the third is system-
a tic. 'rt is the t hird volume 'tvhich presents his objective 
statement of t heology. 
Among the oth er works of Rit schl are: Christian Per-
fection, a short treatise which g ives concis E:ly the prac-
tical religious i dea s involved in his arguments. Instruc-
tion in the Christian Religion, whi6h is a coiripehafum of 
his theol ogy meant a s a textbook for schools, but which 
proved ~ o be much too difficult for its declared purpose.2 
1. Mackintosh, TOMT, 139. 2. Mack intosh, TOI·1T, 140. 
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After 1874, on the completion of Justification and Recon-
ciliatli,on, there v1e re many accessions to his group of fol-
' 
lowers. Among the first to join the new movement were Harnack 
a nd He~mann. The largest part of his following were not 
I 
p erson&l hearers but were student s of his books. By 1889, 
at the time of his death, Ritschl 1 s thought had come to 
exert ~n enormous i nfluence in the theological world of 
I 1 
Germany. 
3. Theory of religious knowledge. 
To understand Ritschl 1 s approach to theological pro-
blems it is necessa ry first to understand his theory of 
I 
religious knowledge . This could well be an ext encled s tucl.y 
in itself and v-rill be discussed here only to the extent 
necessar-y to gain an accurate concention of the nrocedure I - -
I 
employed by Ritschl to arrive athis theological conclusions. 
i. Rejection of the speculative approach. 
! R+tschl took issue with speculative rationalism as a 
means for arriving at religious truth. He felt that re-
ligious knowledge is related to t heoretical or philosophical 
knowledg e in that, as a whol e , they both deal with the same 
object. 2 He did not advocate the expulsion of metaphysical 
or theoretical kno'\'rledge but rather tried to limit it to its 
proper field. Mackintosh po ints out that Ritsch1 1 s antipathy 
1. Rs.cltd.htosh, T01-1T , 141. 2. Ritsclll, JAR, 203. 
for meyaphysics has received a false importance from his 
critics.1 But the truth is that we inevitably go wrong 
I 
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when 1nrj approach his system from the sicte of philosophy . 
He rejected the dis interested, scientific, approach as a 
means df obtaining r eliGious knowl edge. He said that anyone 
' 
who tri ed to arrive a t relig ious k.no~rrledge in such a way 
was not at home in the sphere of religion.2 
I 
Natural theology was objectionable to Ritschl on much 
I 
the same grouncts as "1as philosophy. Although it deals with 
subjects related t o religion it uses the speculative ap-
proach~ which disobeys the main principle of religion.3 
I He rejected the co smological, teleological, and the onto-
1 logical proofs for God 1 s being. He said t hat t he se argu-
. I 
ments rest merely upon the iCl.ea of things and their causal 
connection. These proofs are not based upon any datum re-
I 
ceived from Christianity but are merely conceptions of the 
world-unity wh i ch hav e nothing to do with any relig ion. 4 
I 
I Ritschl rejected also the formal theological stat ements and 
creeds~ v-rhich he f elt were more a result of scientific kno1nr-
I ledg e than of !'eligious know1edge. 
I 
ii. Reject ion of my sticism and subjectivism. 
Another influence affecting religious knowl edge which 
Ritschl rejected wa s myst icism. He criticized the medieval 
mystics "t>rho ·strove to attain 'blessedness in the ecstatic 
·1. Mack intosh, TOHT, 1L1-3. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 398. 
3. Ritschl, J AH , L~ • 
. 4. Ritschl, J AR , 17. 
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knowledge of Goct , or the annihilation of their ovm wills. 
The my~tical vie\'.r is out of harmony v-ri th Ri tschl t s tv-hole 
I 
doctrin e of justification by faith. 1 He said: 
ltmerever men give way to mystice.l states or 
~ aspirations, they imagine that the sphere of the 
1preached Word and t h e promises of grace, there-
fore the necessary subordination to the public 
Revelation i n the2Church, is transcended and jmay be forgotten. 
He said that this pretended immediate communion with, or 
immediate relation to, Christ, in l>Thich men endeavor to 
enjoy all possible forms of blessedness apart from and 
beyond the forgiveness of sins, is false.3 The thing that 
Ri tschl objected to is that the mystic does not talce the 
I proper lattitude toward Jesus. In rising up to God, and 
communing with Him, the mystic tries to transcend and dis-
pense v.ri th the 1<'1ecliator. 4 
- I 
Ritschl felt that subjectivism is closely related to 
mysticism. But yet he was willing to go along with 
Schleiermacher in saying that in knovJledge we observe anc1 
explain even the objects of sense-perception, not as they 
are in themselves, but as we perceive them. Apart from 
volunt a ry activity, through w"hich we receive : and utilize 
for our o1vn blessedness the operations of God, we have no 
c; 
means of understanding objective d.ogmas as religious truths • ..-
1. Ritschl, JAR, 99. 4. Mackintosh, TO!~, 145. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 113. 5. Ritschl, JAPl, 34. 
3. Ritschl, JAR, 113. 
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Although Ritschl accepted Schleiermacher's subjectivistic 
' -
a pproach to a certa in point he felt that Schleiermacher did 
not go far enough i n relating the religious feeling to the 
Christlan community and to h istorical facts. 1 
iii. Independent value-judgments. 
Ritschl based the true source of religious kno"V.rledge 
in independent valu e-judgments, which relate to a man's 
attitude to the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure 
or pain, in 1'\fhich man either enjoys the dominion over the 
world vouchsafed him by God, or f eels grievously the lack 
of God's help to that end. 2 Knowledge of God can be demon-
strated a s religiou s knowledge only when God is conceived 
as securing to the believer such a position in the world 
I 
as more than count erbalances its restrictions. Apart from 
this value-judgment of f a i t h there exists no knowledge of 
Goo_ 'tvOFthy of this content. Ra ther tha n to seek for a the-
oretic91.l kno"rledge v-rhich must first kno'\v the nature of God 
and_ Ch1~ist before 1're can ascertain their v.rorth for us, Ri t schl 
b a sed his knovTledg e of the na ture of God anc1 Christ only 
in their vrorth for us. 3 God. and f a ith are inseparable con-
ceptions. Faith which is genuine and sincere can be exer-
cised only i n response to the true revelation of God. 4 
A value-judgment r esulting from a faith which consists of 
1. Ritschl, JAR, 11. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 205. 
3. R.itschl, JAR, 212. 
4. R.itschl, JAR, 21J. 
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trust ¢annot be unintelligible. The judgment that a thi ng 
I 
is gooq. presupposes or incluo.es the judgment that the thing 
is rea~ . 1 The Christian religi on is in harmony with rea son, 
i but 1...ri th the reservation that knO"t,rledge of God embodies it-
self in judgments which differ in kind from those of theore-
' 
tical science. 2 
R1tschl held that to obtain true knowledge of Chris-
tianity one must be a member of the community of Christ and 
subordfnate himself to Christ.3 He said: 
'i'Je a re able to knovr and unc1erstand God, s i n, con-
'ver sion, eternal life, in the Christian sense, 
1only so far as vre consciously and intentionally 
ireckon ourselves members of the community which 
,Christ found ed. Theology is bound to talce up 
~his point of view, and only so is there any 
lhope of constructillg a theological s ystem which 
d eserves t he name . 
Ritschl quoted John ?:17 as a declaration of Christ to prove 
tha t 11 1·rhoso "VIilleth to do the '\'.till of Goo_ shall lcnow vrhether 
His docitrlne is of God or of merel y human origin. n5 
Tl~e application of this approach to relig ious lcnm<Tleclge 
1vill be. clarified further as it is ap·olied later in discus-
' 
sing Ritschl 1 s doctrine of the Father, Son and Holy Snirit. 
iv. A historical basis. 
Ritschl, of all theolo gians, has most fundamentally 
empha sized the historical. His theory of religious know-
ledge stresses the historical over the metaphysical. He 
1 •. Ritschl, JAR, 395. 
2. Ritschl, J AR , 225 . 
3. Ritschl, JAR, 3. 
Lr. Rit schl, JAR, 4. 
5. Ritschl, JAR, 226. 
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was not only one of the foremost students of historical the-
ology but was also pre-eminently a biblical theologian.l It 
was through a strong emphasis on t he h i s tori cal and th3 
biblical t hat Rit schl sought to avoid t he subjective and t h e 
I 
rational fallac i e s . He gave much attent i on to the study of 
biblic~l t heology t o ascerta in the relig ious conceptions 
of Jes u1s, the :::ruunder of the Church, and those maintained by 
the apostles as i ts earliest l"'epre s entatives. He wanted. to 
discover the conceptions originall y held of the religious 
relation of Christians to God. He felt that the New Testa-
ment has been, anc1 should be, the guide for Christian the-
ology.2 
Although Ritschl "i.•rent back to the Nev-r Tes tament a s a 
b as is f \or h is theology h e held that the material for con-
clusioiJis rega rding forgivene s s, j us tification and recondili-
ation should no t b e sought so much direct ly in t he words 
·of Jesus as in the correlat ive representations of the orig-
,inal- cb nsciousness of the Christian community. He felt 
t hat i t i s impos sibl e to discover the full importance of 
Christ t hrough biographical study. It must c ome mainly from 
t h e f a ith of t he Chris t ian communi ty.3 He wanted to base 
h i s doct rines on the vie,vpoint of the red eemed community of 
Christ. He said tha t only from tha t viel·Ip~int could every 
part of t h eological kno-vrledg e be cons trued, since only so 
1. Sv--rin~ , TOAR, 85. J. Ritscbl, J AR , 3. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 1. 
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can the vmrth of Christ as Revealer be employed throughout 
as the basis of lmO'tvledge i n solving all the problems of the-
olo gy. From this s ource he sought the religious data for a 
knm-Jledge that takes the form of unconc1itional trust. 1 Y.Je 
can rightly kno't.Y God only as 1...re knov.r Him through Christ. 
Therefore, 'tt'Te can knoi·T Him only if v-Ie belong to the community 
of bel ieve r•s. 2 
Thus Ritschl sought to provide a basis for his value-
judgments in something outside of himself. He considered 
that he had preserved the subjective values in Schleier-
macher's approach but yet had avoided t h e fallacies of 
subject'ivism by giving his value-judgments a historical 
foundation. 
4. God's purposes. 
In Ri t sch~ 1 s system of rel1:gious knowledg e the exis-
tence of God is beyond question, for the activity of God 
becomes to us a mat t er of conviction. We find t he proof of 
God in what He does for us.3 Thus Ritschl finds proof for 
the omnipotence and omnipresence of God, which are implied 
in th e creation and preservation of t he 1.;orld by t he ~rill 
of God, in the cert a inty of the care and grac i ous presence 
of God for t he good . Ritschl formed a value-judgment to 
the effect that the 1-vorld creating ancl 1...rorld -preserving 
will of God has for its purpose the good of man. Therefore 
; 
1. Ritschl, JAR 6. J. Ritschl, Jfu~ , 218. 
2. Ritschl, JAR' 112-113. 
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the thought of the omnipotence of God completes itself con-
sistently in tha t of His vrisdom, omniscience and disposition 
to meet the needs of man. 1 The religious vievr of the '"'orld 
is based on the fact that all t~e operations of nature are 
at God 1 s disposal 1r.1hen He wishes to help man . Ri t schl baseP-
~his value-judgment upon the special revelation of the Old 
and Ne1,~ Testaments. 2 
The eternit y of Goo_ is not described in speculative 
terms about His existence rea ching out beyond tha t of the 
world without beginning or end, and that God has therefore 
a different measure of time from tha t of man. Rather, 
Ritschl recognize~ God ' s eternity in the fact that amid all 
the change s of thi ngs , 1•rhich also indicates variations in 
His workings , God himself remains the same, as well as 
maintaj;ns the same purpose and plan in which He creates and 
directs1 the world . 3 
Ritschl held . the Christian revelation of God as the 
Father lof our Lorc1 Jesus Christ to be also a confirmation 
of God ,as the only Being of His kind . He is the creator 
of the univer se, the lvill that determines Himself and all 
things for Himself, and vrho in particular designed a com-
munity of man for religious communion 1·rith Himself and 
4 
et h ical communion i-Ii th one another. 
3. Ritschl, IICR, 186. 
4. Ritschl, IICR, 182. 
1. Ritschl, IICR, 187. 
2. Ritschl, IICR, 1 88. 
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Thus we see ho·H Ritschl determined the attributes of 
God through the Tt·.ray in 1rrhich God affec ts man . We knov-r God 
throug~ v-rhat He do es for us. In the sections to follow 
vve shall see more of God 1 s nature through what He does for 
man. 
5. God as Father. 
i. The love of God~ 
Ritschl noints out t hat t h e complete Christian name for 
God is "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. 11 This 
relationship of fatherhood includes not only Jesus Christ 
but his communit y a s lTell . 1 The key to this f atherly re-
l at ionship is found in the declaration that God is love. 
Love is the essential content of the divine personality . 
God manifests himself to the Son and to the community as 
loving will. The goodness of Goo_ to all men in besto11ing 
on them t he good t h ings of nature is an inference which 
Chris t drew from the knowledge He possessed of the love of 
God to Him and to His community. Thu s the goodness of God 
is embnaced in the specific attribute of the divine Father-
hood.2 Ritschl felt that this is t h e most impor tant con-
ception of God. Even the personality of God could not be 
known "'ithout our first knovring Him as loving "Yrill . The 
conception of love is t he only adequate concep tion of God, 
for it enables us both to undenstand the revelation which 
1. Ri ts1chl, IICR, 184. 2. Ritschl, J AR, 273. 
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comes through Christ to His community, and at the same time 
to solve the problem of the world. In all of Ritschl 1 s con-
siderai; ions of Gocl i...re find man at the very cent er of God Is 
purposes.l 
ii. The family of God. 
In discussing justification and reconcilia tion Ritschl 
stres sed the fact that the true analogy of the Kingdom of 
God is found in the family. He goes into considerable de-
tail to show that families have childr en of blood-relation-
ship and also adopted children. He pointed out that the 
analogy cannot be complete becaus e those who are admitted 
t o the r ank of children of God are all, because of sin, as 
adopted ch ildr en of God. This _fellowship with God to which 
sinners are admit t ed is as close as that i'V"hich ex ists be-
t "tAreen the head and the members of a family. It is in this 
family relationship tha t God carries on his activity of for-
giveness and reconciliation. 2 Justification or r econcili-
ation is the determination of God as Father to admit sinners, 
in spite· of their sin and consciousness of guilt, to that 
relat i on of fellowship with Himself which includes t h e 
right of sonsh i p and the inheritance of eternal life . A 
true consciousness of f a ith is a feeli ng of trust in God as 
Father • .3 
l. Ritschl, JAR, 274. 
2. Ritschl, JL~, 97-98. 
,3. Ritschl, JAR, 126. 
134. 
iii. A value-judgment. 
Thus we see that Ritschl arrived at his concept of the 
fatherhood of God through the religious value-judgment of 
what God does for us. He based his value-judgment on the 
revelation of Christ and upon his o"!m experience. He did not 
discuss the generation of the Son as a basis of God's father-
hood. It is enti r ely a matter of the nature of God as love 
and the relationship of man as the object of that love. 
There is no consideration of the idea of the begetter and 
the begotten. God's fatherhood wa s not ccnsidered in such 
a \vay by Ri t schl. 
It will be shown in the following section tha t Ritschl 
I . 
held Jesus Christ to be in a special relationship as a Son 
but th ' t the relationship was by no means limited to Jesus. 
6. God as Son. 
i. The historical Christ. 
Just as Ritschl based his conception of God on the 
value-judgments derived from what God does for us, so also 
he formed his conc Aption of Christ from the effects of what 
Christ does for us. Rather than start from the nature of 
God and the idea of the God-man to find 11 '\-Jho 11 Jesus vms, 
Ritschl started with the historical Christ to find what he 
did. He is not i nterested in any abstract ideas about the 
person of Jesus. It is the Christ of the recorded mani-
festation and the response to Him by the religious community 
135. 
that interested Ritschl and on \"J'hich he proceeded to form his 
conclusions regarding Christ.l 
ii. The Prophetic office. 
From the information obt a inable regarding Christ Ritschl 
found t hat Christ fulfilled certain offices in carrying out 
his purposes on earth. Ritschl discussed fully the three 
traditional offices which theolog ians had used to describe 
the work of Christ. These were the offices of King, Prophet 
and Priest. Ritschl decided to eliminate the kingly office , 
and to combine it with the other two. He presented these 
two offices, of prophet and priest, as the best descrintion 
of Christ's work on earth. 2 
Ritschl said that the historical connection between 
Christ .)tani ty and the religion of the Old Testament made it 
natural that Jesus should represent Himself as a prophet 
sent from God. He pointed out, howev er, that Jesus set 
himself above all t he precedi ng prophets of the Old Testa-
ment in making himself known as the Son of God, 1-rho 1..rorked 
the i•.rol~ks of God. 3 But Ritschl did not base the prophetic 
calling of Jesus on his messianic dignity, but rather on 
His morally effective teaching and His gracious mode of 
conduct. F.itschl pointed to the nature of Jesus• calling , 
His fitness for His special calling , and His faithful 
1. Mack intosh, TOMT, 169-161. 3. Ritschl, IICR, 194. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 432. 
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exercise of it as the condition of the personal authority 
which is attributed to Him. 1 The fitness of Jesus for His 
calling fotmd expression in the mutual · knowledge existing 
betweem Himself and God His Father. He k.ne,,; God as Father 
because he was cons~ious that he was called of God to found 
the kimgdom of Goo_ in a ne1-v religious community. Ri tschl 
felt that this convi ction of Jesus ~ouches also for all the 
other sides of his spiritual endowment for his calling , 
because all the characteristics of his life witness to his 
absolute rational s oundness. There is not the least trace 
in Him of fanaticism or self-deception. 2 
Ritschl pointed out that the Old Testament prophets 
stoocl :t;1ear to Goo_ in a v.s..rying degree . The Olo_ Testament 
view of prophecy presupposes both the mental and the moral 
incLependence of the p1•ophets. This indep enc1enc e cont r olled 
the divine impulse which was perceived in them by the recog-
nition of their 011n consciousness of the same, and their 
convinced assent to the \'lOrds of Goo_ vJhich "t-lere g iven them . 
At the s ame time the religious value attached to the pro-
phets ancl their i'rbrds, both by themselves anc1 their country-
men, is that they were accounted the instruments or organ s 
of the self-revelation of God . Ritschl said that it wa s p re-
cisely this same estimate that Jesus put upon himself, save . 
only that the essential and ultimate divine purpose, which 
Jesus was conscious not only of explaining in word but of 
1 . R.itschl, IICR, 195. 2. Ritschl, IICR, 195. 
137. 
realizing in deed, involves His placing His own independent 
personality in a still closer relation to God His Father. 
Jesus attributed to His life as a 'lt<Jhole the i·.rorth of being 
the in~trument of the complete self revelation of God. This 
I 
has leQ. the Christian commun i ty, through faith in the divine 
I 
worth 0f Christ, to form the value-judgment that the divin e 
revelation was a human person. 1 Jesus devoted himself to 
the exercise of t his p rophetic office in the preaching of 
2 truth and in loving action, without break or deviation • . 
Thus we find that Ritschl considered Christ to be a 
compl ete revelation of God. Christ was the perfect revela-
tion of C-oo., so that b eyond l.vhat He brought no further rev-
elation is conceivable or is to be look ed for.3 Vl e can 
knov.r God only as ''' e lcnm·r Him thro·ugh Christ. Gocl, and all 
the operat ions of His grace , can be kno-vm through the revela-
tion of Christ. 4 This revelation involves supremely the 
revelation of God a s love, for this is the only adequate 
conception of God. This characteristic of love enables us 
to understand the revelation ltJ'h ich comes to us through Christ, 
for th~ life of Christ was the supreme expression of love.? 
iii. The priestly office. 
The prophetic office of Christ is fulfilled through the 
independent consciousness of Christ but yet it can be 
1. Ritschl~ JAR, 435-436. 4. Ritschl, JAR, ?. 
2. Ritschl, IICR, 196. 5. Ritschl, JAR, 274. 
3. Ritschl, JAR, 388. 
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described as coming from God. Through this office of Christ 
I God revea led Himself to His community. The priestly office 
of Christ, on lllie"" other hand, is more definitely an activity 
of Christ in presenting hims elf ~o God for his own self and 
on beh~.lf of the community. The priestly side of Christ 1 s 
c alling is subordinate to the prophetic becaus e it is some-
-vrhat an outgrowth of t he prophetic office. 1 In fulfilling 
these offices Christ's acts cannot be divided between the 
two. They are really not two spheres or divisions but are 
merely tvro asp ects of the same life. 2 
T~e priestly office is fulfilled in the solidaric unity 
bet-vre en Christ and God. It is the reciprocal relation be-
ttveen t he love of God and the obedience of Jesus in His 
calling .3 Ritschl rejected the orthodox conception of the 
relatibnship betwe en God and Christ. He said that it con-
siders the divine r evealing Word a s constituting t he form, 
and the human individual the substance, of t h e pers on of 
Christ. This would mean that the human individual only 
existed in such a way t hat the Divine Logos was the moving 
force of all His visible e.ctivities, ancl_ tha t His human soul, 
as such , had no scope for ind ependent activity as in other 
men. Ri tsc[l~ insisted that the true interpreta tion of 
Christ's priesthood refuses to be ~ound by the limits of 
such a theory. The human soul of Jesus must have been 
l. Ritscrll, J AR, 22. 
2. Rit schl, JAR, L!-_30. 
3. Ritschl, IICR, 197. 
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operat i ve as form. The ctivine nature came into account only 
' in so far as it was made subo1~inate to the uower of the 
indivi&ual will of the man Christ.l 
I~ fulfilling His calling in the priestly office 
Christ I gaine.d dominion over the l'rorld for himself and for 
I 
his co~unity and established the Kingdom of God. He did 
this t L:.trough His ovm deeds, His words, and His patience in 
suffering, which culminated i n His o.eath. In accomplishing 
this Christ expressed His unity with God, who also had such 
a k1ng4om as His f inal purpose in the world. Jesus, having 
been called to establish the Kingdom of God, had the same 
divine lpurpose and performed the acts of love and patience 
which *ere manifestations of the grace and faithfulness 
actual in God Himself. Ritschl said that it t-ras because 
of sucn a life that the Christ ian community saw the divinity 
I 
I 
of Christ . They felt that the attributes whidh Jesus ex-
1 
presseq. as a man vrere at the same time and under the same 
circum~tances also peculiar predicates of God.2 
iv. The Godhead of Christ. 
v! e come nm-v to Ri t schl 1 s consideration of the GocL"lead 
of Christ. He said tha t it i s false to assume that a uni-
f or m doctrine of the Godhead of Christ c an be exegetically 
const ructed from the Ne\'1 Testament. Strictly speaking, 
t h e content of the New Testament books is not doctrine at 
1. Ritschl, J AR, 437. 
2. Ritschl, IICR, 198. 
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a ll. Least of all ca n we discover in Christ's own words a 
doctrine of His Godhead, because this doctrine has never 
b een other than the expression of t hat unique acknol-rledge-
ment and appreciation which t he Christian community yielded 
1 to its founder. Wha t Ritsc~~ held is that t h e only possible 
-vray in ,.,..hich irle can know tha t Christ is Goo. is from His 
h a ving the i·Jorth of Goc1 for us. It is really in Christ 1 s 
human a chievements that His Godhead becomes manifested and 
intelligible for His people. 2 
Ri tschl stress eel his concept of faith, v-.rh ich he said 
that he lea rned from Luth er. Faith, for him, does not c on-
sist in a ss ent to any revealed dogmas but is confidence and 
trust in Go d . Thus the faith and trust v-rhich the Chris-
tian community ha s put in Christ is a r ecognition of His 
Godhead. Trust of this kind can be given to God alone. 
Such a faith attributes Godhead t o Jesus through a direct 
religious value-judgment. His follo-vuers smr in Him a 
revelation of God which had t he va lue of God for them. 3 
The value-judgment which convinced the Christian commu-
nity of the Godhead of Christ was b a sed not only on what they 
sai.Y in Christ but also on His worth to them in their own 
salvation. For Ritschl, the Godhead of Christ is seen as 
11 the poi.·rer which Christ has put forth upon our recLemption. u4 
The recognition of Jesus as the Chflist ha s no real meaning 
1. Ritschl, J AR, 400. 3. Ritschl, JAR, 391-392. 
2. Ritschl, J AR, 39L~. 4. Ritschl, JAR; 395. 
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for us unless through Him we knovv ours elves to b e raised to 
the same dominion over the 1rmrld that He achieved anc to the 
same c pmmunion 1-vith God.l Christ 1 s Godhead is based on the 
viorth put on His human a chievements, -vrhich suffice for our 
I 
salvation. Ritschl rejected the kind of theology -vrhich 
tries to r efer the priestly activities of Christ ba ck to God 
a s the subject. It is in the inc1epeno .. ent actions and t each-
i ngs of Jesu8 t hat "t·.re f :Lnd the salvation of His community.2 
It is necessary to understand the nature of the Chris-
tian c0mmunity to appreciate the worth of Christ for it. 
Christ, according to Ritschl, is the founder of the Christian 
commun ~ty and its representative in relation to God. This 
commun} ty of the child.ren of God shares the same nature 
with C~rist.3 The a im of Christ was to bring His d isciples 
I into the same attitude toward the world as His own and to 
the sarhe estimate of themselves. He -vranted to enlist t h em 
in the world-·1,rio_e mission of the Kingdom of God, which He 
kne-vr tb be not only His ovm business, but theirs too. 4 As 
the representative of His community Christ has i mparted to 
it t h e same position relative t o God a s He held for Hi ms elf. 
His obedience t o His calling 1rms rendered not only for His 
own sake but for the purpose of bringing mankind into the 
same relat ion toward God as their Fath er which He occupied. 
For this purpose He accepted C~d 1 s will, even unto death, 
8.s a proof of His f ello1-rship with God. He dio_ all of this 
1. Ritschl, JAR, 418. 
2. Rltschl, JAR, 438. 
3. Ritschl, JAR, 575. 
Lr. Ritschl, JAR, 385. 
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in such a way as to prove t h e genuineness of His fellowship 
with God, and the possibility of a similar fellowship for 
a11.1 Although Ritschl held that all who have f a ith in 
Christ can receive the same blessings and have the same re-
lationship to the Father as Jesus did, yet h e reserved a 
special pl ace for Jesus. Being the first to realize in His 
own p ersonal life the final ·ourpose of the Kingdom of God, 
Jesus stands alone of .His kind, for should any other ful-
fill the same task a s p erfec t ly as He, yet he would be un-
like Jesus, because depend ent on Him. Therefore, as the 
original typ e of t h e humanity to be uni ted into the Kingdom 
of God, He is the original object of t h e love of God. The 
love of God for t h e memb ers of His kingdom is mediated 
only through Him.2 The faith 1-1hich led His follmriers to as-
cribe Godh.ead to Him is evidence of His unique ~?osition. 
This f aith involves not only a confession of His Godhead 
but a lso a dominion over us. It thus denies the possibility 
of equality 1.vith Him. If Christ takes the place of God, 
faith in Him is necessarily a kind of obedience. But yet, 
t hrough this fait_1 in Christ it becomes possible for all 
men to find in the community of Christ their true vocation 
to become the sons of God.3 
Thus we see tha t Ritschl has established his conception 
of God as Son on the basis of the earthly, human life of 
Jesus. He felt that it was a false basis for divinity to 
l. Ritschl, IICR, 220. 
2. Ritschl, IICR, 197. 
3. Ritschl, JAR, 593-594. 
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attribute two natures to Him. In the first place this idea 
has no historical nor religious basis for it. He argued 
also t hat the concep tion is . an imp os sible one, because such 
. a uniort of natures is opposec1 to the idea of the divine nature 
I J 1 
a s imm1ftable. 
R~ tschl a_. so denied the orthodox conception of the pre-
existence of Christ. He said t hat it is an impractical idea 
and_ rests only on tradition. It has no pla ce in the salva-
a nd basis of 
. 2 
But tion of man so has no purpose or truth. 
yet Ritscbl does attribute a sort of eternal existence to 
Ohrist by holding that the Kingdom of God as a correlate 
t h e divin e self-end is the eternal object of t h e love of 
I 
God. 0hrist, as the p rototype of the Kingdom, '\voulct be 
t he eternal object of God 1 s love. Thus, t h e Godhead of 
of 
the Son is intelligible as eternal only a s an object of the 
Divine mind and will . That is, only for God Himself. 
Christ exists for Go:! eternally as that lvhich He a pp ears 
to us under t h e limitations of time. Th e pre-existence of 
Christ is hidden from us.3 
R~ t s cbl found it necessary to answ·er the charge that 
he makes the p ers on of Christ to be a "mere man" in h is 
vie"r. He refused, hmvever, to ma.'l.ce it a matter of an alter-
native between Chri st as the union of a divine and a human 
nature and Christ as a mere human nature. Ritschl said 
that such an idea of 11 mere man 11 would mean man as a material 
1. Ritsc~~, JP~, 398-399. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 399. 3. Rit s chl, JAR, 471. 
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entity apart from every characteristic of spiritual and moral 
personlflity . This is far from Ritschl 1 s conception of man 
or of Christ. To him Christ fulfilled t he highest require-
ments of t he spiritual life a nd was , i n fact, the very reve-
lation of God. Christ achieved that "i-Yhich all men should 
achieve , the having of t he value of God in human life. 1 
7. God as Holy Spirit. 
i. Activity of the Holy Spir i t. 
Just as t he Son cannot b e knoum by starting "ivith the 
nature of God ana_ work ing dovmv.rard, so also the Holy Spirit 
c annot be known except in its a ctivity. Ritschl s a id that 
we must give up the questicm , derived from Scholastic psy-
chology, but insol uble, as to hm1r man is laid hold of, or 
p ervaded, or filled by the Holy Spirit. It is not the 11 hmv11 
t hat i ntere s ted Ritschl but t he fact that it happens. He 
v-:rot e: 
~fuat 1ve have to do is rather to verify life in 
the Holy Spirit b y showing that believers know 
God 1 s gr a cious gifts, that they call on God as 
it heir Father, t he.t the y act lvi t h love and joy, 
,;-rith meekness and self-control, that they are 
pn t heir guard above all against party spirit, 
and cherish rather- a spirit of union. In 
t h ese statements the Holy Spirit is not denied, 
but is recogni zed and understood.2 
Th e indiviCtual believer w·i thin the Christian community 
does not appropri ate to himself the call to the Kingdom of 
God and rec onciliation or e.ccep tance as a ch ild of God, 
1. Ritschl, JAR, 397. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 22-23. 
wit hout a t the same time experiencing these effects of grace 
as motives to a corresponding personal a ctivity. In the re-
lig ious estimate of our 'tr.Jhole life1.vork, which corresponds 
to these motives, we recogni z e everything good in us a s t h e 
eff ect of divine gr a ce. The a gr eement of these impulses 
with the purpose of God and their simila rity in different in-
dividuals is effected and assured by the Holy Spirit in the 
community.l The impulse to right conduct in fulfilling t h e 
task s belonging to the Kingdom of God, and the impulse to 
t he practical proof of sonship with God, have their criterion 
in the knOt'l]'ledg e of God as our Father, 1-vh ich is g iven u s in 
Christ ~anity. The Christian knmoJledg e of God is the same as 
.God's knowledge of Himself. Hence, seen from the divine 
point of viev-r, the develo-oment of the Christian community, 
resulting from the exercise of love in accordance with this 
knovJledge of Gael , is a part of the divine self-revelation. 
Thus, Ritschl concludes, the common Spirit, through which 
t h e member s of the community win their like kno 1-rledge of God:) 
and hence their like impulses toward the kingdom of God and 
to't'-rard sonship vrith God, is God's Holy Spirit. 2 
ii. Influence of the Holy Spirit. 
Ri tschl v-Tent into considerable detail to sho1-1 that 
the activity of t h e Holy Spirit does not abolish our free-
dom. He argu ed tha t t h e conn ection of the Spirit of God in 
1. Ritschl, IICR, 226. 
2. Ri t s chl, IICR, 227. 
146. 
beli evers 't·rith their freedom does not imply that it is a 
causal one . Th e co-operation of the Holy Spirit does not 
i nvolve any denial of the fact that freedo m is derived from 
the act of justifica tion dependent on the work of Christ. 
Th e Holy Spirit, and our exercise in Him of self-sanctification, 
is the ground -v.;here'J?y 1-re 1-cno't'l the certainty of eternal l ife. 
No cListinction can be drawn bet't•Teen t h is certainty and t h e 
I 
practical expres s ion of Christian freedom over against the 
world. Thus the Holy Sp irit, which co-exists with freedom, 
is precisely t h e ground of our knowledge of freedom , but n ot 
a s the real ground of its existence. 1 Thus "t-Te see that, a c-
cording to Ritschl, although there is a causal connection 
betvJeen our fr eedom over t h e \'lorld and t he Holy Spirit, 
yet to think of t he i nfluence of the Holy Spirit as a re-
sistl ess natural force is absolutely forbidden. Freedom 
over t h e world, under all circumstances, mus t be lear ned, 
acquired , and fought for. 2 
iii. Godhead of the Holy Spirit. 
Fbr Ritschl, the Godhead of the Holy Spirit is based 
on t h e sa me sort of evidence as i s t hat of t h e Son. It 
comes a s a rel igious value-judgment based on what the Holy 
Spirit does for our salva tion. Confidence a nd trust in the 
Holy Spirit leads to a faith t hat rec ogni z es the Holy Sp irit 
as having the valu e of God for us. Tr ust of t his kind can 
b e g iv,en to God alone.3 
1. Ritschl, JA-B, 532. 
2. Ritschl, J AR, 533-534. 3. Ritschl, JAR, 391-392. 
The Holy Spirit has its place in the eternal Godhead 
the same as does t h e Son, as an object of the Divine Mind 
and will. It exist s for God et ernally, but appears to us 
under the limitations of time. Ritschl used the expressions 
11 Spirit of God 11 and IIHoly Spirit 11 interchangeably. He said 
t hat the 11 Snirit of God 11 is t he lcnov.rl edlge God has of Hims elf, . 
as His 'Ovm self end. The "Holy Spirit" is t he lcnowl edge of 
Gocl rri t hin the c ommunit y of Christ ians . The t vm ar e i dentical, 
becau s e the knowledge of God in the community is identical 
il>ii t h the knowledge 1vhich God has of Himself, through the 
revelation of the Son. Thus the Holy Spirit has t he value of 
Goc1 for us. 
8 . God as a Trinity. 
i. No formulated doctrine. 
It is not altogether accurate to speak of Ritscl1l 1 s 
11 doctriu e 11 of the Trinity. He did not actually fo rmulate 
hi s idea s into a definite stat ement regarding the Trinity. 
This fact resulted largely from his des ire to avoid the 
metaphysical and t he spee.ulative in dealing with religi ous 
matters. He seems to assume the doctrine of the Trinity, 
however, and uses trinitarian language. His approach is 
t hrov_gh the religious exp erience. He gives very ca reful 
cons ideration to the ~arious elements in the Trin ity from 
that noint of view. But he stopped short of the sp ecula-
tive consideration of the elements involved in the Trinity. 
lL:-8. 
His religious purposes are satisfied 1-rithout trying to answer 
the problems concerned with a doctrine of the Trinity. 
ii. Rejection of the orthodox view. 
It is cl ear that Ritschl did not hold t o t he orthodox 
vi ev;r of the Trinity. He tej ected the idea of t"t-m natures 
in Christ and. also the orthodox conceution of the pre-
existarice of Christ, a.s has already been sho't'm . He stressed 
the immutability of God to such an extent that he rejected 
the two nature idea on that basis. His rejection of all 
clivision of the Goo.head tvas on the same grounds. Ritschl 
could not have cons idered the manifestations of God as 
et erna~ distinctions in the Godhead . 
iii. A modalistic view. 
R~tschl did conceive of a Trinity of Fa ther, Son, 
and Holy Sp·:tri t vJi thin the unity of the God..h.ead, however . 
He said that the Father is the loving will of God, the Son 
is the revelation of God to His community, and the Holy 
Su iri t is t h e po-v1er of God lvhich enables t h e community to 
appropriate His self-revelation as Father through the Son. 1 
These three manifestations of God all have their places as 
objects of the divine mind and will of God. Ritschl said 
that the name 11 God 11 has the same sense when used as Father, 
Son, or Holy Spirit and that any attempt to construct a 
1. Ritschl, J AR, 273. 
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scient t fic doctrine of God must be wrong which fails to keep 
in view all of these aspe.cts of Gocl. 1 
Thus we see that Ritschl 1 s views lead to a rnodalistic 
conception of the Trinity . The manifestations of God are 
all moq.e-s or activities of the one God. They became knO't·.,rtl 
I 
to man in history through God 1 s self-revelation , but actually 
they aJ?e eternal characteristics of God. 2 God Himself 't'l]'as 
present a nd active in these various manifestations or self-
revelations. He used the life of Jesus and the Christian 
community as his mediums. God's presence and operation in 
these ways can best b e understood as mod es of God's revela-
tion. The Father, Son ana_ Holy Spirit are each a .separate 
mode of God's rev elation of Himself to man.3 
1. Ritschl, JAR, 273. 3. Garvie, TRT, 343. 
2. Ritschl, JAR, 273. 
CHAPTER V 
KNUDSON'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRI NITY. 
1. Introduction. 
Baillie holds that Karl Barth is the oustanding re-
presentative of those 't'iho have advocated the modalistic 
1 
conc eption of the Trinity in recent theology. Bar.tn.:!s 
expression regarcling the Trinity must cert a inly classify 
I 
him as a medalist, ancl his great :prestige and influence 
will certainly attract vmrld-"ricte attention. 2 The fact 
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that he definitely advocates the use of the expression 
11 moc1es of being 11 rather than 11 pe r sons 11 is an advance be-
yond the thinki ng of any other outst a nding theologian.3 
Oth ers 1have advocat eo_ the use of the term 11 mode 11 but have 
gone on using the term 11 person 11 in referring to the modes 
of the Trinity. 
Knudson's doctrine of the Trin ity is included in this 
dis s erta tion a s one of the outstanding presentations of 
modalism in recent theological thought. There have been 
many expressions of t he modalistic conception of t he 
Trinity in recent years but none has been so completely 
' 
1. Baillie, G1'JIC, 134. 3. Ba rth, DOivG , Lt-20. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 86. 
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I 
incorp9rated into a system of theolo gical thought as has 
that ofl Knudson. His conception of the Trin ity is a result 
I 
of his !personalistic philosophy and theology. He mal-c.es 
use of :some of the best features of both Schleiermacher and 
Ritschl! but also makes some definite contributions of his 
I 
I 
I 
o1·m. I~nudson not only bases his thought regarding the 
I 
I 
Trinit y on a sound, rational basis, but his system of the-
1 
ologica;l thought as a v.rhole has such a founclation. 
I 
I 
I 
2. Historical background. 
A:Ubert C. Knudson v-ras born in Grandmeadov.r, Minnesota, 
I 
on Jan~ary 23 , 1873. He received the A.B. degree from 
the Un~ver sity of Minnesota in 1893. He received the S.T.B. 
I 
degree lfrom Boston Universit y in 1896, and the Ph.D. degree 
I 
in 1900. He studied under Professor Borden Park er Bowne 
I 
a nd vm~ greatly influenced b y the personalistic philosophy 
! 
taught. iby that grea t philosopher.l 
I 
I 
Kduc1son spent a long and va ried career as an educa tor 
in the !Boston University School of Theology. He v-;as Bro-
1 
fessor !of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis rrom 1906 to 1921; 
I 
Profess:or of Systematic Theology from 1921 to 19Li-3; and served 
I 
a s dean: from 1928 to 1938. He has been dean emeritus since 
1938. He has received many academic honors anc1 has r.rritten 
ma ny books. This uresent study is based mainly on three of 
1. Knuctson, BICT, 45. 
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his books: The Doctrine of Redemption, The Doctrine of God, 
I . 
and Ba sic Issues in Christian Thought. 
J. Theory of Relig ious Knowledge. 
i. The place of reason. 
Knudson defines theology a s "the systematic exposition 
a nd rational justification of the intellectu~~ cont ent of 
relig ion. 11 1 He says that relig ion has a valid intellectual 
content and insists that this content, in its Christian form, 
admits, to a certain extent, of rational justification. He re-
jects illusionism, authoritarianism, and romantic irrational-
ism. He a grees tha t reli g ion must in the last analysis 
justify itself, but insists that this self-justification 
does n0t exclude a rational jus tification. Ra ther should 
the tvm go togeth er. If relig ion is self-evidencing, it 
ought also to fino_ support in the common reason. The one 
judge of truth in both philosophy ana. theology is the il-
l 
lumined human mind. To substitute for it any other standa rCJ. 
or auth ority is to fall into a dangerous skepticism and 
op en the door to f anatieism. He says: 
If the enlight ened human reason cannot be trusted 
~n matters of reli gious belief, nothing can be. 
Fai t h and reason stand or fall to gether. Theolog-
ical irrationalism, if made basal in human thinlc-
ing , would pr~ve as disastrous to relig ious faith 
as to reason. 
1. Knudson, DOG, 171. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 41. 
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Kmudson points out t hat some theologians have stressed 
a dualism of fait h and reason and have claimed a uniqueness 
and certainty of t h e Chri s tian faith. They hav e drawn a 
sharp line bet't'i"e en the divine and the human, and have ascrib,ed 
faith to a divine source and reason to man's natural endow-
ment. !Thus b a ck of f aith they claim the divine authority, 
l'.rhile ~eas on is repr es ented as so limited by man's native 
capacities or incapacities that it is unabl e of itself to 
arrive at a knov-1ledge of God. 11 It cannot 'prove' his exis-
tence dr in any other way est ablish the truth of t he Chris-
ti an faith. In t his resp ect it is 1bank rupt 1 • 111 
But Knudson holds that such theolo gi ans have a mistaken 
c onception of t h e nature and scope of reason . Reason can-
I 
not b e limited t o the narrm·:r field of purel y logi cal t h i nk-
ing , w~ere conclusions a re deduced from premises and truth 
is d emonstrat ed with mathematical certainty. Thi s has 
been att emptecl. in t heology but it has never b een v-ridely con-
vincing. Knudson states: 
Reason, limited to a strictly logical and demon-
strative function, is then rightl y regarded a s a 
~rholly inadequate grouncl for reli gious f aith. 
Such a limitat ion of its scoEe, how·ever, is un-
warranted by h i stori c usage. 
Knudson also refuses to accept the limitation of reason 
to t he t-rorld of uhenomena . If this limi tation is accepted, 
then ultimate reality 1..rould be a real m of mystery which the 
human i ntellect cannot penetrat e . Metaphysics would be a 
1. Knudson, BICT, 41. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 42. 
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pseudo philosophy. Only revelation could lift the veil that 
hides the unseen world of ultimate being from us. Such a 
limitat ion of reason is as um·.rarra.nted as is t he strictly 
1 logistic conception of its nature. 
Knudson ' s own view of reason dispenses with the tradi-
tional antithesis betw·e en faith and reason. He holcls reason 
to be not sharply differentiated from the other e s sential 
phases of our mental life. It p ervades our life as a vrhole , 
in so far as we a re responsible beings. He ~tatea: 
It is practical as well as theoretical; it 
b a ses its conclusions on probability as vJell 
as demonstration; i t is concerned with values 
and norms as well as bare facts; and it has to 
do wi th ultimate reality as well as phenomena. 
This comprehensive, practical, normative, and 
metaphysical concept ion of the function of 
reason has become increasingl y common in phil-
osophical and theological circles since the 
time of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. Ac-
cording to it reas on is operat i ve in religion, 
morality, and art as truly as it is in mathe-
matics and natural science. It is, then, 
proper to speak of a relig ious reason, a moral 
r eason, ano_ an aest~etic reason as 1,rell as a 
theoretical rea son. 
ii . The Place of philosophy . 
Knudson holds tha t theology and philosouhy are on 
t he same footing 1vhen it comes to the quest ion of the 
truth of religion . "They both base their case on a 
r a tional i nterpretation of our total human experience, 
both sub,jective ana. objective. 11 3 In discussing the place 
of philosophy in relation to religious truth Knudson 
1. Knud son, BICT, 42. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 43. 
3. Knudson, BICT, 41-l-. 
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advoca~es a per s onalistic metappysics, i.•rhich he claims to 
be e. pov-,rerful bul'\lrark of the Christian faith. He :presents 
nersonalist ic metaphysics as a means of removin g nature as 
a barrier between the soul and God. In this metaphysics 
na ture ceases to be mere being and becomes speech. The 
p o1\•er not ourselves is transformed from blind force to 
p ersonal vlill. The ideal ana_ real are united in one con-
sistent view. 1 Th e personality of God is described as 
being knm-m through our o-vm experience of personality. 
Knuds on says tha t corporeality is not essential to human 
p ersonality, and it is quite forei gn to the idea of the 
divine 1 personality. He insists that personal ity do es not 
necessarily imply a finite or limited typ e of being, such 
as 1Ji e have on the human level. If it clid t hen personality 
could_ not be attributed to Deity, for God is a self-existent 
being . He does not acquire personalit y . If He is personal, 
He must ha ve b e en so et ernally. Personality must be re-
2 
garded a s the very essence of His being. Knudson holds 
that t h is personalit y of God is essential to the infini tude 
or absoluteness of God. 11 As a free personal being God may 
limit Hims elf, but he is not limited by any power not of 
himself either within or without him."3 
Knudson says that selfhood or self-consciousness is 
the basal element in personality. In all articulate ex-
~J erience, the 11 I 11 is either explicitly or implicity a 
1. Knudson, BICT, 45. 3. Knudson, BICT, 54. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 53. 
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constituent factor. To deny this is to distort the facts 
and to negate personality itself.1 Another factor in per-
sonality is the povrer not only to think, but to think cor-
rectly, that is, the power to know. Without t his ability one 
't·rould b,~ devoid of true personalit y. Another essential 
element in personality is self-control, self-direction, or 
t h e po\'rer of contrary choice. \1Tithout this ability a person 
would have no r eal freedom. The moral and sniritual values 
l'rould not exist for him. The quest for truth requires self-
control ancl s elf-direction. Knudson says: 
It is free activity. Freedom and the power to 
knovl thus i nvolve each other. There can be no 
wise exercise of freec1o m without knm·rledge, 
and there can be no sustained pursuit of know-
ledge without freedom.2 
Knudson holds that the foregoing description of per-
sonality is :plainly applicable to Deity. There is nothing 
in any one of these characteristics of personality that is 
out of accord with God 1 s perfection and absoluteness and 
t h e infinitude of his being. There is another factor in 
personality, ho"t-Iever, \.Vhich is not so clear. Thi s is 
the social character of personality, or the desire for 
fellovTShip 1rJ'i th other :9ersons. Knudson holc1s that, regard-
less of our conclusion as to t h e inner structure of the 
divine personality in this regar d , the capacity and desire 
1. Knudson, BICT, 54. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 55. 
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for f ello-vrship i s i nherent in the very nature of God as re-
vealed in Christ .1 Indeed, the Christian doctrLle of the 
divine love is t he supreme expression of the social factor 
in personality.2 
Knudson points out that t h e Christian or prophetic type 
of pieyy , as distinguished from extreme myst icism, presup-
poses the personality of God. The essence of Christianity 
consists in trustful c1ependence on God both for time and 
eternity. 11 It sees in God a temporal provio.ence, an eternal 
redeemer, and a moral law-giver , all of which clea rly are 
functions applicable only to a personal Being. 11 3 It is 
also t:rue that only a personal Being could evoke in men 
t he fa ith , hope, and lov e , l•rhich are the abiding things in 
r elig ion. 
No impersonal p rocess, how·ever glorified by the 
human imagination, could take the place of a 
personal Deity •.. Take for instance t h e case of 
prayer, w·hich is the very heart of religion •.• 
True prayer i mplies fel l ovrship -vri th God, recip-
rocal intercourse 1vi th him; and this is possible 
only on the pers onal plane . The only truly 
spiritual union vrith Deity is the union of com-
m~nion; and t~is4is made possible only through h1s p ersonaliGy. 
Thus Knudson holds tha t the Christian fai t h, as a 
practical reli e_:ion, requires belief in a. personal God 
and 1-rould disintegrat e vli thout it.5 He says that the 
a_istin ction betv-reen the religious and t h e philosophical 
basis of this beli ef is not a hard and fast on e . If re-
ligion, in its h i ghe st and es s ential form, implies 
1. Knudson, BICT, 56-57. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 57. 
J. Knudson, BICT, 61. 
4. Knudson, BICT, 62. 
5. Knudson, BICT, 66. 
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belief in the personal ity of God, l1e are philosophical l y 
just if jjed in holding this belief in default of positive 
d isproof. The practical basis for the belief, furnished · 
by religi on , is therefore in the broader s ens e of the 
1 term a truly philosophical basis for it. But Knudson 
points out that much r·eli gious ancl philosophical thought 
of today '\'rould do avJay 11i th a truly p ersonalistic conception 
of C.:.od . Thus the theoretical or philosophical arguments 
for p ersonalism come to the support of relig ious personalism 
anCl_ make a real contribution to Christianity. Practical 
and theoretical personalism must go together. One supports 
2 the other. 
1/le are concerned here 't-.ri t h theoretical personalism 
in so far a s it is applicable to the p ersonality of God . 
vl e must first regard the human person or s elf. Knudson says 
that it i's a common illusion of sense exp erience that 
material obj ects exist just as lnTe see t hem. Their color 
and other sense qualities are independent of the seeing 
eye or t he perceiving mind. The mind or self, on the other 
hand, i.s supposed to h ave only a va gue, shadmvy , insubstan-
tia l existence. In a materialistic philosophy this would 
mean a denial of any true reali t y of the soul. Mental states 
are conceived as 1rJholly dependent on nervous or physical 
states and as p m,:erless accompaniments of them. Thus p er-
1. Knudson, BICT, 67. 2. Knudson, BICT, 66-68. 
sonality is di ssolved. It is denieo. a ny metaphysical 
signif i cance. 1 
Knudson rejects the materialistic view. He states: 
11 Profound reflective thought has revers eo_ all this. It 
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has made i rrefut ably clea r tha t t he one basic f act of con-
sciousnes s is t he reality of t he s elf. "2 He accepts 
Desc:ir:rtes 1 f amous statement, 11 I think; therefore I am , 11 
and says that vr e shall never be able to get avmy from this 
truth . He says: 
If the knowing and a ctive self is not real, 
t here is nothing else for -v:hich i>re are empir-
ically jus tified in claiming real ity ••• In other 
words personality is the key to reality. In 
philosophy "t-I e affirm the personality of God 
because of the light that our own p ersonality 
t h r ow-s upon the ul timat e problems of knou.Jlec1ge 
and existence.3 
This i s certainly only a small part of philosophical 
personalism but it at leas t sho1,ys how Knudson suppor ts 
his relig ious thought with theoretical thought. In speak-
i ng of Bovme' s exposition of philosophical personalism and 
its effect upon those who hea rd him, Knudson sDate~: 
It proved to t h em a v eritable gospel, a de-
l iverance from intellectual bonclage. Their 
spirit wa s released from t h e leaden 1r1eight of 
a crude realism or mat erialism or pantheism. 
What t h e doctrine of justification by fa ith 
meant to Luther' s religious life, that did a 
p ersonalistic metaphysics mean to their intel-
lectua l lif4. It wrought their intellectual 
redemption . 
1. Knuason, BICT, 66. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 68. 
3. Knudson, BI CT, 69. 
4. Knudson, PTRT, 226-227. 
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iii . The place of faith. 
Knudson puts great stress upon the place of reason 
in rel igious knowledge, but he also helds that in all of 
the aspects of our spiritual life there is a common faith 
in a r a tional i•rorld, without which reason lJ'OUld not be com-
plet e . He states: 
Faith is thus an ess ential complement to reason, 
and reason in turn is a constituent fac t or in 
faith. The t wo are intertwined. There is 
faith in r ea son, and reason in faith.l 
It has already been pointed out that Knudson rejects the 
traditional dualism of faith and reason. The two do not 
operate in altogether separate a reas but "trork to gether on 
t he various e xperiences of life. 11 There is nothing so 
vital or essential to religious faith a s truth. Faith , 
like lcno11ledge, h a s an objective reference. If this refer-
ence is f a lse, knov!ledge ceas es to be knowledge, and faith 
c ea s es to be true faith . 112 
Knudson points out, however, that there is a distinc-
tion bet-r;.reen the t erms 11 knowledge 11 and 11 fai t h 11 as commonly 
usec1 . Kno1..rledge i mpli es truth. False know·ledge 1-;ould not 
be kndtvl edge at all . He says: 
Faith, on the other hand, may be false. It may 
and often does coexist with error, i gnorance, 
super stition, and illusion. The rea son for t his 
is that faith is a more subjective term t han 
knowledge. It r efers primarily to a personal 
attitude or conviction , ""t-Thile kno'\'-rl edge has to 
1. Knudson, BICT, 43-44. 2. Knudson, BICT, 13. 
do with the relation of an idea to its objects • . • 
In general usage knowledge implies a val i d objec-
tive reference, vJhile in faith the objective 
reference may or may not be valid.l 
1 61. 
Faith, hovJever, imnlies belief in its ovm objective valid-
ity. ~f it did not , it would not be faith. This bel ief may 
be mistaken , but the mistake must not be knmm to the be-
li eve r . I f it is, f a ith ceases to b e f a ith. To preser ve 
one ' s faith on e must be hon estly convinced of i t s truth . 
Such c onviction can be creat ed and maintained only by 
spiritual mea ns, only by such empirical and rational pro-
cesse s a s condition the valid quest of truth i n life as a 
't•rhole . "Relig i ous faith to be truly faith must he.ve tl:e 
authentic note both of subjective s incerity and of a con-
fident gr a sp of ob ject i ve reality. 112 Knudson states furtherl, 
It is of the utmost importa nce that Christians 
be prepared to g ive a reason, and an adequate 
r eason , for the f a ith t hat is in them. It is 
not suffic ient to appeal to p ersona l f eel i ng or 
p r a ctical utility or authority. These f actors 
will always exercise more or less influence in 
producing and strengthening religious belief. 
But a more universal and nrofounder basis is 
needed. Relig ion needs to be grounded i n reason 
itself.. Only in t h is 'ft.iay can it appeal con-
v i ncingly to the modern tvorld. To belittle 
the r a tional factor in religion i s a grave 
mistake. Religion must be able t o defend it-
se~f bef~re t h e bar of modern reason and con-
scl ence. 
LJ. . God is On e. 
i. A co-or dinating One. 
Knudson argues for a un itary world-ground on the 
1. Knudson, BICT, 13-14 3. Knuds on, BICT, 15. 
2. Knudson, BICT, 14 . 
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basis mf the admitted fact of systematic interaction in the 
universe. Such an interacting system as the material uni-
verse i s recogni:z,ect to be can be rationally conceived only as 
I the work of a co-ord~nating One. Independent things cannot 
in and. of themselves form an interacting system. The very 
idea of such a system excludes a fundamental pluralism. 
If sucb a system exists, the r e must be a unitary agent that 
mediat~s the interaction of the many or is the dynamic ground 
of their being . 1 
ii. Not the Universal. 
Knudson rejects the idea of iclentifying the -vwrld-
ground 1-vith the highest universal, with b are being , and 
that its nature is pure simplicity. As such it v-rould trans-
cend all the plurality and all ·the differences of finite 
existem.ce. Such a God coulc1 be neither mino_nor matter . 
It 1·rould be something above them both. But what it is, 
aside from the fact that it is one and simple, we cannot 
say. We can form no real conception of it. It lies be-
yond r eason and ·will, and be yonc1 nature and consciousness. 
So far as our articulate experience is concerned, it is a 
blank. It can be assimilated to nothing that we know. 
As a concept it serves no function in a rational system, 
for an absolutely simple being cannot differentiate itself. 
Nothing can be deduced from it. It can explain nothing. 
1. Knudson, DOG, 239 . 
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If God be thought of as a unitary being in this sense of the 
1 term, he could not a ccount for the 1.vorld as vle kno\v it. 
iii. An intelligent agent. 
It is on the plane of free intellig ence that Knudson 
finds true unity. He sees God_ as em intelligent a gent, v-rhoee 
unity does not cons ist in any s implicity of being or of 
substance, but in consciousness its elf. This divine agent 
h a s the ability to originate activity, to posit plurality, 
and to mainta in his own unity and identity over against 
the changing many. Knudson states: 
Hmv t h is is possible He do not knm·r, but it is 
a fact of our own exper ience; and what holds 
true of us in a limited degree we are warranted 
in ascribing to God in an unlimited degree. In 
any case this is t h e onl y intelligible and self-
con s istent form under which the divine unity can 
be conceiv ed . God knows him s elf as oae over 
a ga i ns t t he changing 't,Yorld -vJhich he posits and 2 maintains through his o"m free creative activity. 
Knudson 1 s vie1.v of the personality of Goo_ has already 
been discussed • . It can be said further, however, tha t he 
emphasizes personality as a principle of explanation. 
Personality it self cannot be explained. It cannot be ac-
counted for by analysis, by ref erring its origin to simpler 
and anterior modes of being. It is itself the ultimat e 
f or m of reality and as such cannot be explained by anything 
else. Rather is it t he p rinciple by v-rhich all else is ex-
plained. If we wish to know the meaning of unity, identity, 
1. Knudson, DOG, 313-314. 2. Knudson, DOG, 314. 
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causality, and other fundamental principles of thought, we 
must t~rn to personal experience. 1 Knudson says: 
If we are to understand the divine unity, we must 
rise above the plane of mere process or essence 
and l ay hold of the idea of self-consciousness. 
Only in it do \'re have the lt:.ey to real unity. This, 
hovrever, is an znsight to ~Jhich the ancient t--TOrld 
did not attain . . 
5. God as a Trinity. 
i. A basically sound doctrine. 
Knudson he~as that the orthodox form of the trinitarian 
creed enshrines within i t great values that must be conserved. 
He would not attempt to reject it altogether, nor would he 
t>nmt to supersede it 1\rith a modern restatement. He holds 
that the doctrine in its older form is of permanent value, 
but that it in some respects transcends both the limits of 
reason and the c1emands of faith. I t does not, for him, 
have the finality once attributed to it. He a ffirms the 
underlying motives of the <1octrine as much as they · have ever 
been. He holds that God is immanent in the world and that 
he was in some real sense incarnat e in Christ. He holds 
that God is Redeemer as 1-'Jell as Creator, t hat he is personally 
p resent in human hearts as the sanctifying S;pi·t.1t. He 
denies, however, that in order to make these aff irmations 
we must also affirm all of the implications of the orthodox 
or traditional view.3 
1. Knudson, BICT, 75. 
2. Knudson, DOG, 406. 
3. Knudson, DOG, 422-Ll-23. 
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ii. Objections to the Orthodox .view. 
Knudson finds that the orthodox vievl of the Trinity 
is def ective fro m the personalistic standpoint. He objects 
to i t s tendency tO't,rard tritheism. He says that it does not 
adequately protect the unity of God. He points out hol.r, in 
the populer Christ ian thought on the subject, 9 eople generally 
thinlc of t he three Persons of the Trinity as more or less in-
depent of each other . Some influential theologians advocate 
this viev; and contend for a social theory of the Trinity. 
Knudson says that some of the Re theologians speak of each 
Person of the Trinity as having a self-consciousnes s and 
making self-decisions and the.t each is equally personal in 
the full sense of the term. This "t,.rould make t hre e centers 
of consciousness and decision in the Godhead, not one, 
and seems clearly to be a tritheistic t h eory . Knudson 
rejec ts attempts to expla in t h8s e three personal centers 
as differentiations of an underlying unitary divine essence 
v!h ich coexists in ana_ v-.ri th them. He says that this idea 
is based on a discredited Platonic realism. He insists 
tha t there is no such common divine essence more fundamental 
than personality. P ersonality is the ultimate form of meta-
physical reality. Ess ence is an abstraction from it.l 
Knudson also rejects a.ttempts to jus tify the three 
personalities impl ied in the orthodox view of the Trinity 
1. Knudson, BICT, 81-82. 
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by declaring that the divine unity is a mystery beyond our 
underst and ing . He says that this is obviously a lapse into 
irrationa~ism and that the air of mystery with ~mich it is 
surrounded. and expouncled is a rock of offense that the 
modern mind finds in traditional trinitarianism.l The 
orthodox statement is logically absured. and altogether be-
yond t h e range of the human rea son. And wh en efforts a re 
made to expound it, theologians have often made it more con-
fused. Knudson states: 
Agai nst all of this ir1•ationalism associa ted 
with the doct~ine of the Trinity and with theol-
ogy in general personalism raises a protest. 
The purpose of theology and philosophy should be 
to clarify thought, not to confuse and m~tify 
t he public.2 
iii. A personal~stic view. 
Knudson claims that all of the values of t he c1octrine 
of the Tr inity can be preserved by a truly unit ary and 
personalistic. vim-v of God. This personalistic theory may, 
in t h e light of t he history of doctrine, be called a 
modified Sabellianism. It t eaches the personality 11 of 11 
God, not merely personality 11 in 11 God. It is a conception 
of t he one G-oc1 a s active in three different vrays . God ha s 
in Christian history manifested himself in three funda-
menta l modes of activity, as immanent in the world, as 
incarnate in Christ, and as the sanct i fying Snirit in 
1. Knudson, BICT, 83. 
2 . Knuo.son, BIC'j__1, 84-85. 
1 human redemption. Knudson says: 
l:l e can truly say that to call him God the Father, 
God the Son, a nd God the Holy Spirit is no t h eo-
lo gical aberration or mystification; it is sim~ly 
to g ive !lim his right a nd full Christian name. 
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Knudson's objection to the original Sabellianism is not 
that it taught a Trinity of manifestations, but that it 
failed to bring t his Trinit y into direct relation to the 
essent ial nature of Deity . He states: 
According to Sabellius, the three manifestation s--
Father, Son and Spiri t--'f.r;ere t ernporary and suce-e.s-
sive , and hence did not reveal what God really and 
eternally is. His so-called self-revelations vtere 
not actual r evelations, and they could not be such 
unless there were permanent elements in the di-
vine nature corresponding to them. The Trinity of 
manifestations -.;-voulcl not be true to its name if 
there were not a Trinity of ess ence. The t wo 
belong together. We l earn the Trinity of essence 
from the Trinity of manifestations , and the Trinity 
of manifestations derives it~ relig ious significance 
from the Trin ity of essence.) 
Thus we see that Knudson holds that there may perhaps be 
three eternal ancL necessary distinctions in God, bet1·1een 
'toJ'hich there is an interchange of affection and v-rhich thus 
enrich the inner life of Gocl. But he questions the idea 
that a triune nature is essential to the absoluteness of 
God ' s love and of his ethical character. Without it t h ere 
\vould stil l be in God an eternal self-love, a love of 
goodness, and t h er e mi ght also b e an eternal communicative 
love, ceaselessly but freely creating p ersonal beings. 
Knudson says: 
1. Knudson, BICT , 85. 
2. Knudson , BICT, 86. 
J. Knudson, DOG, 425 . 
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In the latter case he 1-JOUld eternally have ob-
jects of affection even though he did not find them 
in himself, and thus an eternal ana. absolute life 
of communicative love would be possible to him. 
iv. Symbolic terms. 
Knudson says that the classical expositions of the 
Trinity tried to go too far and to ex:plain too much . He 
fio~as that the logical deductions which they made from the 
trinitarian idea are altogether too gnostic and that we can 
h ave no such insight into the inner being of God as they as-
sume . He says that the best we can do , when it comes to 
the dark real m of Go ~ 1 s nature, is to use symbolic terms . 
It is in this sense that the doctrine of the Trinity is to 
be understood. He states: 
vle do not l~novl 't,rhat hypostatic distinctions 
there are , if any, ln the Divine Being , nor 1-rhat 
t h eir relations to each other are, but we are 
confident that vve come nearest the truth vlhen 
v! e think of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
These are s y@bolic terms that express the in-
exhaustible richness of the divine nature.2 
Thus Knudson affirms that God , in his essential nature, is 
all that is indicatec1 by the terms Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, but he does not attempt to define more precisely 
the character of the distinctions in God's being so named 
and t h eir rel a tion to each other. He calls these distinc-
tions 11 p ersons, 11 as Augustine did, in order to avoid the 
necessity of silence, rather than because of any definite -
1. Knudson, DOG, 4·28. 
2. Knudson, DOG, 424. 
idea conveyed by t he term. He points out that although 
strictly s:pealdng they are not persons and are not of them-
selves and_ singly personal, yet they do have a share in the 
One Divine Personality in their o't>m manner. 1 
6. God as Father. 
Knudson's cons iderat ion of the Trinity stresses the 
person of the Son much more than the other tt-ro persons. 
He lfiol.as that it "t>-.ras the interest that centered in Christ 
that is respons ible f or the doctrine of the Trinity. We 
know God a s Father because Jesus made the idea of fat~er-
hooc the unifying principle in his conception of God. This 
came not out of any reasoned conclusion on the part of Jesus 
with r eference to the divine nature, but came rather from 
his ovm relig ious experience, which took the form of a con-
scious filial relation to God. Jesus translated the formal 
address of 11 Father 11 into a vivicl personal consciousness. 
He spoke not simply of God as Father, but as 11 my Fa t her. 11 
Knuc1son says t hat one of the most characteristic things in 
the t eaching of Jesus is that God app ears in it not simply 
as the Father of men in general, but a s . his Father.2 
i i. Self-sacrificing love. 
Knudson says that it was not only the personal and ex-
periential basis that gave uni queness to Jesus' conception 
of the divine fatherhooc1, but also its content. God had 
1. Knudson, DOG, 425-426. 
2. Knudson, DO G, 331-332. 
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been called Father in earlier times but the idea had not been 
lifted up distinctly to the plane of self-sacrific i ng love, 
nor h ad such love clearly and definitely been attributed to 
God. 1 Jesus con s idered self-sacrifice as i nherent in perfect 
love and introduced this thought into his concention of God. 
For him God was love, self-sacrificing ~ove. He was not only 
a forgiving Goc, , but one \vhose love 'tvent in search of t he 
sinner. This is the reflection of a new conceution of the 
divine fatherhood~.2 All of the ideas of righteousness, good-
n ess , etc., v.rere preserved in God but the ne\<T vision of God 
in J e sus is of a Gocl vrho was eager to save the lost and 
ready to sacrifice himself i n order to achieve their salva-
tion. 1 He is a God of redemptive love.J This love does not 
a nnul the divine jus tice, it fulfills it.4 
iii. Revealed in Christ. 
In spite of the high quality of the teaching of Christ 
regarding the s elf-sacrificing love of God, it was not in 
hi s tea chi ng but in his life that this love came to be known. 
The divine lov e of the Father is known to us through the 
Christlikeness of GocL 5 Knudson stresses the fact that it 
was the revelat i onal significance of the life and death of 
Christ tha t led to the devel opment of the idea of God as 
6 Fat h er. 
1. Knudson, DOG, 332. 4. Knudson, DOG, 342. 
5. Knudson, DOG, 428. 
6. Knuds on, DOG, 427. 
2. Knudson, DOG, 333. 
3. Knudson, DOG, 341 
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7. God as Son. 
i. Based on the h istorical Christ. 
Knudson states tha t the commo n s ense and histori call y 
well-attested view i s that the belief in what may be called 
t he d ivinity of Chr ist 1vas due to t h e actual i mpression he 
made upon his disciyl es . 1 Wnatever value the doctrin e of the 
Trini ty may have, it should not be forgotten that as an ex-
pression of t h e divine love it does not stand in its 01m 
right, but is dependent on faith in the Christlik eness of 
God. 2 Knudson holds this to b e basal in the trinitarian 
doctrine and s a ys : 
\fue. t the trini tal~ ian theologians t-Tere funclament-
all v concerned about vras a new ethical conception 
of God. They affirmed the deity of Christ in 
or der to make certain the Christlik eness of God. 
If this conception of God is granted, we have 
t he heart of t h e trinitarian doctrine and for 
p ractical purposes need nothi ng mor e.3 
Knudson tio~ds tha t the ascription of Christlikeness to 
God has the advantage of associating our kno't·rledge of the 
c1 ivi n e character 1·rith t h e historical revelation of it in 
Ch r ist . The revelational significance of t he life and 
death of Christ shoulct be given :!_)rimary stress rather than 
t he eternal p ersonal distinctions '\Ali thin the Godhead. He 
says: 
It 'tvas the impression made by the per sonal ity 
of the man J esus that led to t h e exnansion and 
reconstr·uction of the idea of God. - It l-ras because 
1. Knudson, BICT, 128. 3. Knudson, DOG, 426-427. 
2. Knudson, DOG, 428. 
his life and death and resurrection were Godlike 
tha t men came to believe in the Christlik eness 
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of Goo., ana. it 1-vas because they believed in the 
Christlikeness of God that they mme to believe in 
his eternal and self-denying love. It 1·ras not 
belief in the self-humiliation of the ure-existent 
Son tha.t led the disciples to see a divine element 
in t h e death of Christ, but the reverse. They 
saw God mirrored in the Christ snirit and henc e 
attributed to him an act of self:abnegation.l 
Knudson says that it is an advantage to affirm the Christ-
lik eness of God because it directs particular at tention to 
God 1 s unity. 11 If God is Christlike, he is one both meta-
physically and ethically, especially ethically ••• To speak 
of him as Christlike is equivalent to saying that he is 
in his essential nature love. 112 God 1 s love is both self-
love, a love of goodness, and communicative love. In both 
respebts, according to Knudson, he was incarnate in Christ 
and hence He have a Godlike Christ and a Christlike God.J 
Knudson makes much of the impression made by the per-
sonali ty of Jesus upon lis disciples. 11 This impression 1-laS 
double. The disciples saw in Jesus ana. his 1rV"orlc not simply 
4 
a human ques t after God, but a divine quest after man. 11 
Knudson believes that the disciples heard in the message of 
the l ife and death of Jesus not only the voice of man, but 
t h e voice of God as well. He lists five factors that led 
t he early disciples to set Jesus apart from other men and 
to ascribe to him more or les s of a divine character. The 
1. Knudson, DOG, 427. 3. Knudson, DOG, 428. 
2. Knudson, DOG, 428. 4. ~nudson, DOG, 180. 
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first of these was somethi ng about the personality of J esus 
that awakened the sense of the num i nous or t he superhuman. 
Knudson quotes several New Testament passages to indica te 
t h is attitude toward Jesus. A second f a ctor is the Messi-
anic consciousness of Jesus, and:h'is cons ciousness of a unique 
filia l relation to Goa.. Knudson says that the latter of 
these t1·..ro was t he more ba sal becaus e it vra s Jesus 1 conscious-
ness rather t han the regers e. A third factor which lifted 
Jesus above the common human plane was his exalt ed moral 
character, his embodiment of the principle of sacrificial 
love. This received its sup reme expression in his d eath 
but it must ha ve radia ted from his entire life , thinks 
Itnudson. A fourth such factor 'tvas the belief in the resur-
rect ibn. 11 As Paul put it, it ~vas by the r esurrection of the 
dead that he '"'a s declar ed to be t h e Son of God i·Iith Pov-1er. nl 
The fifth of the factors which Knudson p oints out as con-
f i r ming t h e belief t hat God 't-Ta s in Christ 1..,ras the deepseated 
religious conviction that all history is roo t ed in God . To 
on e holding this conviction it must ha ve seemed inevitable 
that t he unsearchable riches discovered in Christ 11rere 
p rimarily and fundamentally a divine g ift to men . In and 
t h r ough Christ God imparted himself to men. 2 
Thus Knudson shm,rs that the higher viei.'T of Christ came 
from the impression made by his pe r sonalit y upon his disciples 
1. Knudson, DOG, .392. 
2. Knudson, DOG, .390-.393. 
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l instead of from an alien and mythical source. His disciules 
saw a unique relation of Jesus to God or a divine element 
in his being . This i s implied in the · spon t aneous attitude 
of t he early Christians tm·rard him, an attitude of religious 
reverence and i•rorship. Knudson st ates: 
No one who believed profoundly in God and who 
realized the full religious significance of Jesus 
c ould be c ontent to a scribe his personalitv and 
his influence to a merely human quest after God . 
Back of the human Jesus and expressed through 
him there must have been a divine qu est a fter 
man. No life so freighted with meaning and 
vri th vi tal consequenc es to mankind as t hat of 
J esus c ould have been gr ounded in merely hu-
man v-rill. It must have been expressive of the 
d ivine purpose. It must itself- h ave been a 
divine act, a special divine advent into the 
world. The religious nature required such a 
beli ef; and -v;ith the lapse of time and the 
increa sing sway of Jesus over the minds of man 
the demand. for it has bec ome more and more im-
p er at ive. 'Vlhat Jesus meant to the early Chris-
tians and vhat he means today can be rel igi-
ously a ccounted for only on the assumption 
that God 1vas in him. lul humanitarian, adop-
tionis t , and subordina tionist theories 2re 
l a ck ing in religious de:pth and insight. 
ii. Rejection of the t 1v-o-nature idea. 
Knudson accept s the fact that the disciples saw in 
Je sus something that 't'Tas more than human, but he rejects 
the idea t h*t there were two natures in the one p ers on.3 
Such an idea introduces into the personality of Christ a 
dualism the.t is inconsistent both i·lith the gospel r epre-
sentation of him and also 1•ri th a tenable theory of personal 
1. Knuo.son , DOG, 394. 3. Knuds on, DOR, 284. 
2. Knudson, DOR, 291. 
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unity .1 The adherents to the t1"o nature t heory tried to in-
elude a 9erfect d ivine nature and a perfect human nature in 
one unified personality. Such attempts do not define clearly 
the t ,erms 11 na ture 11 and 11 personali ty, 11 and do not shmv how 
two a iverse natures can be comp :!.ned in one p erson. 2 The dif..; 
ficulty is t hat such a theory is based on the defective 
Platonic met aphysics i•Thich conceives of r ee.li ty as substance 
and as a universal form of being. Knud son states: 
In oppos ition to these two metaphysical conceptions 
modern per sonalism conceives of r eality as active 
or dynamic on the one hand and as individual or 
concret e on the other. These differences have 
profoundly affected Christian thought vri th respect 
to the structure of t he divine-human :persone.lity 
of Christ. The t wo 11 natur es 11 of the older t h eory 
v.rere thought of as more or less inde:9endent entities 
or substances ~·J.1.ich -vrere somehov.r fused toge thel"' to 
form the personality of Christ. This, however, 
involves from our point of vie'\v a.m::.·· illicit ab-
straction. Neither human nor divine nature has 
any existence apart from personality. It is there-
fore a mistake to think of Christ as having t wo 
inaependently existing natures.3 
Knudson ctoes hol0. , how·ever, tha t there are f a ctors in 
the personality of Christ v.rhich may be distinguished as 
human and divine . But they v.rere not distinct substances. 
They v.Jere simply different aspects of the one unique per-
s onality. And t h is per son lity is to be viewed , not as a 
substance, but as an agent.4 Knudson h~~fts t hat in the light 
of mod ern personalistic metaphysics it is obvious that the 
traditional t wo-nature doctrine of the person of Christ 
1. Knudson, DOR, 300-301. 3. Knudson, BICT, 1 36-137. 
2. Knuds on, BICT, 135. 4. Knudson, BICT, 137. 
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needs to be reinterpreted or modified. 1 He s a ys that 1·-re must 
discard t h e duali s m of the older theory a nd begin tvith the 
unity of Christ's personality. ~This unit y we must find in 
his oNn s elf-cons ciousness a ncL his ovm self- a ctivit y . There 
i s no s ort of homog ene ous subs te.nce tha t g ives unity to his 
being . His p ersonality is a matter of i~nediate exp erience. 
He kn ew hims elf direc t l y as a self-c on s cious a gent. 2 
iii. God in Christ. 
The q_uestion natur ally arises as to hot·J God c a n be 
present in Ch ris t if he is a unified personalit y . Knuds on 
s p ecifies three different 1 ays in v-rhich this is poss i ble. 
He s a ys fir s t: 11 Christ Has uniq_uely dep enclent on God as the 
creative source a ncJ. susta ining ground of his m,;n unique 
li f e a na. consciousness. 11 3 \"Je are a l l being s devendent on 
· God . This de:pendence varies "t•rith different indivi cJ.uals. In 
the c as e of Christ t h e variation was greater and more signi-
ficant than in any other individual. There vra s a unique 
divin e crea tive a ctivit y at the b a sis of his life , and 
t h is s ~;->ecial mode of op eration of t he divine \-.rill, on wh ich 
he Tr:... s de:pencLent, wa s on e resp ect i n 1hich God via s i mman ent 
or inca rnate in Christ . 4 
A second vray i n which God vras pre sent in Christ "t·ras in 
the unique reciprocal i nteract ion betv.re en Christ ano. the 
d ivine Spirit . The Snirit cannot have been spa tially 
1. Knudson ; BICT, 137. 
2. Knud son, BICT, 138. 
3 .. Knudson , BICT, 140. 
4 Knudson, BICT, 139. 
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present in him, and so 't•ie speak of it as dynamically pres ent. 
Knudson says that t he Spirit was a causal agent, as a special 
form of t he divine act i vi t y , vTi th lvhich Christ stood in a 
1 
unique relat i on of reciprocal int eraction. Knudson says: 
As such t h e divine Spirit has no independent 
existence. It 't·ras God in the a ct of conununica-
ting hims el f to Ghris t and establishing a di-
rect per sonal relat i on -v;ith h im, a relation to 
·t-rhich- Ch r is t made his o·hrn contribution by his o-vm 
fr ee and perfect response. There vras thus a 
uni que reciprocal int er action between him and the 
divine Spirit, and t he constant potenc y of t h is 
interaction co~stituted a veri t able existence 
of Gocl in him. · 
A third iay in whi ch God wa s uresent in Christ i s t hrough 
t h e p ow·erful God-con s c iousne s s of Jesus , in vlhich God was 
a ctually present a s its inspiring source. C~d manife s ts 
himself in the form of a unique s elf-con s ciousness and a 
unique sp iritual pov-1er . These unique ch.<:!.rac t eristics vie 
have i n Christ . Knudson s ays t hat as evidPnce for Christ 1 s 
divinity vre can turn to his consciousnes s of a <livin e sonship, 
to his sinlessness , to his spiritual aut hori t y , and to his 
redemptive power. To explain t he source of these unique 
qual it i es in the life of Ghrist Knuc1son us es Schleiermacher 1 s 
expl anat i on as h e says that they al l had t heir source in 
t he constant potency of Ghrist 1 s God-consciousness. Knudson 
agrees with Schleiermacher also in saying tha t this God-
cons ciousness ,,ra s a veri table existence of God in Christ. 
For Knudson, t h e God-cons ciousnes s of Christ takes the 
1. Knu Cl.son, BICT, 140. 
2. Knudson, BIGT, 139. 
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place of the "divine nature" in the orthodox view of the 
Trinity. He says tha t this is in keeping vri th the modern 
substitution of c ons ciousness for substance in the concep-
tion of p ersonality.l 
iv. Advantages of the personal ist i c theory. 
Knudson calls his conception of the divinity of Christ 
"the deuendence and consciousness theory." 2 He claims 
s evere~ manifest advantages for it over the orthodox theory. 
He points out t hat it conceives of t he divine pr esence in 
Christ as dynami6 rathe r than a s a more or less static 
11 na ture 11 or substance . This is in k eeping with the activism 
of personalistic metaphysics. He also points out tha t his 
t h eory l ays p rimary s tress on the unit y of Christ's person-
elity a s distizllgulshed from the tw·o more or less antithetical 
11 na tures 11 attributed to him in the orthodox vie-vr. This is 
in closer accord with t he gospel p icture of him. He also 
points out that .his theory regards the divinity of Christ 
as manife sting itself in a heightened human cons ciousne s s 
r ather th n in a type of exp erience alien to tha t of 
normal humanity. He says: 
This is in harmony v.rith the doctrin e of t h e Incar-
nation, 1r1hich expresses t h e thought that in the 
conditions of the highest human life \"!e have 
access, a s nowhere else, to t h e inmost nature 
of t h e clivine.3 
1. Knudson, BICT, 138. 
2. ~Knud..$on; ···B+CT, 140. 
3 . Knudson , BICT, 140. 
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8. God as the Holy Sp irit. 
i. A sanctifying Spirit. 
In r eferring to the Holy Spirit Knudson says: 11 In it 
\ve h a ve the p resupposit ion of the 't·rhole Christian movement 
and of the entire redempt ive proces s initiated. by the "'vork 
of Christ."l The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, according 
to Knud son, means that God is present as a sanctifying and 
redeemi ng pmver in human 1 ife. The Spirit is not an inter-
mediary betv.reen God ano. man. It does not put God farther 
away from us but ·rather bring s him nearer. It, indeed, 
emuhas izes the immanence of Goo.. 11 It is this i mrnedi a t e 
a nd vivid experience of the divine power that gives us 
t h e ~orimary me aning of the Holy Spirit. "2 
ii. The Per son of the Spirit. 
Knudson says that the hypostatizing of the Spirit fol-
lmved naturally that of the Son and had no special doc-
trinal significance. He says: 
It would u erhaus have been nos sible to think 
of the Spirit as a mere influence emanating from 
the Fa ther a nd the Son, but biblical ancL ecclesi-
astical usage was on the i·rhole against such a 
vie't'r. 3 
Knudson hG~m. s t hat some ~reight must be allowed the argument 
that the ethical and reli g ious values of the traditional 
trinitarian doctrine i·rould b e provided for by a divine 
1. Knudson, DOR, 389. 3. Knudson, DOG, 402. 
2. Knudson, DOR, 397. 
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dual ity . A third person is not necessary to provide for fel-
lowship within the Godhead or for t h e divine grace manifest 
in the incarnation . He does M0ld, · owever , that p s ycholog i cal-
I ly interpreted, t h ere is s.ome truth in t he a r gument for a 
trinity a s over against a dualit y of divine n ersons i n that 
the SDirit is necessary as a bond of uni on between t h e ot he r 
two p ersons. He says: 
It is t he love that binds t he lover and be-
loved toget her, or it is the uniting bond 
bet 1-reen the subject and object in self-
cons ciousness; and so it is sa id t hat t h e 
t r i nity reduces duality to unity.l 
Knudson go es on to insist, however, that while this is a sug-
gestive 11ay of putting t h e matter, anc1. v-rhile it is important 
to remember that fellowship is an aff air involving at l east 
three factors, it is still true tha t the t h ird f actor ne ed 
not b e a p erson, nor need it be an indep endent object . It 
mi ght oe a common ideal interest. He says : 
If the Holy Spirit were a metaphysica l bond of 
union between Fa ther and Son, it would hav e to 
be rega r ded a s a profouncter typ e of being which 
embraced the other t1<ro vJithin its o\'m unity . 
Th is would be at compl ete variance wit~ the 
traQitional conception of the Trinity . 
iii. A I1!an if'esta tion of God. 
Getting to t he real essentials of Knuc1son' s view· we . 
find, a s has already been pointed out, t hat Gael is i mmanent 
in t h e world. He is personally pr esent in human heart s as 
1. Knudson, DOG, 417. 
2. Knud son , DOG, Li-18. 
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the sanctifying Spirit . Knudson denies , hO"tvever, that to 
malte 1this affi rmation 'tve must also affirm a distinct center 
of self-consciousness and self-decision in the Godheacl .l 
It is rather a manifestation of God. It is a s ymbol ic term. 
It hel :9s t o understand and to express the divine nature of 
God and so should be kept as part of the doctrine of the 
Trinirty . 2 
1. Knudson , DOG, 423. 
2 . Knu~son, DOG, 424 . 
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CHAPTER VI 
A RATIO NAL AND Er•!P I HICAL VID~T OF THE TRI NITY. 
1. Introduction. 
Chapter one of this dissertation presented a survey of 
trinitaria n thought from its beginning through Thoma s Aquinas. 
It showed the development of the orthodox position but r~­
vealed that much of this early thought gave definite support 
to a ~odalistic conception of the Trinity. 
Chapters t't•ro through five -vrere objective presenta.tions 
of some modalis t ic conceptions of the Trinity, dealing with 
the ideas of Hegel, Schleiermacher, R.i t schl, and Knuclson. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to present a ra-
tional and empirical viev.r of the Trinity. The procedure will 
be to state s ome definite criteria for such a view. Then 
the trinitarian idea s of Hegel, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, 
and Knudson will be discussed in the light of these criteria. 
Finally, an attempt will be made to present a conception of 
the Trinity that is consistent -v;ri t h the stated criteria. 
2. Criteria 
i. An empirica.l method. 
11All human lcnow·leclge begins, continues, and ends in 
18,3. 
i 1 exper ence. To obtain true religious knowledge all typ es of 
exp erience mus t be considered.. Religion is only one phase 
of our total experience and we cannot isolate it from the 
rest of our conscious life. The sincere searcher afte r truth 
can never refuse to consider any datum. 2 To satisfy this 
criterion the doctrine of the Trinity must be formulated in 
the light of all data that are related in any way to that 
doctrine. Scientific as well as non-scientific exp eriences 
must be considered. Every use must be made of the sciences 
of relie ion. We must take into consideration not only all 
of our O't·m va ried experiences but also the points of view 
and attitudes of other people, and even the objections 't·rhich 
others h ave to our conclusions.3 
ii. The coherence criterion. 
It is import ant that we use the empirical method in ob-
taining all of the information 't•Te can regarding the data of 
the doctrine of the Trinity but we cannot determine truth 
merely by obtaining informat ion. We must use some criterion 
to verify the truth of our informat ion and to test t h e con-
c ep tions i<lhich grov-r out of it. The coherence criterion is 
accepted here as a means for such testing. 
This criterion requires that an idea be self-consis.tent. 
It mus t also be consistent with all of t h e knm·m facts of ex-
perience ana. 'IIlith a ll other idea s held to be true by the mind 
1. Brightman, POR, 1. ,3. Brightman, POR, 33. 
2. DeVTolf, RRR, 197. 
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t hat i s appl ying the criterion. 1 Our idea s mus t link up with 
one another in ways tha t produce a definite end. Those not 
f ound t o connect with others in fur t h er ance of this end must 
b e dropped and others sought. 2 
Coherence is not merely consistency, h ovJever . It is a lso 
the search for an inclusive s ystem. Hence vl e must search for 
and 1 elcome new data and be willing to reverse p reviously 
~ held theories and to pos tulate new hypotheses.~ Coherence 
need s the emnirical method. Unl ess an idea is ba sed on the 
emp irical method it cannot b e ful ly coher ent. In applica tion 
coherence and empirical method will be used as one criterion, 
vJ"hich ~Jill be called the criterion of empirical coherence. 
iii. The values of the Trinity. 
Another criterion of a valid rational and emp irica l v i evr 
of the Trinity is that it p reserve the essential values of the 
hist or ical doctrine . It is not the pu1•pos e of t he dis s ert a-
tion to discuss or estimate the values of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. The desirability of t heir p r eserva tion is assumed. 
These values involve: (1) The reco gnition of a f atherl y re-
l at i onshi p between God and his children based on love. 4 
( 2 ) An account of t h e divine-human pers on, Jesus Christ.5 
(J) A descript ion of the Holy Spirit a s a divine p ower of God 
v.rhich has effects on man. 
1. Brightman, POR, 128. 
Cf. De,·lolf, RRR , 197. 
4. DeFolf , Art.(l945), 273. 
5. Scott, Art.(l945), 343. 
2. Dewey, LTI, llJ. 
3. De\I!Tolf, F.RR, 197. 
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3. Criticism of the presented views . 
'The vie't<JS presented in the foregoing chapters on Hegel, 
Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Knudson will now be discussed in 
the light of the criteria set forth in the precedint, . ~eot.ll:n:t;J .• 
The criteria will not be applied to the whole thought of 
the s e men but only to their ideas affect.ing the doctrine of 
the T,rini ty. 
1. Hegel's view. 
Hegel c ontributed much to the rational and empirical con-
ception of the Trinity. His insistence on the idea of a ra-
t i onal 't·.rorld, his emphasis on the importance of theologians 
accepting the methoo.s and truths of philosophy , and his re-
jection of external authority all helped to eliminate the ir-
rational and the unempirical from theological considerations. 
Hegel made a serious attempt to be empirically coherent. In 
his 'tvritings as a 't·lhole v,•e find that he considered nea rly all 
aspects of life. But 'tvhen he came to the systematic presenta-
tion of his thought he st r essed speculative reason to such a 
degree that he failed to give proper attention to some other 
areas of experience. This had some definite effect on his 
conception of the Trinity. It ,,ra s to him the rational notion 
of God. Hegel was int er ested in God "as He is in Himself." 
He wanted to show· t hat the Trinity is a rational truth which 
needs no support outside of reason. 1 He interpreted the 
1. \·lallace, LOH, 317; 
OF. Hegel, HOP, II, 383. 
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Trin fty in religious language but the relig ious content is 
lost in the speculative expression of t h e being of God. 
The Hegelian concept ion does not adequately represent the 
hi s torical convictions 1-.rhich led. to the original formulation 
of the doctrine , and it does not do justice to the mot ives 
from which it arose . It is not God. 11 as He is in Himself 11 
~.'lith ~>rhom the early Christians were c oncerned, but God as he 
1 
revealed himself in Christ and the Holy Spirit. Hegel fails 
to give adequate attention to the religious experience which 
\1-ras so imp ortant in the first formulation of the doctrine of 
the Trinity . 
Hegel 's concep tion of God the Fa ther is open to the same 
criticism as is his doct rine of the Trinity as a whol e. The 
conc eption of the fatherhood of God which came from the Old 
Testament, and vias developed by Jesus, is alien to Hegel 1 s 
p resentation. Mackintosh po ints out that in the controversy 
bet1veen the Hebrevl and the Greek ideas of God Hegel 1 s sym-
? pathies lay -v,rholly on the side of Hellenism.- This accounts 
for Hegel 's id.ea of God as 11 Pure Being. u3 He neglects the 
Hebre1.nr idea of the free and creative personality of Goc1. His 
monistic system could not properly include such a conception . 
He called C~d an absolute Person but he said that God is 
necessity. 4 He said that God is dependent upon the conscious-
ness of finite man for his o1vn self-consciousness.5 In Hegel 1 s 
1. Bro-vm , TMT, lL~. 4. Wallace, LOH, 274. 
2. Mackintosh, TNT, 110. 
3. \IJ'allace, LOH, 156. 
5. Hegel, POM, 176. 
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pantheism God is the whole of the process of the Trinity and 
so can logically depend on the consciousness of man in this 
way. , But such a conception does not satisfy the requirements 
of an empirically coherent doctrine of the Trinity. There 
is no place for a real sense of God's otherness and the in-
timate relationship of children to a father. 1 The idea of a 
loving creator also seems to be absent from Hegel's consider-
at ions. 
Hegel's view of the Son also suffers from the logical 
and speculative construction. Hegel has praise for the teach-
ings of Jesus but his main interest is in Jesus as a man, in 
l'Thom 'the unity of God anc1 man has appeared. 2 By overcoming 
the sensuous anc1 becoming purely spiritual Christ made it 
possible for God to be the concrete One, 11 as the one 1rV"ho has 
the other moment, His Son, in Himself."J A pantheistic system 
has some inevitable difficulties. Some of them can be seen 
in Hegel's view. He tried to allow for a freedom in man, but 
yet God ultimately ha s his 1.vay.!P Any system wvhich comprehends 
man vni.thin the notion of God must sacrifice the fellO't,rship 
bet't'reen God and man 1-.rhich is essential to a true conception 
of the doctrine of the Trinity~ The intimate relation be-
t1<reen Jesus and his heavenly father, ~vhich is evident in 
the Gbspels, is impossible in Hegel's system. 
1. Mackintosh, TMT, 111. J. Hegel, HOP, 15. 
2. Hegel, PSH, 328. 4. Wallace, LOH, 350. 
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Hegel's idea of the Holy Spirit gives more consideration 
to th
1
e historical ba ckgrouno_ and religious experience than is 
shm~m l in the othe r aspects of the Trinity. He fe,lloit.red Paul 1 s 
teaching in holding t hat t h e Holy Spirit was the spirit of 
Christ. (This idea will be cri ticized in a later sect ion .) 
His account of the activity of the Holy Sp irit in t he com-
munit~ shows a definite consideration for religious faith, 
I 
but "V.rhen he proceeds to his purely rational conception he 
leaves the relig ious considerations behind . The Holy Spirit 
bec omes the union of pure thought, the i nf init e , and its op-
positr, t he finite 1.1orld. It is the synthesis of his dialec-
tical triad. It may be self-cons istent, but it is not em-
p i ric fllly coherent. He used much of the trinitarian l anguage 
but he did not preserve the values of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 
ii. Schleiermacher 1 s view. 
Schleiermacher was convinced that a real unity can be 
d iscovered in Christian doctrine, and tha t each true doct rine 
acts and reacts on the others .1 His theory of religious know-
ledge, however, vms not conducll:ve to an empirical coherence. 
v·!hereas Hegel put f e eling at the very lo't·Je s t position in his 
consid erations, Schleiermacher considered it to be the most 
i mportant source of religious knowledge. 2 He had little use 
for Hegel' s type of relig i on of r eason. 11 He sa1-r in it but a 
1. Mackint osh, THT, 61. 2. Scllieiermacher , CF, 6-7. 
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faded image of real religion. The latter he f ound only in 
1 
the p0sitive or hi s torical religions." 
Schleiermacher did have a place for reason, however. He 
held that all Christian dogmas are supra-rational i n the sense 
in 1-vhich everything experiential is supra-rational. He traced 
all Christian dogma to an inner experienc e . It rests upon a 
given and lies outsia_e of the realm of reason. But he insisted 
that the expression of the relig ious ex:periences must be en-
2 tirely according to reason. Thus Schleierma.cher tried to 
put relig ious experience and rea son into two separate realms. 
It is possible to have experiences in which one or the other 
aspects might dominat e, but Sclueierma cher had a false con-
cep tion of personality. Our self-consciousness is not divided 
in t ha:t · w.ay. Reason must enter into our religious experience 
and our religious experience must be considered in our reason-
ing . vi e must vie1-.r our experience as a '\'.rhole. Reason cannot 
b e left dormant until called upon for a rational explanation 
of our fe elings. It must be active throughout the whole pro-
cess. Schleiermacher 1 s presentation, as a 'tvhole, shm.;s that 
in practice his reason was active in his whole experience. 
Schleiermacher 1 s emphasis on the religious experience had 
some definite effects upon his conception of the Trinity. He 
held that it is only through the f eeling of absolute dependence 
that ~vk can knovJ God. God is given to us in feeling in an 
1. Knudson, DOG, 120. 
2. Schleiermacher, CF, 67-68. 
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1 
original way. Therefore our only source of knm·;ledge about 
Goo. ~ s through religious experience. i'f e do not lr.nov-I God as 
he is in hims elf but only God as he is revealed. 2 This idea 
is sa tisfactory to the extent tha t a consid.eration of all 
data 11eads t o the conclusion that '\!IJe cannot l~now all tha t God 
is in himself. But Schleiermacher is not empirically co-
her-ent in holding that v.re can knovJ' nothing about Goa. except 
'\~That is revealed to us in r eligious exp erience. He did not 
give reason its proper pl a ce. Reason is not only helpful 
in expressing our religious eA~erience in a rational way. 
It can also d.raw· conclusions and. correlate data so as to ar-
rive at new truth and actually help to g~ide a person in 
his r eligious experience. 
Schleiermacher's c onception of the Holy Spirit as the 
Commqn Spirit in the chur ch is a good description of the ef-
fects of 'the Holy Spirit but it does not allm for a pov-rer 
of God acting upon the church from vriJchout. It is d. e) endent 
u pon the unifying spirit of the church for its power. This 
idea does not tak e adequate account of the Spirit of God which 
direc~ly affects t h e lives of people, a s witnessed by accounts 
in both the Old and the New Testaments. 
Schleiermacher's attempt to describe the Trinity has 
much in its favor with respect to our criteria, ho't<rever. He 
did not tak e· all data into account but he did introduce some 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 14, 17. 
2. Schleierrnacher , Art. ( 1835), VI, 61. 
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important considerations which help to make the doctr i ne more 
empirically coherent. His rejection of the idea of three 
persons in the Godhead ano_ the t't·m-nature idea of Christ wa s 
a definite advance from the irrationality of the orthodox view. 
He also made a distinct contribution in his revival and devel-
opment of the Sabelliun vie't•r of the Trinity. He eliminated 
some of the difficulti es in that view and presented it as a 
complete doctrine. His substitution of the idea of 11 mode 11 
for 11 p erson 11 in trinitarian consiclerations vras a definite im-
provement. And his idea of the abs olutely pm·rerful God-
consciousness in Jesus a s the basis for his divinity is an-
other important insight.1 But although the concept g ives a 
gooc1 basis for the divinity of Christ, Maclcintosh presents a 
valid criticism of Schleiermacher 1 s use of it. Schleiermacher 
is so vague regarding the God-consciousness that it doesn 1 t 
· z 
mean much for him to say that it \•ras in Christ. He o_id not 
g ive proper consideration to the idea of God as an active 
personality who does not 1~rai t to be found by man but v.rho 
comes to man p ersonal l y. Schleiermacher did not seem to 
conceive of such a personality in God. He held that God is 
kno~~ only through the efforts of man. 
iii. Rlt schl 1 s view. 
Ritschl's ~~~ regarding the Trinity contains some 
definite values but as a whole does not satisfy our criteria 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 387. 
2. Mackintosh, TMT, 97-98. 
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for a rational and empirical conception of the Trinity. His 
rejection of sp eculative rationalism as a means to obtain re-
lig icrms knmvledg e involves some difficulties with regard to 
empi~ical coherence. The fact that he did not absolutely re-
ject lmetaphysical or theoretical knowledge, but r a ther tried 
1 to limit it to a prescribed field, resulted in a position 
of dduble truth. This violates the unity of self-consciousness 
and Qf truth . It doesn't consider exnerience as in a total 
personal life. 2 
Although he wanted to avoid sp eculative reasoning in re-
lig iops know·ledge Ritschl by no means relied upon subjectivism. 
He s oiUght to avoid the subjective basis for religious truth, 
such as l~ve, feeling , my sticism, etc., by stressing the his-
toric~l revelation of J esus to the cornmunity.3 But he em-
1 
phasi~ed the community to the point of denying the individual 
B. truly religious experience. 4 The Holy Spirit was for him 
the cbmmon Sp irit in the church.5 This idea fails to recog-
nize the fact that the spirit in the community is derived 
from the religious exp erience of individuals. 
Ritschl 1 s conception of God is centered in the idea of 
t he lmve of God. This is the key to God's fatherhood. But 
in his stress on the community Ritschl seems almost to eli-
minate an inctividual relationship to God.6 Hovrever, he used 
the analo gy of God as the father of an adopted family of 
1. Ritschl, JAR, 203. 4. Ritschl, JAR, 34. 
5. Ritschl, IICR, 227. 
6. Ritschl, IICR, 184. 
2. Brightman, CRTR, 101-1- . 
3. Hitschl, J AR, 1. 
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children. 1 If this is meant to be at all analogous to a 
human l family life it must i mply an i mmediate personal rela-
[ -
tion y etwe en God and his ch ildren. But Ritschl 1 s emphasi s 
on the community is predominant. 
~lthough Ritschl emphas ized the Jesus of history we find 
that ~e wa s more i n tere s ted in Jesus as a form .or prototype 
of th~ communit y than in hi s teach ings and deeds. 2 This sh ows 
I 
a n inadequat e conception of t he New Testament. The Gospels 
certainly emphasize the p ersona1 'life and teachings of Jesus. 
I 
I 
Gne of t h e main weakn esses of Ritschl 1 s thou~ht on the 
I 
Trinity, as also in Schlei ermacher 1 s, was the lack of c onsider-
atlon 1of the idea of t h e self-revelation of God or the testi-
1 
mony of the Holy Spirit. Ritschl held that the only pos-
sible r evelation of God is through Jesus Christ.3 Thi s does 
I 
I 
not g~ve proper attention to the Old and New Testament testi-
1 
mony of i mmediate, individual r elationship bet"toreen individu-
als a rtd God. Ritschl loses much of the value of the doctrine 
I 
of thJ Trinity in this way , as well as of the pl a in teaching 
of Je sus on God as Fa t h er. 
I 
~it schl 1 s i cl. ea of value-judgments as the basis for deter-
mining the worth or divinit y of Jesus and the Holy Spirit is 
I 
of great importance. But, because of his separation of reli-
gious and theoretical knowlec1ge he could not make the best 
use of the idea . His emphasis on the community also put the 
l. Ritschl, JAR, 97-98. 
2. Ritschl, J.~t , 470. 
3. Ritschl , JAR, 212. 
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value-!judgrnent too much on a communit y basis rather than an 
indiv~dual. The conception itself, however, can be of grea t 
I 
use. We a ctually use t h is method whether we reali ze it or not. 
The important thing i s that we use the criterion of empirical 
I 
coher1nce for its b a sis. 
iv. Knud son 1 s view. 
*nudson 1 s doctrine of the Trirlit y more nearl y sat i sfies 
our c~iteria for a rational and empirical c onception of the 
Trinity t han did any of the positions discussed in the p re-
ceding sections . He discusses data fro m a wide area of life 
and c bnsiders the views o~ other t h i nke r s, including those 
I 
oppos~d to his m·m positions. HovJever, his idea of t h e re-
ligiof s apriori is not empirically coherent. Knudson holds 
to th~ autonomous validity of t h e religious exp er ience, a s 
I 
't·:ell e.s t h e scientific, the ethical, a nd the aesthetic ex-
I ~ 
periences, and says that they must be accepted as valid if 
I 
1 they 'do not contradict the la'\'78 of reason. He hold s tha t 
fait h! must be justified, but he fails to vie't"l the mind ano. 
I 
truth as a vlhole. 2 A religious exp erience may be apriori in 
I 
the ~ ense that it is innate, but it cannot be considered 
I 
a lone . All of the a spects of ex9erience must b e formed into 
I 
a unity of c onsciousness. 
In spite of Knudson 1 s idea of the -religious apriori his 
personal idealism provides an excellent philosophica l and 
1. Knudson, VRE, 175. 
2. Brightman, POR, 186. 
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t h eolog ical basis for his doctrine of the Trinity. The close 
aff i n ity bet"t·reen the Christian religious experience anc1 the 
philosophical and theolog ical truths of the typ e of personal 
idealism accepted by Knudson a s sures the preservation of the 
esseqtiel reli gious values of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
The idea of the personality of God, vJhich such personalism 
stres ses, is an excellent basis for the relig ious experience 
of i mmediate, personal relationship bet1-re en God and man out 
of which the doctrine of the Trinity has grmm. 
The conception of the real p ersonality of God has led to 
a r e jection of the idea of Plat onic substance. The conception 
of a !fundamental unitary substance, 1-vhich differentiates it-
self into three personal modes of being is not consistent 
-v.r i t h the ic1ea of p ersonality. Knuclson 1 s emph a sis on the 
personalistic approach to the Trinity ha s been an imnorta nt 
influence i n overcoming t h is mistaken conception of sub-
stanc1e and the irrational conception of the Tri nity that is 
b a sed on it. There can be no semiper sonal substance common 
t o e. number of persons and representing a more fundamental 
type 'of being . 11 All metaphysical reality is concrete or 
individual, and personality is its u~timate form. There is 
nothing more basal. ul 
LJ,. A rationa l and empii•ical cone ept ion of the Trinity 
i. A modalistic doc t rine. 
Schleiermacher ana. Ri tschl 1..rere imp ressed vvi t h the idea 
that v.re cannot knov-1 God as he is but only God as he is 
1. Knudson, DO R, 420 . 
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i 
: 1 
reveajled. -- Schleierrnacher emphasi zed_ this position to the 
I 
p oL1t f of saying that the Trinity has so exclusive a relation 
I 
I to m,n that, if men were to cease to exist, the T~init y would 
I 2 rp do tne same. -his idea was probably a reaction from the 
Hegelfian position that, through speculative rationalism, God 
I 
c an ~ e completely k.no'tro. 3 A consideration of all the data 
I -
' 
leacls' to the conclusion t hat vre can k nm., much about God but 
v.re c J nnot know him completely. God is a person and we lrnow 
him through his activity and the c onclusions that vle can 
reaso,nably drm-r from his activity. \ve are limited to what 
' 
I 
God c:hooses to reveal a nd to what man is able to r eceive. 
' 
The doctrine of the Trinity. is a statement '.in ··.t.heoretical 
terms; of the knOi·Jledg e that 1r1e h ave of God. The first chapter 
I 
of t~is dissertation shovlS that the orthodox vie1•r of t h e 
Trin~ty is basically irrational, and so must be rejected. 
I 
' 
It w~s seen that the modalistic conception of the Trinity 
' 
recei\ved early c ons ideration but 1-ras suppressed by ecclesi-
astic:a l authority. Later moctalistic views have nol-l been 
I 
cons ~dered and, although s ome features of each view fail to 
I 
meet :our criteria, the ba sic modalistic i dea of the Trinity 
I 
provels to be sound. After discussing the various approaches 
to the doctrine Knuctson ri ghtly states that for rational and 
. 4 
empir:ical thought the future lies vii th modal ism. 
1. Ri~schl, JAR, 212. 
2. Scpleiermacher, Art.(l835), VI, 52. 
J. Hegel, POR, III, 194-195. 
4. Kn~dson, BICT, 86. 
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The '\vord 11 mode 11 has not been clearly defin ed . i n Christian 
theoJ.! ogy. The Sabellians us eeL the "rord in connect ion 'tvi th 
I 
the ~rinity to explain the idea of three successive states of 
being in God. Hegel seems to have follo'\'Jed t h is idea in the 
three states or stages of being in the dialectic of the Tri-
1 
ni ty. Schleiermacher used thE! idea of modes in the sense of 
thre ~ distinct revelations of God in time. They were not 
God ds he is in hims elf but are revelations of God. Each 
mode ;wa s the ">vhol e Godhead revealed in a distinct 'ltray. Knud-
son eJccepted much the same use of t h e -vmrd. His ic1ea of God 
I 
as a ldivlne person p rovides a good basis for the c onception 
of t~ree modes of activity in God without sacrificing his 
! 
I 
uni ty
1
• 
ISchlei ermacher, Ritschl, and Knudson conceived of the 
modes ] of the Son and Holy Spirit as limited to the revelation 
of Gotl in J esus Christ and the process of Christian redemp-
1 
tion. Their conception of mode involves the idea of a way 
I 
or me~hod of revelation1 but it is limited to a historical 
portipn of God's activity. The view advocated here involves 
• I a .broader idea of mode . It stress es the way or method of God's 
I 
I revel~tions and includes his qCtivity throughout the whole 
history of man. 
The que s tion naturally arises as to v.rhether the modes of 
God 1 s I revelations can properly be callec1 11 persons 11 as they 
1. See 11 1Y1ode 11 in the Oxford~English Diet ionary. 
' 
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I 
have been traditionally callea.. Certainly they cannot be 
called 11 persons 11 in the usually accepted meaning of the -vmrd 
I 
if wJ still h old to a u nity in the p erson of God. Our re-
ligi9n must be basically monotheistic or "tve will sacrifice 
I 
our d
1
once_? t of the unity both of God and the world. All at-
temp t 'S to incorporate three cent ers of cons ciousness into 
the cioncept of the Godhead must be d e finitely rejected. 
The onJ.y reasonable alternativeiffito designate the modes 
as 11 p .ersons 11 in a special sense or else to drop the idea of 
oersons in connection with the distinctions in the Trinity 
anc1 u 1se the "t-mrd 11 mode 11 exclusively. This 'vas recognized 
as a problem at least as early as. Augustine and was discussed 
I 
I 
by Th~mas Aquinas . Thomas ex:olained that the Latin word 
personae~as used for characters in a drama or for dignitaries 
and d~ es not necessarily signify a center of consciousness.l 
Such p. special use of the vmrd in connection vJ ith the Trinity 
is an i acc eptable solution, if it is definitely understood in 
I 
that s ense. But as long as the word is used, either in Latin 
I 
or English, most p eople vlill accept it in its common usag e. 
I 
It is 1 advisable to change gradually from this use of the \,rord 
I 
11 p er·sbn 11 and. to use the word 11 mocle. 11 Only through the elimina-
tion of the c onfusion c aused from the use the "t·lord 11 person 11 
in co~nection with the distinctions in the Trinity can a 
rat ional ana_ emp irical conception be a chieved generally. 
1. Summa Theol., Q.29, Art.J. 
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ii. God the Father. 
One of ihe 't•Jays in '\.Vhich God reveals hims elf to man is 
through his creative and sustaining activity in the uorld. 
God has been i mmanent in his world throughout its whole his-
tory. His activity is evident and reveals some definite 
truths rega rding him. Through this mode of revelation we 
learn t hat God is a divine Person. A rational and empiri cal 
a pproach to the world brings a conviction tha t there are cer-
tain ends to God's creation. Goals are meaningless without 
a consciousness. Ends and p ersonal consciousne s s imply p sy-
chological elements such as willing and l{nm.ving . li e see that 
I 
p ersonality as applied to God must mean more or less what 1ve 
unders t and by the term v-.rhen applied to ourselves. This con-
ce ::,;tibn makes the f a therhood of God meaningful. 1 Unless God 
is a conscious person he cannot have a f a therly attitude 
I 
t ov-rarcil his creatures. As a reEll p erson he can perform the 
spiritual functions which fat herhood implies, such as loving , 
desiring , and pl a nning. 
\tlhen 't·J'e reali ze the truth about t h e p ersonality of God 
we have a basis for fellOi·lShip '\•Ji th him. This fel lowship is 
p ossibl e :for all mank i nd but ·- ,ve have a sp ecial example of 1 t 
in Je sus Christ. Others have ..L. al k ed about God as a f ather 
but Jesus had such an intimate and complete relat i on to God 
that he called him not m:erely 11 the 11 father but 11 my 11 f a ther. 
1. See Kimclson~- . DOG, 285-324. 
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This is a relation to v-;rhich eaeh of us can attain if \ve follow 
I the exa mnle of Jesus. I -· 
I 
I 
iii. God the Son. 
God the Son is .God revealed through mankind. in general 
and in Jesus Christ in particular. This conception of the Son 
stresses the biblical idea of man as mad e in the imag e of 
I 
God. 1 Knudson :points out that both Protestant and Roman 
Catholip t eaching hold to the godlilc eness of the ideal man. 
They h a ve not onl y affirmeo_ the s up reme 't·mrth of the human 
soul but h ave g r ounded it in t~e supreme likeness of ma n to 
God. 1 Man, ln his essential being , ,,;as made in the image of 
Goc1, knd hence shares in the absolute 't·mrth that i·:e attribute 
I 
t o Goa.2 
I 
i'he biblica l v.rriters and Christian theologians Y.Tere 1-vrong, 
hm·1ev~r, in attributing a perfection or io.eal to a 11 first man. 11 
The ·g:>4ike qualities in man are potentialities "t"lhich can be 
I 
develpped to varying degrees in all mankinCl.. God not only 
created man 1r1i t h the p oten tial:i ty to reflect his likeness but 
I 
he also gave man a free will, which implies responsibility 
to a ttain godlik eness. Schlei ermacher empha sized the f a ct 
tha t pert a in men 1tJill rise above the circle i n v-1hich they live 
as a result of the pow·er of d.evelo:pment \vhich resides in our 
human ! n a ture. It is a pm.;ei' 111]'hich exp resses itself in par-
ticular men at p a rticular p oints a ccording to laws which, if 
l • Genes is 1 : 2 7 • 
2. Knudson, DOR, 85. 
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hidden from us, are neverthele s s of divine arrangement.l Only 
I in th+.s way can vve account for human progress. Ri t schl pointed 
i 
I 
out t hat the OlcL Testament prophets stood out above all others 
I 
of their day and w·ere accounted. the instruments or organs of 
I 
the s l lf-revelation of God. 2 It involves a placing of our 
indep~ncLent :p er sonalit y into a close relationship to God. 
I 
fod is revealed to some extent in the life of every per-
i 
son. As the human potentialities are developed a person be-
comes 1more godlik e, and is more fully a revelation of God . 
I 
Schle~ermache r vra s right in say-ing that this same process 
appliect also to Christ. 3 Jesus "tvas born as other men and 
I develpped as others do. Yet the potentialities which are 
I developed partial l y in ev ery man beca me fully developed in 
him. As a person becomes more godlike a God-consciousness 
comes j into one's self-consciousness. The s elf-consciousness 
is mo r e and more depeno.ent upon the Goo.-consciousness. In 
Jesus i v.re find an absolutely pm<Ierful God-consciousness, and 
I 
I . hence a veri table existence of God in him. The follo-v1ers of 
Jesus ! became aw-are of t h is e.nd Cl.eveloped a faith in him that 
amount ed to a faith in God. Jesus has the value of God for 
those who put their trust in him. 
In Jesus, the ideal man, we see God perfectly revealed. 
The total life of Jesus wa s an example of the possibilities 
of human life. Jesus "t"i'a s the successful fulfillment of God 1 s 
1' . Schleiermacher, CF, 63. 
2. Ritschl, J AR , 435. 
3. Schleiermacher, CF, 63-64. 
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revellation through huma n nature. This moc:Le of revela tion 
I 
I 
must lnot be c onsidered. as li:mlted to the life of Jesus, ho"ttl-
1 ' ever.l The re nave been, and p roba bly i<Vill be, othe r great 
godl ~ke lives through vJ"hich God is highly revealed. Th e mode 
I 
shou~d be consid ered as a meth od of revelation and not any 
j 
one 1life or the tot al lives of mank ind. A mode as such can-
not Jave a self-consciousness. But Jesus should be held in 
a didtinctive pl a ce in relation to this mode. The great 
live s before him s e em to have been preparing the way for him. 
The g rea t live s since the time of Jesus seem to reflect h is 
glor~ and to find strength in him. He was the epi t ome of 
the godlik eness in human nature and vJe can reasonably call 
i 
I 
him the Son of Gocl. 
! 
I 
j iv. God the Holy Spirit. 
I 
:The idea of the Holy Sp irit as the common Suirlt of the 
I 
Churc~ , held by Schleiermacher and Ritschl, must be rejected. 
I 
It doles not account for the p 01.rer from 1-vi thout the.t acts 
u p on lthe incLi Yidual s in the church. Th e idea of t h e Hol y 
I 
Sp iri[t as the s p irit of Christ is also ina dequate. There is 
a eloise connection bet1ve en the t wo but t h ey must be distin-
guisbied. The Holy .Sp irit is the .Spirit of God and has b e en 
I 
active throughout t h e 1-.rhole history of man. It is an active 
p ovJerl 1~hich r eaches into the live s of men vlhenever a life is 
I 
opened to it. God 11Jas not satisfied ·to create man 1-vith the 
p otentiality to be godlike~ He has also been a ctive in 
20.3. 
aiding man to d evelop that potentiality. As man is reaching 
I 
up to I Goct , so also is God reaching down to man through his 
Snirit. The Old Testament gives us too much evidence of this ~ I 
mode ?f God's act i vity to p erm:Lt its being i gnored . It is 
through the Holy Spirit t hat man has his clos est l'elationship 
to God . 
I Although the Spirit of God was active throughout the lihole 
histo~y of man its act i vit y was greatly increased t hrough the 
influence of t h e life and spirit of Christ in the wor ld. 
I 
Th e Snirit waits for a rec eptive life. The dynamic of the 
T 
Chrisr i an life ana. message developed a fait h in t h e Chris-
tian communit y that provided a great field of activity for 
I 
the sbi r i t of Gocl. The po't'rer of the Spirit became so evi-
I 
dent f ha t it was called 
gruit ~ in the f a ct that 
the Holy Spirit. There is no incon-
the Holy Spirit became clo s ely as soci-
at ed 1in the minds of the people 1-ri t h the spirit of Christ. 
I 
It w~s .t he Holy Spirit tha t entered into the life of Jesus to 
I 
p rovide the God-consciousness in him. The God-consciousness 
I 
in Jesus ·would naturally have a close affinity to the Holy 
Spiri1t. But we must not limit our conception of this mode 
to t~e spirit of Christ or to the Spiri t in Christ, nor even 
to the proc ess of Christian r edemption a s a ltvhole. God has 
I 
a lways been active in h i s efforts to reach man through the 
Spi r 1t. It 1 s approp ria te, ho\<eVe r, t hat we call God 1 s Spirit 
the "Holy Spirit 11 because it b.as been in the Christian experi-
I 
ence that the Spirit has had its greatest significance, and 
tha t is the Christian name for this mode of God's activity. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS. 
P-· The concept of the Trinity grO\,rs out of a genuine 
religious exp erience which started v.rith the original Chris-
tian disciples and ha s continued down through Christian 
histojr y. Attempts to express t his concept in the form of a 
theoJ.Jogical doctrine have occupied considerable attention 
I 
and ~ave aroused much c ontroversy. There were various 
opin~ons regarding the nature of the Trinity which h eld 11<ride 
supp~rt in early trinitarian thought. A study of the records 
pert, ining to t h is cont r oversy shows that the orthodox view 
of the Trinity resulted from a false interpretation of Scrip-
1 . 
ture 1and an incorrect concept of substance. Once the doc-
triny was accepted by the chm:-ch councils it was protected 
by a~ ecclesiasticism "tvhich made all opposition to the viev-r 
ineffective. Even in our day it enjoys a 1vell-entrenchec1 
I 
position which is due more to ecclesiastical support than 
I 
to its own merit. 
I The doctrine of the Trinity should receive a thorough-
going restudy 1:ry Christian scholars. There should be a criti-
cal reconstruction conducted on the basis of the best 
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techn~aues of scientific research and with the sole aim of 
arriv~~g at the truth. The thought not only of early Chris-
tiani~y but of the whole histo:ry of the Christian Church should 
be co psidered. Not only the orthodox view but all points of 
vie"t>r bh01.J~d be included. 
I 
~he re sul ts of this restudy should b e made available to 
the o~'"'clinary Christian minis ter and l ayman. Christians in 
i 
g ener
1
al need to be sh O"tm tha t they do not have to accept a n 
I 
irra t /iona.l p osition to p reserV'e the essential values of the 
doctrii n e of the Trinity. 
/2. The modalistic concep tion of the Trinity h a s received 
serio/1us consideration throughout much of the hi s tory of Chris-
tian~ty. Some of the earl iest Christian thinkers exnressed 
I 
idea~ vJhi ch were at least in harmony 't•ri th modalism. Before 
I the .t ,i rne v1hen the church c ouncils decided on an 11 accepted 11 
vievJ tmodalism had received c ons iderable attention and hact a 
rath~r 't'Videspread acceptance for a 1.;hile. Had trinitarian 
t h ought not be en stifled b y the ecclesiasticism of the Roman 
Church, modalism vmuld und oubtedly have received more a tten-
tion [ancl_ development than it d id and vrould have had more in-
fl u el')ce in Christ ian t h ought . The orthodox vie't'T 'tvas pro-
tected by the church , hov-.rever, and all opposition 11as effec-
tive]y cut off. This meant that modalism 1'1Ta s left in its 
I 
early, undevelop ed stage. 
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It v-Jas not until the Enlightenment in the 1 8th century 
that imoctalism a gain received serious c onsideration. itlhen 
I 
Chris!tia n s s ought for a r a t i onal a nd empirica l expl a nation of 
I 
the Trinity t h ey inevitably turned to a form of modalism. 
Thi s required a b r eak 1·:.r i th church auth ority , for it had c on-
tinuJd t o lend support to t he orthodox or traditional vievr. 
There has been cons iderable modalistic trinitarian thought in 
I mo de~n t h eolo gy , in s p ite of the p rivileg ed place t hat the 
orthd
1
dox vie1·.r has continued to hold. Schleiermacher and 
Rits9hl, the mo st important ni.neteenth-c entury Prot esta nt 
theoJ.l og ians, ~~rere the most influentia l thinkers to support 
moda~ ism, and many of their follm.".'"ers rrere also a ttra cted to 
this lview. Recent the ologians have been more a nd more in-
fluenced by t h e p ersonalistic metaphysics, wi th its r at ional 
a na. Jmpirical c oncep tion of the divine u nity. Only some form I - -
o f mdclified moda l ism c a n be ac~cepte.bl e in such a vie\v. Knudson 
is n~obabl y ri ght in s aying : 
~ I There can be littl e cl oubt tha t the future lies 1-..ri th 
modalism and a strictly p ersona l and intelligible 
concep tion of the cl.ivine unit y rather tha n I~~Jith 
traditional tri theism or sub-personal a n o_ myst ify-
ing c onceptions of t he unity of the Godhead.l 
J. The historic modalistic concept ions of the Trinity 
conta in significant c ontribut i ons but fail to s at isfy the 
criteria for a r a tional and empirical vievJ . Their limita tions 
as ,.,11 as their positive cont ribu tions a re a guide in formu-
1. K~udson, BICT, 86. 
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lating a rational and. empirical concep tion of the Trinity. 
4. To form an empirically coheren t vie"Vl of the Trinity 
it is. necessary to Cl.efine the moctes of revelat ion so a s to 
i nclude God's activity throughout t h e v/hole h i s tory of man. 
The modes cannot be limited to any one person or p eriod of 
time . A mode is a 1·ray or methoo_ of revelat ion and must in-
e l ude all of the activity of GDd that f alls under that mode. 
The Son is God revealed in human nature. Ther e is a godlik e-
ness in all men, but in Jesus we find a p erf ect God-con s cious-
ne ss , l\rhich is a veritable presence of God in him. This con-
cep tion ad equat ely preserves the idea of the divinity of Jesus. 
The Hol y Spirit is the power of God which reaches from God to 
man. It has received sp ecial significance in the Christian 
c omm'Linity but h a s been active in every period of man's h istory. 
Man finds an immediate experience of God through the Holy 
Snirit. This modalistic conception of the Trinity is rational 
- I 
and emp i r ical a no_ still preserves the essential religious 
va lue s of the hi s torical doctrine of the Trinit y . 
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ABSTRACT 
!The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the 
position of t h e early Christian writings regarding the Trinity, 
! 
i to consider some developments in modalistic thought regard-
ing the Trinity, and to p resent a r a tional and emp irical vie1.r 
of t h e Trinity. The v.rord 11 moCLalism 11 will be used r a ther than 
11 Sab ~llianism 11 because it is a broader conception and in-
1 clude, s certa in modificationsof ·Sabellianis m. 
i 
The testimony of the Christian writings of the first and 
I 
sec011d centuries gives ample v-ritness to the religious experi-
ence lfro m 't'Thich the doc t rine of the Trinity springs, but this 
test ~,mony cannot be used c onclusively in support of one view 
~ t J e Trinity over agains t another. "~en speculation on the 
I 
T J'in~ty did start it r esulted in considerable controversy. 
One J roup insisted on the complete equality of the Father, 
Son ahd Holy Spirit to assure the divinity of Jesus . Others 
insis~ ed on a subordination of the Son ana. Holy Spirit to the 
person of the Father to preserve monotheism. Sabellius advo-
cated a modalistic view, not only to preserve monotheism but 
to as!sure the true divinity of Jesus as well. The church 
councils chose the first of these views and established an 
orthodox view. The position is based on an incorrect 
215. 
int erpretation of the New Testament and a mistak en concep tion 
of substance. Ecclesiastical support made it the accep ted 
view~ ho1'rever, and effectivel y elimine.ted all opposition. 
The Protestant reformers adopted t h is view· and it has con-
' 
tinu~d to be the gener all y accepted d octrine of the Trinity. 
It t'ras n ot until the Enlightenment in the 18th century 
t hat the orthodox view of the Trin it y rec eived any serious 
opposition. Hegel stres s ed a r a tional approach to God and 
explained the Trinit y in terms of his dialectical process. 
The thesis is God a s the Absolut e , or the Idea . This would 
be G·od the Father. Th e antithesis is t h e Other '\'rhich God 
distinguishes from himself. This 't•JOUld be the Son. The 
s ynthesis is t hat which proceeds out of a union of t h e ttvo. 
This
1
would be God as Spirit. Hegel made a valuable contri-
bution by rejecting ext ernal authorit y in t heology and by 
insisting that theology consider the t ruths adva nced by 
phil<Dsophy. 
Schlei errnacher presented the idea that the feel i ng of 
absolute d.ependence, expressing i t self as a consciousness of 
Go d. , is the true b a sis of determining relig ious truth. He 
insisted, however, that these f eelings must have a rati onal 
present ation. He advocated a modifi ed Sabellian or modalistic 
vie'tv 1 of the Trinity. He said that the Trinity c onsists of 
thre1 modes of revelation of God to man, vJ'hich took pl a ce in 
time. Each is a revela tion of the sam e Godhead, which sacri-
flees none of its unit y in i t s revelations. God the Fa ther 
216. 
is Go,d revealed to man through the creation. God the Son is 
God revealed to man in the person of Jesus Christ, whose 
complete God-consciousness 1-ras a veri table existence of God 
in him. Go d the Holy Spirit is God revealed as t h e common 
Spirit of the Christian Church. These three modes of revela-
tion h ave no independent personality nor are they eternal dis-
tinctions in God. They are rather three distinct modes of 
revelation "t,rhich man has seen in the unity of God. 
Ritschl 1 s theory of relig ious knowledge is marked by 
his rejection of t h e speculative and mystical approaches and 
his a dvocacy of indep endent relig i ous value-judgments. He 
saio_ t hat we should b a se our l"-no-v;ledg e of CTod and Christ only 
in their "iiirorth for us and not on any t h eoretical knmdeo.ge of 
t h eir nature. To eliminate the purely subjective and the 
p urely rational in making relig ious value-judgments Ritschl 
advocateo. a strong emphasis on the biblical and t h e historical. 
He said that Christian doctrine must be based on t h e vie\·;point 
I 
of t h e redeemed community of Christ. He b a sed his idea of 
God the Fa ther on v-rhat God does for the Christian Community. 
Man i s t h e object of God 1 s love. Goo. the Son is based on 
vrha t Christ does for us. Through him Christians are brougb:t 
into the same fello1·!s h ip with God that Jesus enjoyed. Thus 
"t•le form a reli g ious value-judgment to the effect that Jesus 
h a s the value of God for us. God as Holy Spirit is the common 
Spirit of t h e Church through whic~ the Christian k nm-.rledge of 
God is the same as God 1 s knm·;ledg e of himself. Thus a value-
217. 
judgrn,ent is formed from i•rhat the Holy Spirit does for our sal-
I 
I 
vati9n. It has its place in the eternal Godhead , the same 
I 
as t :rie Son, as an object of the divine mi nd and v:ill . 
I 
~ Knudson stresses the 
one judge of truth in 
importance of reason and says that 
t h e b oth philosophy and theology is 
I 
the illumined human mind. Faith, however, provides us with 
I 
a rational i•rorld, iiithout vlhich reason could not operate. 
! 
I His personalistic philosophy g ives strong support to his the-
ology in attributing personality to God . God is a fre e , 
I 
I intelligent ag ent whose unity does not consist i n any simpli-
city of being or substance, but in consciousness itself. Per-
sona~ ity is t h e ultimate form of reality and the p rinciple 
I 
I 
b y w~ich all else is explained. He rejects the idea of three 
I indenendent nersons i n a Trinity a s tri theism ancl. irrat i onal. 
-1 -
God ~ust be considered as a person and as truly unitary. 
This 'results i n a modif :i.ed Sabellianism or modal ism. God 
is d~ scribed a s act:i.ve in three fundament al modes of activity. 
I God yhe Father is God's activi ty as self-sacrificing love. 
God a. s Son is God revealed through the life a nd God-consciousness 
I 
I 
of J ¢sus, ·v1hich vras truly a presence of God in him. God as 
I 
the Holy Spirit is the immediate experience of God as a 
sanctifying and redeeming pm·;er in human life. It is a mani-
fest 4tion of God. 
A rational and empirical vie1nr of the Trinity must satisfy 
i t h e criteria of em9 irical coherency. It must also preserve 
t h e essential values of the doctrine of the Trinity. Hegel 1 s 
21 8 . 
vie1r1 is a logical, speculative idea which fails to g ive 
proper consideration to the relig ious experience on which the 
doctrine of the Trinity is based. In stressing the relig ious 
feelimg of absolute depenc1ence Schleiermacher did not a de-
quately consider the unity of p ersonality and experience. 
He held that relig i ous experience must have a rational expres-
sion 1but he gave no place to reason as a source of rel~gious 
knmdedge. Rits chl 1 s separation of theoretical and relig ious 
knowledge l ed to a position of double truth, vThich violates 
the unity of self-consciousness anct of truth . He stressed 
the community to the detriment of individual relig ious ex-
p erience. In Knudson's idea of the religious apriori the 
minc1 and truth a re not vie1ved as a 1-:hole. But his personal-
istic c onception of God is ~ sound basis f or a modalistic 
view of the Trinity . Howeve~, his idea of the Son does not 
adequately consider God 's act ivity outside of the Christian 
revelation. 
!n an empirically coherent doctrine of the Trinity a 
mode must be defined as a way or method of God 1 s revelation. 
It must include God. 1 s activity throughout the entire history 
of man and not be limited to one person or one period. The 
Son is God revealed in human nature. There is a godlike-
ness / in all men , but in Jesus we have a perfect God- conscious-
ness! whi ch is a veritable presence of God in him. Thus the 
ide~ of the divinity of J esus is preserved. The Holy Spirit 
is the pmver of God \I'Ihich reaches do"m to man . It received 
219. 
spec~al significance in the Christian Community but ha s been 
i 
a means of immediate exp erience of God throughout all of man's 
hist bry. 
I Conclusions: (1) The concept of the Trinity grows out 
of a [ genuine religious exp erience which started l•Ji th the 
I 
orig~nal Christian disciples and has cont :lnue<1 through Chris-
' 
tian l history. Attempts t o interpret this experience in the 
form! of a doctrine have resulted in much controversy. A 
I 
vie't-v, describing the Trinity as three equal persons vms ac-
dept bd by 
pretkt ion 
t he church councils. It v-ras baseo_ on a false inter-
- I 
of Scripture and an incorrect concept of substance 
I 
and b ersonality. Once it 1..ras accepted by the church councils 
r 
I 
it 1vk.s protected b y an ecclesiasticism which made all oppo-
! 
i 
siti~n ineffective. That view still enjoys a well entrenched 
I 
i posi]t i on 't.vhich is due more to ecclesiastical support than 
"- · L it uo l iGs ov-m mer . 
I 
I 
! The d.octrine of the Trinity shoulo_ receive a thorougll-
! 
I 
goin~ restudy. The best methods of research and critical 
rec onst r uction should be 
obje bt should be only to 
be mlde availabl~ to all 
used and all data included. The 
find the truth. The r esults should 
Christians. 
1 (2) The modalistic conception of the Trinity preserves 
the r alues of the historic doctrine and eliminates the ir-
rationality of the orthodox view. It has had spokesmen 
thro~ghout most of Christian history and 'tvould ~ve receiyed 
an earli er development had it not been ecclesiastically 
220. 
suppressed. Modern rational and empirica l t h ought is inclined 
toY.rarcl a modalistic view of the Trinity. 
I 
I (J) The historic modalistic conceptions of the Trinity all 
ma de progres s to"t.v.q,rd a rational ana_ emp i rical view but each of 
these views pr esents difficulties. However, both their limita-
tions a ncl positive contributions a re a guide in fo rmulat ing a 
rational and emp irical conception of the Trinit y . 
( Lr ) An empirically coherent modalis tic ~'J osi t ion rege.rding 
the Tri n it y is poss ible. To at t a in such a position a mode must 
be defined broadly a s a way or method of revelation. The Son 
I 
i s Goc1 revealed in human na ture. There is a godlikeness in all 
men, but in Jesus we find a perfect God-cons ciousness , v.rhich is 
a ver itable p resence of God in him. Thus t h e idea of the divin-
1 
i t y of Jesus is preserved.. The Holy Spirit is the i mmeCI. iate 
I 
exp erience of God reaching do~1 to man. It has been active 
throughout the history of man. This doctrine of the Trinity is 
r at i onal a nd emu i ri cal and preserves the essential values of 
the historic teaching . 
221 . 
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